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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
WELL CALCULATED AND INTENDED TO DECEIVE: COUNTERFEITING AND
POLICING ALONG THE OHIO AND MISSISIPPI RIVERS DURING THE MIDNINETEENTH CENTURY
by
Joseph Carlos Marin
Florida International University, 2020
Miami, Florida
Professor Kirsten Wood, Major Professor
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the United States lacked a national
currency and individual states chartered banks that issued much needed and sought after
paper currency into their local economies. Counterfeiters, men and women who created
and passed fake currency, exploited the bewildering array of paper money and the chaotic
financial world of the nineteenth century United States to obtain goods through
illegitimate means. Historians have already explored the presence of counterfeiting in the
colonial United States and in the New England States, including its existence along the
nation’s border with Canada during the nineteenth century. This dissertation argues that
counterfeiters operated along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers and their presence reveals
insights into the region’s counterfeiting underworld, the urban and rural efforts to deter
counterfeiting, the power of nineteenth-century U.S. cities, and the infrastructural power
of the American state. Through newspapers, penitentiary reports, judicial records,
pardons, and criminal confessionals, the dissertation argues that the counterfeiting
networks found along the Ohio and Mississippi rivers from the 1840s, until the outbreak

vi

of the American Civil War in 1861, rivaled the scope and scale of counterfeiting found in
the New England States. The dissertation also reveals the previously unknown efforts of
the urban and rural communities along the rivers to police counterfeiting through judicial
and vigilante means. In particular, the dissertation argues that the professional police
forces in Cincinnati and New Orleans allowed the state to effectively police
counterfeiting in the region. In turn, the lack of counterfeiting’s consistent punishment in
the rural areas along the Mississippi River resulted in the use of violence and vigilantism
to rid the area of counterfeiting. Through its reconstruction of counterfeiting and policing
along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, the dissertation argues that counterfeiters
participated in an underground capitalist economy that knit the North, Midwest, and
South into a shadow economy that urban police and rural vigilantes attempted to destroy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Well Calculated and Intended to Deceive: Counterfeiting and Policing Along the
Ohio and Mississippi Rivers

In January 1844, New Orleans police arrested Bill Nesbitt in a coffee house and
found sixty thousand dollars worth of counterfeit money in his room.1 In the trunk, the
officers found counterfeit ten-dollar bills on the State Bank of Missouri and the Northern
Bank of Kentucky, two-dollar bills on the Hamilton Bank of Ohio, located near
Cincinnati, two-dollar bills on the First Municipality Bank of New Orleans, and onedollar bills on the City Bank of New Orleans and the Bank of Louisville.2 The police
gathered the counterfeit money for evidence in the upcoming trial of Bill Nesbitt and his
two accomplices, Henry Barvec and Vincent Clark. While the counterfeit money
provided a New Orleans court with key evidence of the men’s guilt, the state gained
additional insight into the counterfeiting operation from Clark, who turned state’s witness
and testified against his partners in court. With Clark’s testimony and the captured
counterfeit money as evidence, the court convicted the men of counterfeiting. The court
sentenced Barvec and Nesbitt to prison, while Louisiana’s Attorney General rewarded
Clark for his testimony by releasing him from prison. Clark left the courtroom free to

1

“Counterfeiters,” Democratic Standard, February 13 1844. From the Library of Congress, Chronicling
America: Historic American Newspapers site (https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83035312/184402-13/ed-1/seq-1/).

2

“Money Market, The New York Herald, February 4 1844. From the Library of Congress, Chronicling
America: Historic American Newspapers site (https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030313/184402-04/ed-1/seq-3/).

1

pursue whatever new ventures his heart desired.3 It turned out that Clark desired to return
to New Orleans’ counterfeiting underworld. Barely nine months passed before New
Orleans police once again arrested Vincent Clark and found a large quantity of
counterfeit bank bills and bonds in his possession. Before the state could try Clark for his
crimes, he passed away and Louisiana closed its case.4
Ten years later, in the fall of 1854, Cincinnati police travelled to Madison,
Indiana, a small town on the Ohio River, where they arrested William Haydon, his wife
Mary Jane, and their partner, William Boyd, on suspicion of counterfeiting.5 When the
police searched the Haydon’s property, they found counterfeit twenty-dollar bills on the
Bank of Tennessee, counterfeit ten-dollar bills on the Southern Bank of Kentucky, and
counterfeit one-dollar bills on the Farmers’ Bank of Kentucky.6 The police also found on
the Haydon’s property a key piece of evidence for making counterfeit money: the
banknote plates needed to create the fake one and ten-dollar bills on the Southern Bank of
Kentucky. The officers noted the high quality of the counterfeit notes on the Southern
Bank of Kentucky, which the group achieved by using the plate to create nearly identical

3

“Commercial and Money Matters,” New York Daily Tribune, October 14, 1844. From the Library of
Congress, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers site
(https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030213/1844-10-14/ed-1/seq-2/).

4

Ibid.

5

“Descent Upon a Gang of Counterfeiters by Cincinnati Officers,” Eaton Democrat, November 2, 1854.
From the Library of Congress, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers site
(https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84028570/1854-11-02/ed-1/seq-2/).

6

Ibid.

2

notes.7 The police’s discovery and likely destruction of the plates allowed them to put a
permanent end to this particular group of counterfeiters.
Although the above examples occurred years and thousands of miles apart, the
extensive economic, geographical, and policing changes that characterized the
nineteenth-century United States created ideal conditions for counterfeiting to take hold
across the nation during the first sixty five years of the nineteenth century. When the
charter for the Second Bank of the United States expired in 1836, the federal government,
in regards to the nation’s currency supply, effectively ceded its role in the nation’s
banking system to the states. As a result, states rushed to fill the void by chartering their
own banks and granting them the right to create and issue paper currency into their
economies.8 In 1837, the United States Supreme Court upheld the right for state banks to
7

“Descent Upon a Gang of Counterfeiters by Cincinnati Officers,” Eaton Democrat, November 2, 1854.
From the Library of Congress, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers site
(https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84028570/1854-11-02/ed-1/seq-2/).

8

Hoffman, Susan. Politics and Banking: Ideas, Public Policy, and the Creation of Financial Institutions.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pg. 71. For an overview of state banking during the
nineteenth-century United States see: Howard, Bodenhorn. State Banking in Early America: A New
Economic History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Bodenhorn explores the regional
differences in the United State’s banking structures in order to explore the connections between financial
and economic development. In regards to banking in the South, Bodenhorn notes that small denomination
banknotes were important in a specie short, heavily commercialized economy. Bodenhorn also notes that
banks in the South and West invested heavily public works projects like roads, canals, and dams. Finally,
unlike banks in the North, some southern states heavily regulated their banks. Bodenhorn concludes that
there was no universal banking policies that a region in the United States could follow that would guarantee
economic success. Rather, state’s needed to adopt flexible banking policies that reduced the risk of
potential harm on its people. While Bodenhorn concludes that a unifying economic police did not
guarantee success in the nineteenth-century United States, he notes in A History of Banking in Antebellum
America: Financial Markets and Economic Development in an Era of Nation Building, the importance of
banks as vanguards of economic growth and development. Bodenhorn believes that through banknotes and
credit, banks acted as intermediaries between savers and investors that pushed the economy to grow and
that the majority of banks were beneficial to the development of the United State’s economy during the
nineteenth century. Bodenhorn notes that the states that had more banks and other financial institutions
experienced quicker economic growth than the states that lacked these institutions. See: Bodenhorn,
Howard. A History of Banking in Antebellum America: Financial Markets and Economic Development in
an Era of Nation Building. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2000. In Banking in the American
South, from the Age of Jackson to the Reconstruction, Larry Schweikart argues that banks in the South
followed one of two broader patterns of economic development. Some banks in the South followed free

3

issue their own paper currencies and state’s chartered banks en masse.9 In exchange for
banking privileges, chartered banks agreed to provide states with access to lines of credit
and/or they agreed to help finance the construction of projects such roads, canals, and
dams.10 State banks issued lines of credit to corporations, entrepreneurs, farmers, and
everyday people. Bank’s roles in issuing paper money, providing lines of credit, and
financing public works projects, contributed to the growth of capitalism across the United
States during the nineteenth century. Paper currency knit the Deep South to the
commercial markets in the Midwest and to banks in the Northeast. Roads, canals, and an
increasingly expansive rail system carried goods from the South to markets across the
United States. The explosion of state banknotes, when combined with American’s
increasing ease in conducting businesses with strangers and the proliferation of travel

market concepts while others fell under high levels of state control and planning. Schweikart believes that
by looking at how and why the Old South (Georgia, Louisiana, Virginia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina) generally allowed free competition while the New South (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, and
Mississippi) favored tighter state control over their banks, can help explain some of the political mysteries
of the period. One of the “political mysteries” that Schweikart attempts to address is to explain why the
Democrats of the period who supported the “common man” favored banking policies that stunted the
common man’s access to social and economic success. See: Schweikart, Larry. Banking in the American
South, from the Age of Jackson to the Reconstruction, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1987.
9

Hammond, Bray. Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957, pg. 567

10

For example, the 1833 charter for the Citizens’ Bank of Louisiana specified that the bank must provide
Louisiana access to lines of credit in the amount of five hundred thousand dollars. The charter also granted
the bank the right to establish a railroad north of New Orleans. See: Brusle, G.: The Charter of the
Citizens’ Bank of Louisiana, Conferred by the Legislature of Louisiana, and Approved April 1, 1833, New
Orleans, 1836. Obtained from the Historic New Orleans Collection. Banking charters also provided states
with an additional instrument though which to police its economy for the public good. See: Novak,
William J. The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth Century America. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1996. By providing banks with a variety of privileges, issuing credit to
the state, financing and then profiting from public works projects through tolls, and printing money, bank
charters also directly and indirectly set the rules for who could control, and participate in, large sectors of
the United States economy. See: North, Douglas C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast: Violence
and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009.

4

across the country on roads, rail and steamboats, contributed to counterfeiting’s heyday in
the United States during the first sixty five years of the nineteenth century.
At the same time that the maturation of capitalism across the United States during
the nineteenth century set the economic stage for counterfeiting to take root across the
country, the nation’s westward expansion provided counterfeiters with new territory to
establish their operations.11 By the late 1830s, the United States completed the removal of
the Cherokee and Creek from the southwest and opened the areas for agrarian
settlement.12 The opening of land in the western United States resulted in a mass
migration of Americans who left the east for the Deep South in the hopes of starting anew
by buying cheap land and purchasing slaves on credit with the goal of participating in the
growing and lucrative cotton economy. Other Americans, however, travelled to the Deep
South to establish small businesses to support the growing cotton economy, while others
sought to reinvent their identities in the expanding regions.
Although many nineteenth-century Americans moved to the Midwest and Deep
South in the fulfillment of Thomas Jefferson’s yeoman farmer ideal, others flocked to the
growing urban centers found in the two regions in the pursuit of new economic
11

The dissertation situates capitalism within its commercial and financial worlds, rather than looking at the
capitalism of labor. Its references to capitalism should be understood as such. The dissertation’s attempts to
label each region’s version of capitalism, however, does not ignore the fact that the geographical and
political borders of the United States did not limit the influence of a regions version of capitalism.

12

While there are multiple works that examine the intricate and violent histories of the United State’s
interactions with the Creek and Cherokee, some works that provide a general history of the subject are:
Conley, Robert J. The Cherokee Nation: A History. University of New Mexico Press, 2005. Hudson,
Angela. Creek Paths and Federal Roads: Indians, Settlers, and Slaves and the Making of the American
South. Raleigh: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010. Frank, Andrew K. Creeks and Southerners:
Biculturalism on the Early American Frontier. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2005. Green,
Michael D. The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crises. Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1982. Saunt, Claudio. A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the
Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733-1816. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

5

opportunities. Some cities, like Cincinnati, grew from frontier outposts to sprawling
urban centers, acting as a beacon for both Americans from the east who wished to find a
fresh start in the west and for newly arrived European immigrants.13 Cincinnati’s
swelling population and its location on the Ohio River meant that during the first half of
the nineteenth century, prior to the rise of Chicago, the city acted as one of the United
Sates’ most important commercial centers in the Midwest.14 Cincinnati’s markets
imported produce and goods from the interior of the United States and shipped them
south on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to New Orleans and the Atlantic port cities.15
Cincinnati’s role as a major stopping point for both goods and people meant that all types
of local, state, and international currencies circulated in the city alongside the strangers
and visitors that characterized a typical nineteenth-century city.16
As Cincinnati’s commercial standing grew during the early nineteenth century, so
too did its banking industry, which made the city an ideal location for the counterfeiters

13

Aaron, Daniel. Cincinnati, Queen City of the West, 1819-1839. Columbus: Ohio State University Press,
1992, pgs. 7-8

14

Cronin, William. Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West. New York: W.W. Norton and
Company Inc., 1991, pgs.228-229

15

For a detailed early account of Cincinnati’s trade along the Ohio River and the city’s importance as a
commercial hub, as well as a general history of the city, see “Chapter Thirty Five: Commerce and
Navigation” found in: Ford, Henry and Ford, Kate B. History of Cincinnati with Illustrations and
Biographical Sketches. Cleveland: L.A. Williams and Co., 1881 pg. 348. In the chapter, the Fords’ note the
importance of trade between Cincinnati and New Orleans, Cincinnati’s role as a regional commercial center
by acting as the end point for goods from the interior such as flour from Ohio, cast iron from Pennsylvania
and Virginia, cotton, tobacco, and saltpetre from Kentucky and Tennessee. Goods from New Orleans also
made their way to Cincinnati via steamboat. From New Orleans, Cincinnati imported molasses, cotton, and
salted hides. Interestingly, the Fords’ noted that Cincinnati occasionally acted as a shipyard, building ships
that travelled down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers and made their way across the Atlantic Ocean.

16

Salafia, Mathew. Slavery’s Borderland: Freedom and Bondage Along the Ohio River. University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2013, pg. 114

6

who immigrated west as well.17 The proliferation of banks in Cincinnati, along with the
presence of banknote brokers who bought and sold paper notes, and the engraving firms
that designed and produced a bank’s notes, provided the region’s counterfeiters with
access to equipment and supplies that would be hard to obtain in the surrounding rural
areas on the Ohio River. Furthermore, Cincinnati’s engraving firms could also
inadvertently provide counterfeiters with engravers who could design note impressions
on the steel and copper plates used to create a counterfeit banknote. Cincinnati’s banking
industry in the 1840s and 1850s meant that people in the city encountered a wide variety
of paper notes from as far away as New York and Louisiana and would not look too
closely at notes that originated from other parts of the United States. The location of
Cincinnati’s financial institutions and their currencies, clustered together in the city’s
urban center, provided counterfeiters with a space where counterfeit money could enter
the local economy undetected.18 As Cincinnati’s commercial and financial standing grew
alongside its population, counterfeiters found that the city provided them with plenty of
advantages to aid their illicit businesses.

17

Soon after Ohio achieved statehood in 1803, the Miami Exporting Company acted as Cincinnati’s first
bank. In 1812, the state established the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank in the city, followed by the Bank of
Cincinnati in 1814 and the John H. Piatt and Company’s Bank in 1817. In early 1817, the Second Bank of
the United States opened a branch in Cincinnati and dominated Cincinnati’s banking scene until the state
chartered additional banks for Cincinnati during the 1830s and 1840s. Finally, during the 1850s, in addition
to the six incorporated banks that called Cincinnati home, the city contained quite a few private banks and
brokerage firms. Also by the mid-1850s, Cincinnati housed three engraving firms that specialized in
creating bank notes. See Chapter Thirty-Six: Banking-Finance-Insurance in: Ford and Ford. History of
Cincinnati with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches and Reilly, W.W. and Company’s. Ohio State
Business Directory containing the Mercantile Firms, Manufacturing Establishments, Mechanics,
Professional Men, Together with the Banking Institutions, Post Offices, and all other Miscellaneous
Departments Which Contribute to the Wealth and Prosperity of the State for 1853-1854. Cincinnati:
Morgan and Overend Printers, 1853.

18

Ford and Ford. History of Cincinnati with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches, pg. 360

7

By the 1850s, Cincinnati’s population made the city the sixth largest in the United
States, ranking it just behind New Orleans, which also benefitted from the nation’s
westward expansion.19 While Cincinnati’s population and commercial standing increased
throughout the nineteenth century, New Orleans further entrenched its position as the
South’s primary commercial center when the cotton economy took off across the Deep
South during the mid-nineteenth century. Goods from both the interior of the United
States, the Atlantic, and the Caribbean arrived at the Crescent City before departing for
ports around the Atlantic Ocean or along the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers.20 Steamships
began and ended their journeys at New Orleans, bringing passengers from across the
United States, and the world, into the city.21 More importantly, several prominent banks
established their primary branches in New Orleans.22 By the mid-1850s, banks such as
the Louisiana State Bank and Bank of Louisiana existed alongside the Mechanics and
Traders’ Bank and the Citizen’s Bank, all of which were found within a short walk of
each other along “Exchange Alley” in New Orleans. A branch of the United States mint
also called the city home, giving counterfeiters potential access to molds for coining.23
The currency and credit of New Orleans’ financial institutions travelled far beyond the

19

United States Census Bureau, Population of 100 Largest U.S. Cities: 1850. Obtained from
(https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab08.txt).

20

Smith, Thomas Ruys. Southern Queen: New Orleans in the Nineteenth Century. London: Continuum
International Publishing Group, 2011, pg. 51

21

Smith: Southern Queen, pg. 54

22

Norman, Benjamin Moore, and Millard Fillmore. Norman’s plan of New Orleans & environs. New
Orleans, La.?: B.M. Norman, 1854, Map. Obtained from (https://www.loc.gov/item/2012593335/).

23

Ibid.

8

city, across the South and up the Mississippi River, meaning the city’s notes were a
familiar sight throughout the Deep South and Midwest.24 New Orleans’ extensive
population of people from all around the world, the variety of currency found in the city,
and its proximity to the Mississippi River and Gulf of Mexico provided counterfeiters
with operational advantages not found in many parts of the United States, let alone in the
Deep South.25
As Cincinnati and New Orleans’ populations grew throughout the nineteenth
century, they encountered a problem that confronted the other growing urban centers
across the United States: how to police and control their increasing populations. The
rapid growth of cities across the United States during the nineteenth century fostered the
conditions for crime and disorder that overwhelmed the limited capabilities of the loosely
organized municipal police and made cities ideal locations for counterfeiters to establish
their operations. Before the populations of cities exploded in the mid-nineteenth century,
most cities across the United States contained a few constables and/or a day and night
watch whose purposes were to prevent crime while performing other civil obligations.26
When un-organized municipal police failed to curb the crime and disorder that
characterized the nation’s mid-nineteenth century cities, municipal governments across

24

Schweikart, Larry. Banking in the American South, pgs. 256-257

25

For a general history of Louisiana’s banking system see Caldwell, Stephen A.: A Banking History of
Louisiana, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1935. Caldwell argues that from 1835 to 1842,
New Orleans’s banking capital exceeded that of New York. He notes that while the city took advantage of
its position at the mouth of the Mississippi River to import goods from across the nation, it failed to export
many goods back up the Mississippi River. New Orleans’ failure to export goods up the Mississippi helped
contribute to its failure to compete financially with New York long-term.

26

Johnson, David R. Policing the Urban Underworld: The Impact of Crime on the Development of the
American Police, 1800-1887. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979, pgs. 10-13

9

the United States established professional police forces that replaced the ineffective
constable and watchmen systems.27 By the 1850s, most cities in the Midwest and
Northeast contained organized police forces that set about preventing and detecting
crime.28 The newly professionalized urban police earned a salary rather then relying on
fees obtained through the return of stolen property and goods, wore uniforms, and
adopted military style chains of command and organization.29 Although cities contained
professional police forces that patrolled their jurisdictions, urban police rarely worked
together or pursued criminals beyond their municipalities.
The establishment and development of urban police in the northern United States
offers a glimpse at one of the ways that slavery indirectly influenced the growth of
northern cities. While the urban centers in the North built their police departments in the
1850s, it is possible that southern cities influenced the creation of their police. Due to the

27

For a general history of policing the nineteenth-century United States see Johnson, David R. Policing the
Urban Underworld: The Impact of Crime on the Development of the American Police, 1800-1887.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979 and Richardson, James F. Urban Police in the United States.
New York: Kennikat Press, 1974. Both Johnson and Richardson trace the evolution of United States police
from an unorganized group of constables into the force that resembles our modern police in mid-nineteenth
century cities.

28

Cincinnati’s efforts to establish its own police mostly followed the trajectories of the other urban centers
across the United States. Between 1803 and the 1830s, Cincinnati mostly relied on night watchmen whose
primary responsibility, other than arresting anyone caught committing a crime, was lighting and
maintaining the city’s gas lamps. In the 1830s, Cincinnati reorganized its night watch into a force of twenty
people, established a watch house at the center of the city, and levied taxes to help fund its police.28 While
Cincinnati’s police evolved into a slightly more powerful version of its earlier incarnation, the pro-slavery
riots that erupted in Cincinnati during the 1830s exposed the weakness of the police that led to its
reorganization. By the 1850s, Cincinnati paid its police a salary and organized them into a military style
chain of command, but its police did not adopt uniforms until the 1860s. As the dissertation shows,
however, Cincinnati’ efforts to police counterfeiting in the city and throughout the Ohio River Valley was
out of step with the rest of the region. For a general history of Cincinnati’s police see: Roe, George M.
Our Police: A History of the Cincinnati Police Force, from the Earliest Period Until the Present Day,
Cincinnati, 1890.

29

Richardson. Urban Police in the United States, pgs. 36-37 and Johnson. Policing the Urban
Underworld, pgs. 38-39

10

presence of slavery and a greater need to maintain social order, southern cities such as
Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans contained organized and well-armed
police before the cities in other parts of the United States.30 In New Orleans, police wore
uniforms, carried weapons, and earned a salary form the city years before their
counterparts in the North. Due to its extensive slave population, New Orleans’ municipal
government believed that the city needed an organized and armed police force to control
its large population of enslaved while also protecting the city’s social order.31 The
presence of organized and armed police in the southern cities during the 1830s and 1840s
meant that the South contained the blueprint for modern police years before the other
cities in the United States.
The development of urban police in the United States during the nineteenth
century, however, ignores the large swath of the county’s population who resided in the
rural areas that linked the cities and small towns together. While the nation’s urban
centers developed powerful police forces that could deter counterfeiting, the surrounding
rural areas were left to police the crime themselves, ask for help to combat the
counterfeiters, or let them operate freely in their midst. Many small towns in the
northeastern United States during the nineteenth century adopted a laissez-faire attitude
towards their local counterfeiters, viewing their creations as a kind of public good.32 In
other examples, counterfeiters in the New England states circumvented the law by
30

Rousey, Dennis. Policing the Southern City: New Orleans 1805-1889. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1996.

31

Rousey. Policing the Southern City, pg. 13

32

Mihm, Stephen. A Nation of Counterfeiters: Capitalists, Con-Men, and the Making of the United States.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007, pg. 158

11

winning local elections as sheriffs. Still other counterfeiting gangs in the northeast were
powerful enough to ignore the piecemeal policing that characterized the region’s rural
and small towns. The lack of cooperation that characterized the nation’s urban police
could be found in the rural areas as well, meaning that the nation’s hinterlands and
geographical borders offered counterfeiters prime locations to establish their operations.33
In particular, the northeastern United States provided counterfeiters ideal
operating conditions and in addition to settling in the region’s rural areas, many
counterfeiters operated in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and along the border with
Canada.34 The sprawling populations of the cities provided counterfeiters with cover to
conduct their operations. Boston and New York contained thriving commercial centers
through which goods, people, and currencies from around the United States and the world
flowed. Philadelphia housed the Bank of the United States, firms that bought and sold

33

Mihm. A Nation of Counterfeiters, pg. 159

34

Lynn Glasser’s Counterfeiting in America provides a general survey of counterfeiting from the colonial
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banknotes, and engravers willing to work as counterfeiters on the side.35 The
northeastern United States contained a robust banking system that housed several
prominent banks whose currencies offered the region’s counterfeiters an array of options
for counterfeiting. The nearness of the Canadian border provided counterfeiters with an
escape hatch through which to evade the few local law enforcement officers who
attempted to put a stop to their operations. The northeastern United States acted as a
haven and beacon for many counterfeiters during the nineteenth century.
The tolerance afforded to counterfeiting in the northeast resulted from the darker
side of the consequences of capitalism. In particular, the proliferation of state banks and
the deskilling and industrialization of banknote engraving during the mid-nineteenth
century created a proliferation of banknotes that the nation’s unemployed engravers
counterfeited in exchange for payment.36 Additionally, as individual states chartered
more and more banks to aid economic growth and development, some banks,
intentionally and unintentionally failed to fulfill their charters. While most state banks in
the United States set out fulfill the requirements of their charters, others known as wildcat
banks engaged in get rich schemes that undermined the public’s confidence in the
nation’s banking system.37 Wildcat banks operated for a short period of time, usually just
long enough to exchange their paper notes for specie. After they exchanged all of their
notes for specie, the owners closed the bank and fled the area with the specie while
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leaving their bank’s worthless paper money behind.38 Still other Americans found
themselves in possession of worthless banknotes after a bank went bust during one of the
financial panics that occurred during the nineteenth in the United States. Through their
creations, the counterfeiters of high quality counterfeit notes exposed the fuzzy line
between nineteenth century counterfeiter and unscrupulous banker.
Out of work engravers further blurred the lines between banking and
counterfeiting by contributing to the difficulty in distinguishing real banknotes from high
quality counterfeit notes that resulted from the process involved in creating banknotes
during the nineteenth century. When banks wanted to create their notes, they engaged the
services of one of the nation’s engraving firms. If the firm accepted the bank’s proposal,
the bank then sent a representative to the firm with sketches of the note’s design. Once
the firm established that the proposed design was an original one, an engraver in the firm
then etched a steel plate with the design. The firm then printed the notes and shipped
them to the bank.39 When banks wanted to print more notes, they contacted the engraving
firm who selected the bank’s plates from a secure room and printed off the requested
amount of notes. By the 1850s, advancement in engraving technology helped both
legitimate bankers and counterfeiters produce large quantities of different notes by
changing the dies used on the plate. Prior to the creation of individual dies, engraving
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firms created their plates so that each plate bore the entirety of the bill, all on a single
plate. By the 1850s, however, engraving firms designed metal dies for each piece of the
bill, its denomination, name, border, and the scenes found on the bill. The firm then
employed different combinations of dies to create different banknotes.40 While dies acted
as a deterrent against counterfeiting, their proliferation meant that counterfeiters could
purchase some of the excess dies, obtain the other equipment needed to make a banknote,
and then use the dies and equipment to create a wide variety of counterfeit notes that
looked exactly like their legitimate counterparts.41 Skilled engravers who knew how to
obtain the dies and how to engrave banknote plates were highly sought after commodities
and their skills and knowledge contributed to the rise of counterfeit banknote across the
United States.
The explosion of banks and banknotes across the United States during the 1840s
and 1850s, coupled with the deskilling of engraving through the proliferation of dies, and
the bankruptcy of several engraving firms, created perfect conditions for counterfeiting.
When engraving firms went out of business, their plates and dies ended up in the hands of
counterfeiters, either through auction or by simply being lost.42 One key reason that
counterfeiters targeted engraving firms derived from the fact that many firms worked
with multiple banks, which meant they possessed a variety of bank plates within their
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premises.43 When the firm went out of business, counterfeiters could then expect to
obtain a variety of banknote plates that allowed them to create copies of banknotes across
the nation. Just as important, bankrupt firms also provided counterfeiters with out of
work engravers who resorted to counterfeiting in an effort to make money.44
The need for engravers, banknote plates, and the equipment to create counterfeit
money meant that counterfeiters worked in a specialized and technically complex field.
Rather than crudely changing a counterfeit note’s denomination or its location, a process
known as “raising,” skilled counterfeiters across the United States obtained the tools,
technology, and personnel that allowed them to create high-quality counterfeit banknotes
indistinguishable from their real counterparts.45 In order to create a high-quality note,
counterfeiters hired an engraver who etched the note’s design onto a steel plate.46 Next,
after the counterfeiter attached the plate to a printing press, they filled up the plate with
ink and ran banknote paper through a heavy press. When the plate pressed against the
paper, the ink was left behind, which resulted in the creation of the counterfeit note.47 The
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wide variety of banks and engraving firms in Cincinnati and New Orleans made the cities
attractive locations for counterfeiters from across the United States.
In a manner that mimicked the legitimate supply chains forged by nineteenth
century capitalism, counterfeiters relied on an informal network of associates to spread
their creations far beyond their point of origin. After the counterfeiter printed the fake
money in bulk, they sold uncut sheets of counterfeit money to dealers and distributors of
the fake currency.48 In turn, dealers cut the sheets and sold the counterfeit currency
individually to “shovers,” the men and women who actually attempted to pass the
counterfeit money off as legitimate and who made up the lowest level of the network.49
Through its organization, a counterfeiting network spread the blame far from the initial
counterfeiter and engraver, which is one of the reasons why nineteenth-century police
frequently arrested shovers and dealers of counterfeit money, rather than the actual
counterfeiter or engraver.
Nineteenth-century newspapers primarily used the term “counterfeiter” as a
description for anyone caught with counterfeit money regardless of whether the
individual actually made the counterfeit money or not. For example, a newspaper might
carry the headline “Important Arrest of Counterfeiters at Cincinnati” even if the police
failed to find any counterfeiting equipment in their possession.50 Newspapers may have
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taken their cues from local law enforcement, which arrested those who “passed”
counterfeit money during everyday business transactions and those who possessed
counterfeit money on their person or property, as well as those who dealt counterfeit
money wholesale. Far more rare, although more impactful, where the actual
counterfeiters themselves, men and women who possessed the technical skills,
knowledge, and equipment needed to make fake currency.51 The terms “shoving,”
“uttering,” and “passing” are terms used by both mid-nineteenth century sources and the
dissertation to describe people who knowingly and unknowingly used counterfeit money
during their everyday lives. The dissertation also adopts a similar strategy in its use of
the term “counterfeiter” as shorthand to describe anyone involved in some aspect of
counterfeiting, whether that role involved creating the money, selling it, passing it during
a business transaction, or some combination of the three.
The blurred line that separated the counterfeiter from the shady banker, the
worthless banknote on a wildcat bank from a high-quality counterfeit, meant that some
places in the United States, in particular the northeast, tolerated counterfeiting. For some
communities in the northeast, counterfeiters appeared to be hardly any different from an
unscrupulous banker. An undetectable counterfeit bill, however, carried more value than
a broken banknote and in doing so, counterfeiters provided the area with a public good:
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currency.52 By providing local communities with highly sought after currency,
northeastern counterfeiters appeared as self-made entrepreneurs, who won over their
communities and operated beyond the limited capacities of local police. If counterfeiters
in the northeast failed to win over, or intimidate, local police, they exploited the nation’s
border with Canada to evade the police.53 In addition to fleeing to Canada, northeastern
counterfeiters also fled into another city or state, thereby losing the police who decided
not to pursue them across state and municipal borders.54 Other police were either
incapable, or unwilling, to pursue and arrest local counterfeiters and allowed them to
operate in their jurisdictions. The combination of a wide proliferation of banknotes
circulating around the United States, the deskilling of engraving, the rise of cities across
the country, and loosely organized local police, meant that counterfeiting operated at its
zenith in the United States during the first sixty years of the nineteenth century.
So what changed? As with many aspects of the United States during the
nineteenth century, free vs. slave labor, North vs. South, sectionalism vs. nationalism, the
Civil War acted as the catalyst that ended the heyday of counterfeiting in the United
State. Prior to the Civil War, the federal government left individual states to craft their
own responses to counterfeiting. As the Civil War engulfed the United States, the federal
government found itself in need of a way to finance the war and it set out to reclaim its
position in the nation’s money supply. In 1862, the United States Congress passed the
Legal Tender Act of 1862, which gave the federal government the authority to issue
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paper notes in payment of its obligations.55 A year later, the U.S. Congress passed the
National Banking Act of 1863, which made the government the sole provider of currency
and drove state banknotes out of existence.56 At the same time that the government
created a national currency to finance the war, the federal government sought to reassure
its citizens that the United States would triumph over the Confederacy, thus surviving the
war intact. The creation of the greenback, the modern United States dollar,
simultaneously solved both of the nation’s finance and confidence problems. The United
States government issued the greenback as legal tender and used the first issue as a bond,
promising those who invested in the new national currency that they could redeem the
notes in five years.57 Thus, the greenback financed the war and forced Americans to
invest in a future outcome in which the United States triumphed over the Confederacy.
In order to get American’s to invest in the greenback, and by extension into the
nation’s future, the federal government needed to protect the currency from
counterfeiting.58 Prior to the Civil War, the government largely left the policing of
money to individual states. With the sovereignty and authority of the United States
government underwriting the greenback, however, the government recognized that the
bills’ soundness as a currency also made it an attractive target for counterfeiting.59 In
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order to protect the integrity of the greenback, and by extension its sovereignty, the
federal government tasked the newly formed Secret Service with arresting those who
would try and counterfeit the bill.60 Although it took several years for the Secret Service
to evolve into an effective federal law enforcement agency, one that wielded the newly
expanded powers of the government, it eradicated counterfeiting across the United States
by the end of the nineteenth century.61 By the start of the twentieth century, Americans
no longer needed to worry about the integrity of their currency as counterfeiting largely
disappeared from the public’s consciousness.
Through the above framework we see how and why counterfeiting flourished in
the northeastern United States and why historians have focused their projects on that
region, largely ignoring the Midwest and Deep South’s experiences with the crime.62
The primary mistake, however, is the assumption that counterfeiting, and even
capitalism, in the northeast is representative of how it worked in other regions of the
United States during the mid-nineteenth century.63 Moving beyond the study of
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counterfeiting, other historians of the various branches of American history, economic,
political, cultural, have started to offer a corrective to the notion that the New England
states should act as a model from which to base our understandings of the other regions
of the United States.64 Some historians of capitalism argue against taking the lessons
from the industrial and commercial capitalism found in the northeast and applying them
to other portions of the United States. In many ways, the industrial and commercial
version of capitalism that emerged in the northeastern United States, and some even
argue the larger systems of capitalism and industrialization, were anomalies, especially
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when we define industrialization as European industrialization.65 By extension, framing
the industrial capitalism of the northeast as the ideal, or as the “control,” from which to
make our comparisons, masks the fact that the rest of the United States looked
economically different from that region.66 Therefore, a focus on counterfeiting in the
Midwest and Deep South explores the crime in the two regions that set the stage for the
key political arguments that led to the Civil War and the forging of an American
identity.67
Counterfeiting, however, is just one part of the story. Exploring how Cincinnati
and New Orleans police responded to counterfeiting, shows how two municipal police
departments deterred counterfeiting in the Midwest and Deep South. Historians of
policing rarely focus on how urban police in the nineteenth-century United States
attempted to deter a particular crime.68 By focusing on the police’s efforts to fight
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counterfeiting, the dissertation demonstrates how nineteenth-century municipal police
fought counterfeiting through undercover operations and by relying on informants who
traded information in exchange for a lesser sentence. Cincinnati and New Orleans’ use of
undercover operations and their reliance on informants to crack their counterfeiting
networks hints at a complexity in their policing methods that previous histories of
policing in the United States overlook. The dissertation brings to light Cincinnati and
New Orleans’ efforts to deter the crime with as much effort, or more, than the police in
the northeastern United States. Lastly, by bringing to light official state numbers relating
to counterfeiting, we see a rare look at the frequency of the crime before the Civil War
that can help explain the degree of its decline following the establishment of the Secret
Service.
Furthermore, the histories of urban police primarily focus on the establishment
and growth of police in Boston, New York and Philadelphia during the nineteenth
century, meaning that examinations of municipal police outside of the northeastern
United States prior to the Civil War are rare.69 Both Cincinnati and New Orleans police
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offer a chance to study how municipal police carried out their duties along and within the
system of slavery. Furthermore, while historians have explored the growth and
professionalization of the New Orleans police and judicial system, it is usually within the
context of policing slavery in the Crescent City.70 By looking at how New Orleans’
police and judicial establishments responded to counterfeiting, we gain insight into the
ways that the city policed urban whites in the nineteenth century and not just the slaves.
Through the following chapters, the dissertation’s reframes our understanding of the
policing of counterfeiting from a story of inept local police unsuccessfully fighting
counterfeiting, to one about the significant and extensive efforts of urban police along the
Ohio and Mississippi Rivers actively fighting counterfeiting rather than passively
allowing its practice within their jurisdictions.71
Therefore, the arguments that the well-policed urban and rural areas of the Deep
South deterred counterfeiting and that we should look elsewhere to study the crime
actually offers a fascinating counterpoint to the lackadaisical responses to counterfeiting
found in the northeastern United States. The study of counterfeiting and law enforcement
along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, in particular its presence in Cincinnati and New
Orleans, during the mid-nineteenth century offers a window into looking at the
challenges of policing an early form of organized crime through both legal and extralegal means. Along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, urban police pursued counterfeiters
across local and state jurisdictions, expending significant amounts of time and resources
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in their efforts to bring counterfeiters to justice.72 In addition to pursuing counterfeiters
across Ohio and throughout the Ohio River Valley, Cincinnati police implemented
undercover operations designed to infiltrate local counterfeiting gangs, obtain clear
evidence of their guilt, and then arrest the men and women, bringing them before a judge
who sentenced them to the Ohio penitentiary. In New Orleans, the city’s courts sentenced
counterfeiters to years in the state penitentiary after which few returned to the city’s
counterfeiting underworld. Far from a whimsical story of the state tolerating
counterfeiters, the dissertation establishes that Cincinnati and New Orleans police
departments went to significant lengths to combat and deter the crime within and beyond
their jurisdictions, revealing major differences between the policing of counterfeiting in
the northeast and the responses to its presence in the Midwest and Deep South.
The efforts of Cincinnati and New Orleans to police counterfeiting through their
police also reveals that law enforcement functioned as a tool for nineteenth century cities
to pull the surrounding rural communities into their orbits. Nineteenth-century urban
historians have thoroughly established the ways that cities connected economically to
their surrounding hinterlands and pulled them into their spheres of influence.73 The
policing of counterfeiting reveals another way that U.S. cities reached into the
surrounding countryside to exert their influence and control. While the economic links
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between urban and rural spaces could remain invisible to those affected by them,
uniformed police offered a stark example of a rural area’s dependency on the city and its
reach into their lives. Throughout the 1850s, Cincinnati police not only arrested
counterfeiters in the small towns and rural areas that orbited the city, they arrested
counterfeiters in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, and western Virginia. In Louisiana, New
Orleans police travelled across the state to arrest counterfeiters in the bayous, rivers, and
small towns found near the city. By adding the role of the police back into the study of
counterfeiting, I show how urban police in the nineteenth-century United States acted as
another tool, in addition to the economic, that linked urban and rural spaces together.
In addition to linking urban and rural spaces together, nineteenth-century
municipal police are also one of the key pieces of studying the power of the American
state during the mid-nineteenth century. Historians who argue about whether the United
States has operated as a strong or weak state believe that one of the ways to answer that
question is to study the strength of its infrastructural power.74 Infrastructural power
refers to the capacity of the state to “penetrate civil society and implement policies
throughout a given territory.”75 State officials in particular, such as police, judges, and
grand juries, embody the infrastructural power of the American state and make for key
subjects in the study of its formation and reach.76 Additionally, theorists believe that “to
try and gauge the power of the American state…by looking at the national center of
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federal bureaucracy, is to miss where much of the action is, at the state and local level.”77
The development of the American government in the late eighteenth century on the
periphery of the European metropole meant that since its inception, the federal
government needed to develop effective mechanisms for policing an ever expanding and
diverse territory.78 Therefore, the study of how representations of the state, in the form of
state laws and municipal police, carried out its power on the periphery and within its
geographical borderlands, offers an important window through which to study the power
of the nineteenth-century American state. The expansion of the United States into the
Midwest and Deep South during the nineteenth century means that they fit the above
model, while police and state laws offer key subjects through which to gauge the scope
and reach of the infrastructural power of the American state.79 Thus, by looking at how
the infrastructural power of the American state penetrated and impacted the civil societies
on its periphery, the dissertation’s examination of the state’s efforts to police
77
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counterfeiting, through its law enforcement and judicial systems, in the Ohio and
Mississippi River Valleys, contributes evidence to the argument that the American state
has historically been more powerful than we realized.
The municipal policing of counterfeiting reveals more than the hidden power of
the American state, it also shows the underground links that knit the separate sections of
the United States together during a time when slavery threatened to tear the country apart.
Historians of the nineteenth-century United States, whether economic, political, or social,
tend to establish the Ohio River as a border that separated the free and slave states, and
their economies, from each other. Just as nineteenth-century banking policies crossed the
borders of the United State’s industrial and slave economies and connected the two
systems, so did counterfeiting. Borderland theory reveals that a nation’s borders act less
as barriers whose functions are to separate spaces from each other. Instead, borderlands
operate more as places where people, ideas, goods, and money mix to form something
different from their two originators.80 Both the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers functioned
as geographical borderlands in the United States that attracted the nation’s
counterfeiters.81 As such, an in-depth study of counterfeiting in the United States’
interior borders illuminates our understanding of how counterfeiters navigated the
nation’s messy internal borders, how they attempted to exploit these places for their own
gain and freedom of movement, and how illicit goods traversed the Ohio and Mississippi

80

Salafia, Matthew. Slavery’s Borderland, pg. 2

81

Mihm. A Nation of Counterfeiters, pg. 159

29

rivers, connecting the nation’s regions and economic systems together into a cohesive,
underground criminal economy.82
Trying to separate those who knowingly participated in the nation’s illicit
counterfeiting economy from those who were innocently caught in its reach pervade the
histories of counterfeiting and warps our understanding of its impact on the United States.
Taking a closer look at counterfeiting along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers reveals that
many of the region’s counterfeiters, through their actions, knew they were engaging in a
criminal act. While it is plausible that a person who passed a counterfeit note may have
done so unwillingly, state laws, like those found in Louisiana, addressed this possibility
by establishing that police needed to find at least five similar counterfeit bills or coins in
a person’s possession.83 The difficulty in separating the innocent from the guilty and in
reconstructing the two region’s counterfeiting underworlds also explains the sources used
in the dissertation. Nineteenth-century newspapers provided a wealth of data such as the
names and locations of those involved in counterfeiting and the outcomes, if any, of their
trials. Newspapers, however, can also inflate the numbers of people involved in
counterfeiting. In order to gain a clearer understanding of those involved in
counterfeiting, I attempted to corroborate as many newspaper accounts as possible with
judicial records, penitentiary lists, and pardon records. State and federal pardon
82
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applications provide important information about convicted counterfeiters, their partners,
if they acted as state’s witnesses, and, more importantly, the reasons for why the state
decided to cut their sentences short. Lastly, criminal confessionals helped fill in important
parts of the story of counterfeiting in the Ohio and Mississippi River Valleys during the
mid-nineteenth century.84 By combining the information gleaned from newspaper
accounts, judicial records, and criminal confessionals, a clearer picture of the U.S.
counterfeiting underworld emerges that can help separate innocent passers of counterfeit
money from those who sought to purchase everyday goods with fake currency.
The sources used in this study of counterfeiting in the nineteenth-century United
States, however, reveals two paradoxes that can stifle our efforts to better understand the
extent of the United States’ counterfeiting underworld. First, how could we tell if an
arrested counterfeiter returned to the crime if they, and their creations, were so good as to
avoid notice? Which leads to paradox number two: if a counterfeit note was perfectly
created to such a degree that a person could not tell a difference between the real note and
its fake counterpart, then how can we gain an accurate picture of counterfeiting in the
United States? In regards to the first question, the methodology of this dissertation was to
generate a master list of counterfeiters from newspapers, judicial sources, prison records,
and pardon applications. After I created the list, I ran the names through databases like
the Library of Congress’s Chronicling America newspaper database to try and locate
counterfeiters across time and space. While the searches were an inexact science, I
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believe that I covered an extensive volume of records that would reveal if at least a few
of these people returned to counterfeiting. In answer to the second paradox, the
dissertation is not concerned with trying to establish the impacts of counterfeit currency
on state budgets, or on local, state, and national economies, and those who do focus on
such questions largely miss the point.85 Rather, the dissertation’s view on the presence of
counterfeit notes is that any presence of counterfeit currency is a lot when none should
exist in the first place.
With the above clarification in mind, let us return to the arrests of Barvec, Clark,
and Nesbitt in New Orleans in the 1840s and the capture of the Haydons and Boyd in
Indiana in the 1850s that opened the introduction. Both groups provide a glimpse into the
removal of a single piece of a counterfeiting network, the sellers of counterfeit money,
which meant that despite the setback, the larger network continued to operate. In Chapter
One: The Queen City Police and Counterfeiting in the Early 1850s, the dissertation
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explains why Cincinnati attracted counterfeiters to the Ohio River Valley and reveals
how counterfeiting worked in Cincinnati and along the Ohio River. The chapter then
reconstructs the entire structure and scope of a single counterfeiting network, the Ohio
State Stock Bank counterfeiters, to show how it impacted the region and how Cincinnati
police dismantled the network. In Chapter Two: The Detection of Counterfeiters:
Counterfeiting and Policing along the Ohio River During the Late 1850s, I reveal that the
expanded powers of the Cincinnati police aided the department’s efforts to fight
counterfeiting in both southern Ohio and throughout the Ohio River Valley, into Indiana,
Illinois, Missouri, and Virginia. By policing counterfeiting throughout the Ohio River
Valley, Cincinnati’s police functioned as an important tool that penetrated state borders
and pulled the surrounding region into the city’s orbit. Chapter Three: Wholesale
Outrage and Retributive Justice: Responses to Counterfeiting in the Deep South shifts
the story away from the Ohio River Valley towards the Deep South and focuses on rural
and vigilante responses to counterfeiting along the Mississippi River during the 1840s.
The chapter contextualizes southern responses to counterfeiting during the 1840s by
showing that many rural southerners attempted to connect the region’s counterfeiters to
the mythical “Murrell” gang that instigated mass hysteria in rural Mississippi during the
late 1830s. Despite the region’s violent responses to counterfeiting, the rural areas along
the Mississippi River only resorted to violence as a last resort, when local police and
judicial systems, tools of the state designed to establish structure in the form of law and
order, failed to punish the region’s counterfeiters. In Chapter Four: The Crescent City
Counterfeiters: Counterfeiting and its Punishment in New Orleans, explores how New
Orleans’ police and judicial system punished counterfeiting between 1846 and 1861 that
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contrasts sharply with nearby rural Mississippi and provides a rare look into the city’s
counterfeiting underworld.
The dissertation’s conclusion argues that the Midwest and Deep South’s
counterfeiting underworlds during the mid-nineteenth century offers a key place and time
through which to study key pieces of American history. By studying counterfeiting and
policing together, we also see how municipal police and judicial departments doggedly
pursued and punished counterfeiting throughout the two river valleys that contrasts
sharply with the crime’s de facto acceptance in other parts of the United States. It also
reveals how two nineteenth-century cities used their police to regulate crime in nearby
towns that further pulled the surrounding hinterlands under the city’s influence. Lastly,
the efforts of Ohio and Louisiana to deter counterfeiting in the Ohio and Mississippi
River Valleys provides evidence of the power of the American state during the nineteenth
century.
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II. CHAPTER ONE
The Queen City Police and Counterfeiting in the Early 1850s
Beginning in the 1840s and lasting through the Civil War, Hamilton County,
Ohio, home to Cincinnati, the state’s largest urban center, made an ideal location for the
region’s counterfeiters. By the 1850s, Cincinnati’s banking situation had stabilized and
six banks either established their headquarters or a branch in the city.1 The proliferation
of banks in Cincinnati, each issuing its own currency, offered the region’s counterfeiters
multiple targets for the basis of a counterfeit note. In addition to several banks, Cincinnati
also contained a variety of engraving firms, three of which specialized in engraving
banknotes.2 Cincinnati’s engraving firms gave the region’s counterfeiters access to
banknote plates, the equipment and supplies for making banknotes, while also potentially
supplying the area’s counterfeiters with the most important asset: unemployed engravers
who desperately needed work, regardless of whether a firm or a counterfeiting network
paid them for their talents.3 Cincinnati’s collection of banking and engraving firms
1
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provided counterfeiters with crucial access to material and personal missing from the
surrounding rural areas that made the city a popular destination for counterfeiters.
While Cincinnati’s banks and firms provided counterfeiters with the necessary
material and personal to establish their operations, other financial actors, such as the
city’s exchange brokers, also inadvertently helped camouflage the presence of counterfeit
money in the city.4 In the nineteenth-century United States, exchange brokers bought and
sold the various banknotes that circulated across the United States. The presence of
brokerage and engraving firms, and banks, when coupled with Cincinnati’s function as an
important commercial center on the Ohio River, meant that Cincinnati contained
banknotes from across the United States. The wide variety of banknotes in Cincinnati
facilitated the daily economic transactions that took place along the city’s wharf, while
the buyers and sellers in the Cincinnati’s public markets exchanged banknotes for goods
and services.5 By the mid-nineteenth century, Cincinnati’s financial and commercial
worlds made the city an ideal location for counterfeiters to set up their operations.
On the surface, Cincinnati’s counterfeiting underworld contained similarities to its
northeastern counterpart. Important distinctions, however, characterized counterfeiting in
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the Queen City that sheds light on both of the region’s legitimate and illicit economies.
The structure of Cincinnati’s counterfeiting underworld mirrored those found in Boston,
New York, and Philadelphia. The city contained counterfeiters who created both fake
banknotes and forged false coins. Dealers and distributors of counterfeit currency also
called Cincinnati home and they spread the fake currency in both Cincinnati and
throughout the Ohio River Valley. For the men and women who bought goods with
counterfeit money, also known as shovers, Cincinnati’s public markets offered myriad
opportunities to pass the money undetected into the city’s commercial economy. From a
structural standpoint, Cincinnati’s counterfeiting underworld operated in a similar way as
those found across the United States during the nineteenth century.
Cincinnati’s counterfeiters, however, are just one part of a larger story about
counterfeiting in the Ohio River during the 1840s and 1850s. Equally important to
Cincinnati’s counterfeiting underworld are the police who made every effort to deter
counterfeiting in the Queen City during the mid-nineteenth century. During the late 1840s
and 1850s, Cincinnati police largely encountered, and arrested, small groups of
counterfeiters who created both fake and coins. Through Cincinnati’s arrests of smaller
organized groups of counterfeiters, the quirks of the city’s counterfeiting underworld
emerges, such as a preference for counterfeiting coin at a time when other counterfeiters
in the United States prioritized creating counterfeit banknotes. In 1853, however,
Cincinnati police arrested and dismantled a group of counterfeiters whose operations
spanned the state of Ohio and who largely counterfeited the notes on Ohio’s State Stock
Banks. Cincinnati’s policing of counterfeiting in Cincinnati and throughout the Ohio
River Valley shows how the Queen City pulled the surrounding hinterlands into its orbit
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and offers a counter-example of how other places in the United States approached
counterfeiting, one that sharply contrasts with the de facto acceptance of counterfeiting
found in the northeastern United States. Lastly, and more importantly, by focusing on
Cincinnati’s efforts to police counterfeiting in the region, through its police and other
civil servants, those who represented the power of the state, the infrastructural power of
Ohio is revealed. Showing Ohio’s infrastructural power demonstrates the state’s capacity
to safeguard the regional markets by deterring counterfeiting and in doing so, it reveals a
more nuanced story of the Ohio River borderlands during the mid-nineteenth century.
With headlines that read “Arrest of an Extensive Gang of Counterfeiters,” and
“Counterfeiting on a Large Scale in Ohio, Implication of Well-Known Citizens,” it is
easy to arrive at the conclusion that counterfeiters operated in Cincinnati and southern
Ohio with impunity.6 A close examination of Ohio state documents reporting on crime in
Ohio during the late 1840s and early 1850s, however, reveals a more nuanced picture.
For example, in 1852, the state of Ohio convicted twenty-three people for passing a
counterfeit or forged note.7 The state convicted three people for passing base coin, two
people for selling counterfeit money, and three people for possessing counterfeit money.8
Additionally, Ohio overturned five convictions for attempting to pass counterfeit money
6
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due to writ of error, acquitted eleven people for crimes relating to counterfeiting, and
refused to bring charges against another eighteen people.9 The conviction and acquittal
rates reveal that while counterfeiting occurred across Ohio in the 1840s and 1850s, it was
not a crime that went unpunished, nor was it as prevalent as nineteenth-century
newspapers made it appear to be, at least from an official perspective.
The clearest picture of Ohio’s counterfeiting underworld emerges in 1853, when
the Ohio courts that reported their crime statistics can be combined with reports from
Ohio’s penitentiary. In 1853, Ohio convicted twenty-five people for crimes relating to
counterfeiting.10 The state convicted for a range of crimes such as passing counterfeit
money, selling counterfeit money, having counterfeit money in their possession, and
possessing counterfeiting instruments.11 For 1853, Ohio acquitted eleven people and
refused to press charges against another sixteen for various counterfeiting crimes.12
According to the report, Ohio still waited to indict another twenty-nine people for charges
relating to counterfeiting.13 In addition to the court records for counterfeiting, Ohio’s
penitentiary reported that it accepted twenty-five convicts into the state penitentiary for
counterfeiting.14 The state’s counterfeiting statistics for 1853 indicates that quite a few
9

Ohio. Attorney General’s Office. Appendix to the Report of the Attorney General, pgs. 173-178. Obtained
from HathiTrust Digital Library (http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102440593).

10

Ohio. Attorney General’s Office. Appendix to the Report of the Attorney General, pgs. 197-198.
Obtained from HathiTrust Digital Library (http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102440593).

11

Ibid.

12

Ohio. Attorney General’s Office. Appendix to the Report of the Attorney General, pgs. 200-203.
Obtained from HathiTrust Digital Library (http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102440593).

13

Ohio. Attorney General’s Office. Appendix to the Report of the Attorney General, pgs. 215-216.
Obtained from HathiTrust Digital Library (http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102440593).

14

Ohio. Attorney General’s Office. Appendix to the Report of the Attorney General, pg. 485. Obtained

39

people entangled themselves in Ohio’s counterfeiting underworld, but not on the scale of
hundreds or thousands that peppered newspaper accounts. Furthermore, the statistics
indicate that arrested counterfeiters stood a decent chance of avoiding punishment for
their crimes, offering a possible answer as to why Cincinnati police repeatedly arrested
the same people on charges relating to counterfeiting during the 1840s and 1850s.
The 1853 penitentiary report also contains a complete list of the total number of
crimes committed by the convicts that resided in the state penitentiary that gives an
indication of where counterfeiting ranked in regards to other crimes committed across
Ohio during the past few years. In 1853, Ohio’s penitentiary held thirty-five people for
passing counterfeit notes, five people for having counterfeit bank notes in their
possession, and two people for keeping counterfeit equipment.15 The penitentiary also
held three people each convicted on a charge of selling counterfeit money, helping pass
counterfeit money, and attempting to pass counterfeit money.16 In addition to the people
who passed counterfeit bank notes, the penitentiary contained eight people convicted on
charges of passing counterfeit coin.17 In total, Ohio’s penitentiary housed 532 convicts
and of those, fifty-three of the convicts received sentences related to counterfeiting. The
most popular conviction related to counterfeiting, passing counterfeit notes, meant that
twenty-four convicts in the penitentiary were there for that crime. In terms of numbers of
people convicted for a single crime, passing counterfeit money was tied for fifth. Ninetyfrom HathiTrust Digital Library (http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102440593).
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six convicts resided in the prison for grand larceny, seventy-eight for burglary, fifty-one
for horse stealing, forty for burglary and larceny, twenty-nine people were there for a
second degree murder conviction, and then twenty-four convicts passed counterfeit notes
while another twenty-four were in the penitentiary for rape.18 When counterfeiting
related crimes are combined into a single number, one that takes into account those who
were in the penitentiary for passing counterfeit money, dealing counterfeit money, and
having instruments for counterfeiting, then ten percent of Ohio’s penitentiary convicts
were there for counterfeiting.
Arrested counterfeiters, however, are just one method to show how frequently the
crime occurred in Ohio. State documents for Ohio during the 1840s and 1850s also offer
a glimpse into the amount of counterfeit currency that appeared in Ohio’s state budget.
Evidence from Ohio’s General Assembly Reports reveal that for 1849, Ohio’s treasury
contained about nine hundred dollars worth of counterfeit currency.19 During the same
year, Ohio’s Treasury took in two and half million dollars in revenue through taxes,
dividends, and the selling of land, thus revealing that counterfeit currency made up a
fraction of Ohio’s revenue in 1849.20 It is likely that Ohio unknowingly accepted the
money during everyday transactions and only discovered the counterfeit money after the
fact, hence its presence in the state documents. Two additional reports also support an
18
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argument that counterfeit currency made up a small portion of the currency in Ohio’s
treasury during the 1840s and 1850s. In 1854 the president of Cincinnati’s Commercial
Bank reported that of the seventy five thousand dollars in his bank, seven hundred and
forty three dollars was counterfeit.21 In 1859, the report from Ohio’s comptroller noted
that his office burned and destroyed close to fourteen hundred dollars worth of
counterfeit and broken banknotes out of the one hundred and thirty six thousand dollars
in Ohio’s general revenue fund.22 The above evidence suggests that while Ohio’s
encounters with counterfeiting fluctuated from year to year, counterfeit money made up a
fractional portion of Ohio’s economy. From an official capacity, Ohio’s legislatures and
appointed officials appeared to accept the presence of counterfeit money as the cost of
conducting business. Local police, however, refused to accept counterfeiting as a matter
of course and took great pains to combat it wherever they encountered the crime. Ohio’s
police may have had the better perspective on the dangers of counterfeiting. It is within
the realm of possibility that the Ohio General Assembly’s records failed to account for all
of the high quality counterfeit money the state took in during a given year. After all the
paradox for Ohio and for the rest of the United States was how could an individual
distinguish between a well-designed counterfeit and a genuine banknote?
Ohio’s penitentiary statistics provide a clear view of where counterfeiting ranked
amongst Ohio’s other crimes and the number of people in prison for counterfeiting.
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While the convicts in the prison came from all over Ohio, evidences exists that provides a
better understanding into an individual county’s numbers that detail its convictions and
acquittals for crimes relating to counterfeiting. When held in comparison to Ohio’s other
counties, the county statistics relating to counterfeiting place Hamilton County and
Cincinnati as a primary node in the Ohio River counterfeiting underworld. 1852 county
reports reveal that of the twenty-three people convicted of passing counterfeit money in
1852, Cincinnati courts convicted eleven of them.23 Furthermore, for the two years that
break down crime in Ohio counties during 1852 and 1853, the majority of counterfeiting
crimes occurred in Hamilton County, indicating Cincinnati’s status as a counterfeiting
center on the Ohio River during the mid-nineteenth century.
Statewide crime statistics reveal counterfeiting’s prevalence in Hamilton County,
Ohio, and newspaper accounts provide specific details about Cincinnati’s counterfeiting
underworld that illuminates our understanding of the region’s capitalist and underground
economies. One key encounter between Cincinnati police and the city’s counterfeiters
occurred in the summer of 1852, when the police arrested Louis and Sarah Slate
(Sleight), John Frisby, Milton Parker and John Collins for counterfeiting.24 During the
trial that followed, Cincinnati’s judicial system relied on testimony provided by John
Collins in order to obtain convictions against Louis and Sarah Sleight, John Frisby, and
Milton Parker. If Collins turned state’s witness in an effort to avoid jail time, then the
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court quickly dashed his hopes for leniency. After the trial of the other counterfeiters
ended, the Cincinnati police arrested Collins and charged him with dealing counterfeit
money.25 The arrests of the Sleights and John Frisby illuminates the interconnectedness
of some of Cincinnati’s early counterfeiters and how close personal relationships helped
forge business connections, even in the underworld. Sarah Slate’s maiden name, Frisby
made her the sister of John Frisby, which meant that it is possible that the marriage
between Louis and Sarah helped solidify a working partnership between Louis and John
Frisby. The marriage may have served to strengthen the men’s criminal partnership, as
the partnership survived its troubles in Cincinnati in 1852 and reemerged four years later,
when in 1856, Louis and Sara Sleight and John Frisby partnered with Nelson Driggs to
print banknotes in Nauvoo, Illinois.26 Nine years later, in 1865, the Sleights still worked
with Frisby in Nauvoo when the group caught the attention of the Secret Service, who
arrested them for counterfeiting.27 The length of time that the Sleights and Frisby worked
together in their counterfeiting partnership, thirteen years, reveals the importance of the
dual roles that familiarity and trust played in establishing long-lasting criminal
partnerships in the counterfeiting underworld. Furthermore, the Sleights and Frisby’s
counterfeiting arrangement survived geographical spacing as well, moving from
Cincinnati, to Nauvoo, Illinois. The marriage between Lewis and Sarah Sleight, and
Sarah’s relationship with her brother John Frisby, reveals the roles that familiar
25
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relationships played in forging business partnerships in the region’s counterfeiting
underworld that survived both time and space.28 The Sleight’s marriage functioned as an
inverness of a similar process that occurred within capitalisms’ legitimate side that also
helped forge business ties across the United States during the nineteenth century.
Additionally, the arrests of the Sleights, John Frisby, and Milton Parker reveals
that despite prior convictions, or encounters with law enforcement, some of Cincinnati’s
counterfeiters found their way back into the region’s underworld. As discussed above, the
Sleights and Frisby resurfaced in connection to counterfeiting in 1856 and the Secret
Service arrested the trio in 1865. The other member of the group, Milton Parker, also
returned to counterfeiting following his arrest in 1852. Just a year after Cincinnati’s
Court of Common Pleas convicted Milton Parker in 1852 for his involvement in the
counterfeiting operation, Ohio’s governor pardoned Parker in the summer of 1853.29
Within just a few weeks, Cincinnati police arrested Parker on July 26, 1853 in Cincinnati
in connection with a large counterfeiting network, the Ohio State Stock Bank
counterfeiters.30
Milton Parker, Lewis and Sarah Sleight, and John Frisby provide clear examples
of recidivism among counterfeiters along the Ohio River. Other counterfeiters in the
region also returned to the crime following their arrests in Ohio. In 1853, when
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Cincinnati police arrested Milton Parker, they also arrested William McGreary and Lewis
Dolman, who had also returned to counterfeiting following previous encounters with
local police.31 Other counterfeiters in Cincinnati returned to the city’s counterfeiting
underworld and repeatedly clashed with Cincinnati’s police. Eleven years after Cincinnati
police arrested James Fields for counterfeiting in 1848, the police once again arrested
Fields, this time at Rising Sun, Indiana for counterfeiting gold dollars and banknotes.32
In 1859 Cincinnati police arrested John Johnson for passing counterfeit half-dollars.33
While Johnson somehow managed to avoid a lengthy prison sentence, he failed to stay
away from the counterfeiting underworld and four months later, police once again
arrested Johnson for counterfeiting.34 Following Johnson’s second arrest, he appeared to
move to Ohio’s Butler County, where local authorities once again arrested Johnson and
sent him to prison. Less than two years later, however, Johnson escaped the prison and
headed to Wheeling Virginia where he attempted to hideout with his family. Local
authorities recaptured Johnson shortly after his arrival, before he returned to
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counterfeiting, and escorted him back to prison.35 On the surface, it appears that
Cincinnati’s counterfeiters willfully subverted the authority of the state and continued to
evade punishment for their crimes. Yet, Cincinnati police continued to arrest the
counterfeiters, revealing their willingness to try and protect the city’s economic world
from counterfeiting.
Cincinnati’s coin forgers posed one such threat to the city’s economic world and
the threads of policing, recidivism, and counterfeiting link together in an 1848 case in
which Cincinnati police learned that a “money manufactury” operated along Cincinnati’s
Miami Canal.36 The Cincinnati police travelled to a house on Cincinnati’s Baum Street,
surrounded the residence, and then entered the counterfeiting site. The police arrested a
man named James Fields, searched the property for evidence of counterfeiting, and found
dies, crucibles, and chemicals used to create counterfeit money. The police also found
two hundred dollars worth of counterfeit money in addition to finding counterfeit
American quarter and half-dollar coins, counterfeit Spanish quarters, and counterfeit
franc pieces. Fields used the dies, chemicals, and crucibles obtained by police to create
both fake coins and counterfeit banknotes. As such, the confiscated tools provide
evidence that Fields created high quality counterfeit notes and coins that could pass
undetected into Cincinnati’s commercial economy. At least one newspaper speculated on
the scope of Fields’ operations by comparing it to the United States Mint found at
35
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Dahlonega, Georgia.37 Fields’ removal from Cincinnati’s counterfeiting underworld
eliminated a major source of counterfeit currency from the city that in turn shows how
Cincinnati’s police provided the state of Ohio with a tool to regulate the integrity of its
business transactions for the public’s welfare.
Fields’ arrest for counterfeiting in 1848 reveals that Cincinnati’s commercial
economy contained a demand for specie that continued into 1852, when police arrested
William Simmons, Francis Bailey, and Pauline Mitchell, Bailey’s wife, for counterfeiting
coin with the intent to sell. Their arrests provide further evidence of Cincinnati’s appetite
for counterfeit specie and shows that a sizable market for counterfeit coins still existed in
Cincinnati’s underground economy in the 1850s.38 In 1852, Cincinnati police arrested
Francis Bailey as the coiner poured liquid metal into coin molds. The officers also
arrested Pauline Mitchell, Bailey’s wife, who confessed that she assisted Bailey in
making the counterfeit coin. After they removed Bailey and Mitchell from the scene, the
police searched the room and found evidence of a sizable counterfeiting operation.39
Perhaps in recognition of the nation’s patchwork laws against counterfeiting, and in an
effort to avoid punishment, Bailey argued that it was legal to create counterfeit coin as
long as he did not attempt to pass the coins off as genuine. The Cincinnati police failed to
37
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accept Bailey’s argument and escorted the counterfeiter to the city jail. Following
Bailey’s arrest, the police also arrested William Simmons at one of Cincinnati’s hotels,
after Bailey revealed to the Cincinnati officers that he planned to sell the coins to
Simmons.40 Through Bailey, Mitchell, and Simmons’ arrests, the Cincinnati police
removed two coin forgers and a counterfeiter dealer and distributor from Cincinnati’s
counterfeiting underworld, further underscoring the police’s role in safeguarding
Cincinnati’s commercial economy from counterfeiting.
The trio’s arrests, however, also provides a glimpse into the region’s market rate
for counterfeit coins while highlighting the unforgiving nature of gambling on turning
state’s witness in an attempt to secure a lighter prison sentence. During their examination,
Francis Bailey and Pauline Mitchell provided the courtroom with evidence against
William Simmons. The two counterfeiters claimed that Simmons approached Bailey
with a proposal to create counterfeit dimes and Simmons would pay Bailey one genuine
dollar for every three dollars worth of counterfeits. Likely in an effort to imply that they
would not have counterfeited the coins without Simmons, both Bailey and Mitchell
claimed that Simmons went to great lengths to entice Bailey into forging the counterfeit
coins. They claimed that Simmons informed Bailey that there was little danger of being
caught as he made the counterfeit coin and that the real risk lay with the one who
attempted to pass the counterfeit coins into circulation.41 Bailey and Mitchell’s efforts to
downplay their roles in the coining venture failed as the court kept the two for a trial.
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The judge set their bond at one thousand dollars apiece and when they failed to post bail,
the court committed the two to confinement until their trial. Despite Simmons’
prominent, and alleged, role as the instigator who approached Bailey with the request to
counterfeit the coins, the court set Simmons’ bail at five hundred dollars.42
The arrests of James Fields in 1848 and William Simmons, Francis Bailey, and
Pauline Mitchell in 1852, provides clear evidence of the prevalence of counterfeit coin in
Ohio’s counterfeiting underworld, indicating that it differed from the counterfeiting
underworlds found along the United States’ east coast by the 1850s. Historically, coin
counterfeiters in the United States, such as those who operated in the 1820s, found a
ready market for their products as many Americans distrusted the paper money issued by
their local banks.43 By the 1850s, however, the banking situation in the United States
largely stabilized, with several state banks having been in operation for a few decades.44
The stabilization of U.S. banks and their currencies meant that counterfeit banknotes
made for attractive targets for counterfeiting and by the 1850s, the counterfeiting markets
in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia primarily dealt in counterfeit bank notes and not
fake coins.45 In the counterfeiting underworlds of the nation’s financial centers, the
shovers could pass counterfeit banknotes with less chance of detection than they could
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fake coins, and in higher amounts too.46 Questions of profit also influenced the New
England dealers of counterfeit money who could package and sell counterfeit notes at a
higher volume than they could counterfeit coins. Perhaps the more established
commercial worlds of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia felt at ease dealing with
counterfeit banknotes, while the nation’s river economies in the Midwest and South
preferred the perception of economic stability represented in hard specie. According to
Francis Bailey’s testimony, his buyer, William Simmons, expected to find a ready market
for the forged coins. 47 The counterfeiter’s decisions to forge counterfeit coin shows that
a fairly robust market for counterfeit specie still existed in Cincinnati by 1852.
Further evidence revealing the demand for specie in Cincinnati, regardless of its
origin, can be seen in Fields and Lowell’s coining operation from 1848. When Cincinnati
police arrested Fields and Lowell, they found counterfeit Spanish and franc coins, a
decision that on the surface seems odd. During the nineteenth century, however, specie
availability fluctuated wildly across the United States, which resulted in its high demand
across the nation. One such shortage and demand occurred during the presidency of
46
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Andrew Jackson in 1836, when the government required that land purchased from the
United States could only be paid for in gold or silver, which meant that specie largely
disappeared from circulation and into the government treasury.48 In order to compensate
for the lack of specie in their local economies, people across the United States minted
cheap coins and tokens and used them conduct their business.49 By the 1850s, in addition
to fractional coins and tokens, foreign coins also made up a large portion of the nation’s
hard money, which explains Fields’ decision to counterfeit franc coins in 1848 that in
turn helped meet Cincinnati’s demand for specie.50
Despite the additional scrutiny that accompanied the payment for goods with
specie, if Cincinnati’s coin counterfeiters created high quality counterfeit coins, then they
stood a good chance of passing undetected in Cincinnati’s local economy. Unlike the
counterfeit banknote detectors that provided their owners with detailed descriptions about
how to differentiate counterfeit banknotes from their genuine counterparts, counterfeit
coin detectors supplied their users with far less information about forged coins, making
them more difficult to use. A glance at Dye’s Gold and Silver Coin Chart Manual, issued
in 1851, revels that it only contained a facsimile of the coin and lacked any further
information that might aid in the detection of counterfeit coins such as a coin’s weight, its
value at full weight, etc.51 Three years later, the 1854 edition of Dye’s Gold and Silver
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Coin Chart Manual still lacked descriptive information about the coins found within its
pages.52 If Cincinnati’s storeowners wanted a coin chart manual that provided more
information in their efforts to detect counterfeit coins, then turned to Paddock’s Gold and
Silver Coin Chart Manual. In addition to providing its users with facsimiles of coins
issued in the United and from countries across the world, Paddock’s Gold and Silver
Coin Chart Manual listed a coin’s expected weight, fineness, and value per weight.53
The expected weight of coin and its value per weight helped people determine if a coin
was merely gold or silver on the outside, while filled with a lesser metal on the inside.
Paddock’s Manual also instructed its readers on how to assess a coins value after it had
been clipped or possibly cut to make change in an earlier transaction.54 If an owner of a
coin manual wished to consult its imagery in an effort to tell the difference between a
counterfeit and genuine coin at a glance, like one could do with a counterfeit banknote
detector, then they were in trouble. If a business owner recognized too late that they now
possessed counterfeit coins, however, they could still try and pass them to an
unsuspecting customer.55
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In an effort to further increase the possibility of successfully passing counterfeit
coins, and demonstrating their technical expertise, Cincinnati’s counterfeiters built
batteries that galvanized their coins.56 When Cincinnati police arrested Fields in 1848,
they uncovered a battery used to galvanize their coins.57 In 1853, Cincinnati police
searched a counterfeiter’s home and found a galvanic battery for coining on the
property.58 In 1857, Cincinnati police arrested George Williams, who worked as a
butcher across the Ohio River in Newport, Kentucky, a travelling salesman named John
Amos who lived in Cincinnati, a carpenter named Crail, and a farmer named McCormick
who owned a farm near Cincinnati, for counterfeiting various denominations of coin.59
When the police searched George Williams’ property in Newport, they found the
equipment needed to make counterfeit coins such as dies, molds, and coins in various
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stages of production. The police also uncovered a galvanic battery among Williams’
counterfeiting equipment.60 Barely two months later, in January 1858, the Cincinnati
police raided the Kentucky Hotel in Cincinnati and arrested its proprietor, a man named
Jonathan Ketchum. The police found between two to three thousand dollars worth of
counterfeit notes, several counterfeit coins, and a galvanic battery.61
The Cincinnati counterfeiters who used batteries in their operations underscores
the technical complexity of the counterfeiting operations found in Cincinnati while also
reinforcing that several counterfeiters, not just the distributors and shovers, established
counterfeiting operations near the Upper South. Cincinnati’s capacity as the major
commercial center on the Ohio River provided the region’s counterfeiters with access to
the components needed to create a battery and access to the other tools needed to forge
coins. Rural counterfeiters likely found it difficult to obtain the material needed to make
a battery, thus providing one possible explanation as to why counterfeiters tended to
operate in Cincinnati and Hamilton County. Similar to other counterfeiters who exploited
Cincinnati’s banking infrastructure, the banks, the engravers, and note brokers,
counterfeiters who specialized in coin likely exploited the city’s expansive commercial
economy to obtain their materials. Finally, just like the counterfeiters who marked their
notes so that they appeared well worn which meant that someone had accepted them in a
past transaction, those who counterfeited coin galvanized their creations to hide
imperfections.
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Cincinnati’s arrests of the above coin counterfeiters also points to one of the ways
that Cincinnati’s police differed from other nineteenth-century municipal police
departments in the late 1840s and 1850s. Many other nineteenth-century law enforcement
agencies that relied on paying their officers through fees based on the return of stolen
property meant that their officers quickly moved on from one arrest in order to make
another arrest, and more money, as fast as possible.62 In the late 1840s, prior to the
sweeping changes that provided Ohio police with a higher salary and more power,
Cincinnati police, at least in regards to counterfeiting, devoted significant time towards
crime detection, a time consuming process that resulted in no monetary reward to
supplement an officer’s income. Cincinnati police arrested Fields and then spent two days
looking for his partner in the city before they arrested him near the Ohio River. In regards
to George Williams, the Cincinnati police arrested him at his stall in the Cincinnati
market place and discovered that his wife kept the counterfeit money at their stand.63 The
police were not content with the arrests of the Williams’ and they travelled across the
Ohio River to their farm in Newport, Kentucky and obtained additional evidence of their
guilt in the form of molds, metal bars, the battery, and resin used to rough up the coins to
indicate past usage.64 Other nineteenth police departments that had yet to shift from the
fee system to a salaried policeman would have likely remained content with the arrest of
either James Fields or George Williams without discovering the rest of the counterfeit
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network and/or important evidence of their guilt.65 Even if clues and evidence remained
to indicate that a larger counterfeiting organization existed, many nineteenth-century
police departments found little motive, and most importantly little profit, in pursuing well
organized, and technically sophisticated criminal enterprises like counterfeiting.66 In
regards to counterfeiting, Cincinnati’s police expended lengthy time and effort towards
exhausting all its leads about a counterfeiting operation in an effort to remove its players
from counterfeiting that in turn inflicted maximum impact on the city’s underworld.
A key strategy of the Cincinnati police’s efforts to crack the city’s counterfeiting
underworld involved the police visiting the nearby rural towns and arresting their
counterfeiters, an action that also provided the city with an additional method, other than
commercial, through which to pull the surrounding areas into its orbit. In 1851,
Cincinnati police travelled across southern Ohio to the town of West Union in pursuit of
a group of counterfeiters. At West Union, the police arrested two people for
counterfeiting and found four thousand dollars in counterfeit notes and the bank plates to
create counterfeit notes on the State Stock Bank of Ohio and the Northern Bank of
Kentucky.67 In 1852, the police travelled north to Mt. Caramel, Ohio to arrest Robert
Neal, who used his steel engraving and printing shop to create counterfeit money on the
65
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State Bank of Ohio, the State Bank of Indiana, and the Northern Bank of Kentucky.68
While Neal escaped, the officers put an end to a counterfeiting operation that allegedly
printed the majority of the fake bills on the State Banks of Ohio and Indiana and the
Northern Bank of Kentucky found along the Ohio River during the past two years.69 In
1853, Cincinnati police visited Darrtown and Hamilton, Ohio, located just north of the
city and arrested a group of counterfeit distributors who dealt in counterfeit money on the
Ohio State Stock Bank.70 In 1857, Cincinnati police arrested a counterfeiter named
McCormick, who worked with John Amous and the coiner George Williams, in the rural
town of Miamitown, Ohio.71
Cincinnati police, however, also crossed the Ohio River to arrest counterfeiters in
nearby northern Kentucky that reveals one of the ways the city’s influence penetrated the
Ohio River and nearby state boundaries. In 1852 Cincinnati and Covington police
arrested Rinaldo Baxter and found thousands of dollars worth of counterfeit money in his
possession.72 In 1853, Cincinnati police arrested James Jones in Covington and found
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counterfeit tools and fifteen hundred dollars in counterfeit money in his possession.73
During the same year, the Cincinnati police visited the Washington House in Covington
and arrested George Kingsley for counterfeiting. The police found thousands of dollars
in counterfeit money in Kingsley’s room.74 At the end of 1853, Cincinnati police and
sheriffs from Campbell and Kenton Counties, which contain the towns of Newport and
Covington respectively, travelled to the small town of California, Kentucky on the Ohio
River where they arrested two men for counterfeiting. The officers escorted the men
from California to Newport, Kentucky where the mayor committed the two shovers to jail
in order to await future examination.75 Finally, recall that Cincinnati police visited the
farm of George Williams in Newport and obtained several pieces of evidence regarding
his role as a counterfeiter of coin.76 The several examples of Cincinnati both policing
northern Kentucky and also receiving aid from Kentucky’s law enforcement, reveals one
of the unknown ways that Cincinnati connected with nearby slaveholding Kentucky,
demonstrating the interconnectedness between the nation’s free and slave states that often
disappears when the Ohio River is framed through a sectional perspective. Lastly, the
examples provide evidence that Kentucky appeared to be a willing participant in
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Cincinnati’s efforts to ride counterfeiting within its borders, thereby revealing how Ohio
law enforcement acted to regulate northern Kentucky’s local commerce.
Cincinnati’s police frequently travelled to the small towns that ringed the city as
they provided the region’s counterfeiters with several advantages. First, counterfeiters
across the United States often sought to establish pieces of their operations in out of the
way places not visited by local law enforcement that also offered counterfeiters a kind of
anonymity.77 Second, in a contrast to Cincinnati’s municipal police, many small-town
law enforcement agencies lacked the resources, manpower, and desire to fight
counterfeiting in their towns.78 As long as the counterfeiters spread their money
elsewhere, or paid their bonds to their local government following their arrests, then local
law enforcement often left the counterfeiters alone.79 Finally, many small towns lacked
the paper currency needed to facilitate the economic transactions necessary to the
capitalist market system and counterfeiters provided towns with a product that was much
in demand.80 Cincinnati police, however, negated the above advantages when they
travelled to the small towns and arrested their counterfeiters. Unlike the small New
England towns, that gratefully accepted counterfeiters in their midst because they
provided highly sought after currency, the small towns that ringed Cincinnati provided no
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resistance to the police when they arrested and then removed the counterfeiters who
operated within their jurisdiction.81
The above examples also illustrate the seriousness with which Cincinnati police
pursed counterfeiters throughout the Ohio River Valley in an effort to deter counterfeiting
in the region. Unlike rural New England police that were overwhelmed by the
counterfeiting gangs who operated in their midst, Cincinnati’s policing of counterfeiting
suggests that the New England model of policing and counterfeiting does not apply to
Cincinnati or the small towns that ringed the city during the 1840s and 1850s.82
Furthermore, during the early 1850s, Cincinnati police started travelling beyond Ohio to
dismantle pieces of the region’s counterfeiting underworld. In 1853, the police travelled
to New Brighton, Pennsylvania, located on the state’s border with Ohio, to obtain
banknote plates that counterfeited the notes of the Ohio State Stock Bank.83

When

Robert Neal escaped the Cincinnati police from Mount Caramel in 1852 they followed
his trail to New York City where they learned that he boarded a ship bound for Europe.84
The police’s pursuit of Neal to New York and their capture of banknote plates in
Pennsylvania reveals that Cincinnati police started travelling significant distances to
arrest counterfeiters, a trend that increased during the late 1850s.
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Cincinnati’s resolve in pursuing and arresting counterfeiters in the early 1850s
culminated in 1853, when they encountered the Ohio State Stock Bank counterfeiters, a
group whose members and operations spanned the state of Ohio. The Ohio State Stock
Bank counterfeiters created high-quality counterfeit notes and introduced a high volume
of fake currency into Ohio’s local economy during 1853. The consequences of the
volume and quality of the counterfeit currency forced the state of Ohio to alter the
designs of the bank’s bills. Finally, the Ohio State Stock Bank counterfeiting network
shows that Cincinnati’s relationship with the nearby Covington police was more
reciprocal than it first appeared. During the course of the arrests, Covington police aided
Cincinnati by arresting members of the network in Cleveland and aiding in the recovery
of the stolen bank plates in Pennsylvania.
It is unclear exactly how Cincinnati police learned about the Ohio State Stock
Bank counterfeiter’s operations in the city, but on July 26, 1853 a group of Cincinnati
police boarded an omnibus and travelled to the residence of a man named Samuel
Towner.85 When the police arrived, they captured and arrested Samuel Towner, Milton
Parker, Lewis Dolman, Quincey Hurschley, and William H. McGreary.86 When the
police searched Towner’s property, they obtained evidence of a large-scale counterfeiting
network and distribution center, one that used Cincinnati as a focal point to disperse
counterfeit money into southern Ohio. During their search, Cincinnati police found
between thirty to forty thousand dollars worth of counterfeit bills hidden on the property.
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The counterfeit money consisted of ones, threes and fives on the Dayton branch of the
State Stock Bank of Ohio along with various denominations of counterfeit money. The
police also found counterfeit coins and the materials needed to make them, the stamps
needed to alter the bank’s bills, parts of presses, and other counterfeiting equipment, in a
stable attached to the house.87 They discovered counterfeit notes signed, cut, and bundled
into packages, each of which contained one thousand dollars worth of counterfeit notes,
likely meant for distribution into the city.88
By 1853, Cincinnati police discovered the components of a well-organized gang
of counterfeiters whose operations spanned the state of Ohio. Subsequent newspaper
accounts, judicial records, and pardon applications reveal that Samuel Towner and
William McGreary sold the counterfeit money to the city’s shovers, while Lewis Dolman
passed the money into Cincinnati’s commercial economy. Another man arrested at
Towner’s home, Milton Parker, appeared to be one of the primary counterfeiters of the
gang who allegedly forged the signatures of the bank’s notes.89 In order to acquire the
bank note plates, William Kelly, the other suspected leader and counterfeiter of the gang,
convinced a Cincinnati engraver named Ransel Lamb to steal the Ohio State Stock bank

87

“Important News-Arrest of a Gang of Counterfeiters,” Loudon Free Press, August 12, 1853. From the
Library of Congress, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers site
(https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn86053481/1853-08-12/ed-1/seq-2/).

88

“Great Den of Counterfeiters Broke Up-An Arrest of the Counterfeiters,” Nashville Union and American,
August 3, 1853. From the Library of Congress, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers site
(https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85038518/1853-08-03/ed-1/seq-3/).

89

“State Stock Bank Forgeries-Arrest of One of the Supposed Forgers,” The New York Herald, August 29,
1853. From the Library of Congress, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers site
(https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030313/1853-08-29/ed-1/seq-2/).

63

plates from his place of employment.90 For the past twelve years, Lamb worked as an
engraver and foreman at Rawdon, Wright, Hatch, and Edison, an engraving firm located
in Cincinnati responsible for engraving and printing the banknotes of the Ohio State
Stock Banks.91 After meeting with Kelly, Lamb agreed to his offer, stole the bank plates
from the engraving firm, and sold them to the gang.92 Over the course of their
investigation, the auditor of the state’s office and the Cincinnati police learned of Lamb’s
involvement in the counterfeiting network and arrested the engraver, who turned state’s
witness to provide information about the counterfeiters.93 Through the arrests of the
above counterfeiters, Cincinnati police arrested the counterfeiters and engravers, the
distributors, and the shovers of counterfeit money. In other words, they captured people
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who operated at all levels of a counterfeiting operation, putting a permanent end to this
group’s counterfeit activities.
Despite, the above arrests, Cincinnati police continued searching the surrounding
region for the distributors of the counterfeit money, in doing so they continued fortifying
the links between Cincinnati’s urban center and its rural hinterlands. Following the
arrests of Ransel Lamb and the counterfeiters at Towner’s home, Cincinnati police sent
Edward Paxton undercover to purchase notes from suspected counterfeit dealers. During
the course of his undercover activities, Paxton purchased counterfeit notes from thirteen
different sources throughout southern Ohio in “retired, out of the way places.”94 Through
Paxton’s efforts, police arrested Moses Mann, Thomas McGehan, and Samuel Stoddard
in Hamilton, a small town north of Cincinnati. The Cincinnati police also arrested
William Marshall, a “man of wealth,” in the village of Darrtown, located a few miles
north of Hamilton.95 When police searched Marshall’s home, they found counterfeit
money on the Ohio State Stock Bank, the same counterfeit bills found at Samuel
Towner’s residence in Cincinnati. Through their efforts to arrest the dealers of the Ohio
State Stock Bank counterfeit money, Cincinnati police travelled to the small towns that
ringed the city and arrested the men. The police’s efforts provide an additional way,
other than economic and commercial, in which the urban center of Cincinnati fostered
links with the surrounding towns that in effect placed these towns under the city’s
control.
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The Cincinnati police’s resolve towards putting an end to the counterfeiting
network impacted more than the small towns in Ohio that ringed the city, it also drew
nearby Covington, Kentucky under the city’s reach as well. In September 1853, the two
police departments arrested James Jones and George Kingsley in Covington. The police
arrested Jones and found counterfeit tools and fifteen hundred dollars in counterfeit notes
on the Ohio State Bank in his possession.96 According to subsequent accounts, one
newspaper noted that Jones worked as an “accomplished” pressman who helped
counterfeit the designs of the Ohio State Stock Bank notes.97 According to the Cincinnati
Gazette, Cincinnati and Covington police arrested George Kingsley in Covington after
the landlord of the Washington House informed the police that he was uneasy about the
number of people visiting Kingsley in his room. When the Covington police arrived at
Kingsley’s room, they searched the room they found three thousand dollars in counterfeit
fifty-dollar bills on the Ripley branch of the Ohio State Stock Bank.98 When Cincinnati
police arrested suspected counterfeiters across the Ohio River in Covington, it suggests
that the city’s police could claim jurisdiction in Covington, revealing the porousness of
the border between Ohio and Kentucky.99 Cincinnati and Covington’s combined efforts
96
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to arrest the Ohio State Stock Bank counterfeiting network suggests that the two police
departments viewed the problem as one that went beyond state borders and pooled their
resources together to fight the crime.
The arrests of Jones and Kingsley led Cincinnati and Covington police to the final
member of the Ohio State Stock Banking network, a man named Rinaldo Baxter who
knew the location of the bank plates used to create the counterfeit notes. Many
nineteenth-century police departments relied on informants to provide them with
information about the underworld in exchange for money or immunity, and it is possible
that George Kingsley or James Jones attempted such a strategy.100 In 1861, however,
James Jones’ pardon application fails to mention if Jones provided information to the
state, a clarification that appears in the pardon applications of Ransel Lamb and Rinaldo
Baxter. 101 Nonetheless, it was likely James Jones who provided Cincinnati and
Covington police with information detailing the final portion of the Ohio State Stock
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Bank network. When the police arrested Jones, they found a book in his room that
contained the various locations of hidden bank plates along with “the names and
residences of a good many people engaged in the business,” which likely included
Rinaldo Baxter.102 The police’s possible use of the book to locate other members of the
counterfeiting network means that while James Jones provided police with key
information about the group’s illicit activities, he did so unwilling. Jones’ inadvertent aid
to the police could explain why his pardon application does not mention that he acted as
an informant to the state, as it was not a formal arrangement.
Cincinnati and Covington’s entanglements with Rinaldo Baxter and the Ohio
State Stock Bank counterfeiters further reveal the recidivism of the Ohio River Valley
counterfeiters and the difficulties of policing counterfeiting in the region. A year earlier,
in 1852, the two police agencies arrested Baxter in Covington for counterfeiting and
found close to eighty thousand dollars worth of counterfeit money in his possession. 103
The officers escorted Baxter before a Covington court where a judge initially set his bail
at two thousand dollars before reducing it to four hundred dollars. Baxter paid his
lowered bail, walked out of the court and fled Covington.104 Cincinnati and Covington
police lost track of Baxter for a year, before learning of his location near Cleveland in
1853. Other members of the network had also been arrested in the past for crimes
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relating to counterfeiting. In 1851 police arrested William McGreary at a Cleveland hotel
for passing counterfeit five-dollar bills on the Thames Bank, found in Connecticut.105 In
March 1852, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Please convicted McGreary for
passing counterfeit banknotes and sentenced him to five years imprisonment in the Ohio
state penitentiary.106 Barely a year later, the Ohio penitentiary administrators
recommended that the state pardon McGreary. On May 25, 1853, the state issued a
pardon for McGreary on the condition that he would leave the state of Ohio for five
years. Instead of leaving Ohio, McGreary travelled south to Cincinnati where Cincinnati
police arrested his at Samuel Towner’s home in 1853.107 In addition to their arrest of
William McGreary, Cincinnati police also arrested Milton Parker in the summer of 1853
at Samuel Towner’s house.108 The police likely recognized Parker from their earlier
encounter in 1852, when they arrested Parker, alongside Lewis and Sara Sleight, and
John Frisby, for dealing counterfeit money in Cincinnati. 109 Finally, at least one member
of the Ohio State Stock Bank network escaped from prison and returned to the region’s
counterfeiting underworld. At Samuel Towner’s Cincinnati home, the police arrested
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Lewis Dolman, an escaped convict from the Jeffersonville, Indiana penitentiary recently
convicted on charges of counterfeiting.110 Following his escape from Indiana, Dolman
travelled north along the Ohio River to Cincinnati and joined the counterfeiting operation
in Cincinnati with little apparent trouble. The movements and relationships of the
formerly convicted counterfeiters provides a glimpse into a counterfeiting underworld
that spanned the Ohio River, connecting northern Kentucky, southern Indiana, and Ohio
into a rough confederation who worked together create, distribute, and pass, counterfeit
money throughout the Ohio River Valley. In turn, the Ohio State Stock Bank
counterfeiters shows the various ways that the region’s counterfeiting underworld
spanned the nation’s borders between capitalism and slavery and knit the two regions
together.111
By the end of 1853, Cincinnati and Covington police had arrested most of the
primary members of the Ohio State Stock Bank counterfeiting network and obtained the
plates used to counterfeit the Ohio State Stock Bank’s bills. William Kelly, the man who
convinced Ransel Lamb to steal the banknote plates, however, remained at large.112 Back
in September 1853, the Cincinnati criminal court indicted Kelly for his role in the
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counterfeiting operation and police had been looking for him ever since.113 It took two
months before Cincinnati police arrested Kelly at tavern in Aurora, Indiana. After
months of searching and arrests, Cincinnati police finally captured the last major member
of the Ohio State Stock Bank counterfeiting network and put an end to group.114
The convictions of key members of the Ohio State Stock Bank network reveals
that Ohio sought to send a strong message to those counterfeiters who would create
counterfeit money on the state’s banks. In Ohio, a conviction for knowingly passing
counterfeit money carried a penalty of one to five years in the state penitentiary.115 A
conviction for dealing counterfeit notes carried a penalty of three to fifteen years in the
Ohio penitentiary.116 If convicted of engraving a bank plate for the purposes of
counterfeiting, a prisoner also faced three to fifteen years in prison.117 Finally, a forgery
conviction carried a penalty of three to twenty years in the Ohio penitentiary.118 As the
penalties for counterfeiting and forgery make clear, the members of the Ohio State Stock
113
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Bank counterfeiting network faced serious prison time for their roles in spreading
counterfeit money across Ohio. Although police arrested several people in connection to
the counterfeiting network, the Ohio judicial system only punished a handful of the
counterfeiters, revealing the difficulties in both obtaining a conviction for counterfeiting
and bringing a suspect before a court of law. In December 1853, the Hamilton County
criminal court convicted James Jones on a charge of aiding and abetting forgery. The
court sentenced Jones to ten years in the Ohio Penitentiary.119 For “aiding and abetting
the forgery” of the Ohio State Stock Bank notes, the Hamilton County criminal court
sentenced James (William) Kelly to ten years in the Ohio penitentiary.120 The Hamilton
County Court of Common Pleas convicted both Milton Parker and William McGreary of
having counterfeit banknotes in their possession for the purpose of bartering and selling
the notes and sentenced Parker and McGreary to ten years in the Ohio penitentiary.121
The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas convicted Lewis Dolman of having
counterfeit bank bills in his possession with intent to pass and sentenced him to ten years
in the state penitentiary.122 The convictions and prison sentences for the Ohio State Stock
Bank counterfeiters reveals that Hamilton County sought to punish those counterfeiters
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who appeared within its courts, a trend that is evident in the report conviction and
acquittal rates for the county during the early 1850s.123
The convictions of the Ohio State Stock Bank counterfeiters, however, also
reveals that Ohio wanted to reward those who aided their efforts to put an end to
counterfeiting in the region. Ransel Lamb, the engraver who provided the counterfeiters
with the bank plates that allowed the group to circulate high quality counterfeit notes,
only received a three-year sentence to the penitentiary for his role in the affair.124
Perhaps in an effort to convince the court of his sincerity, Lamb admitted to his role in
the counterfeiting network despite the state’s inability to connect him to the
counterfeiters, and agreed to provide the state with information about the operation.125
Thus, the shortened sentence resulted from Lamb’s testimony on behalf of the state,
testimony that provided prosecutors with key information about the network. Indeed,
Ohio’s Attorney General credited Lamb with providing the prosecution with information
that assisted in the recovery of the spurious paper and led to the convictions of “other and
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more dangerous people.”126 Lamb’s gambit paid off. Not only did the state sentence him
to three years in the state penitentiary, far less than the ten years the state sent his
counterparts to prison, Ohio also pardoned Lamb in 1855, after he served about half of
his sentence.127
Rinaldo Baxter also turned state’s evidence that resulted in both a shortened
prison sentence and a state pardon. In June 1854, The Portage County Court of Common
Pleas sentenced Baxter to three years imprisonment for selling counterfeit bank notes.
The state of Ohio, however, pardoned Baxter barely a year into his sentence. Baxter’s
pardon application reveals that the shortened sentence and pardon resulted from the
information that he provided the Cincinnati police in regards to the location of the Ohio
State Stock Bank counterfeit banknote plates. Baxter’s pardon application noted that
Cincinnati police told Baxter that if he cooperated with their investigation by providing
them with information regarding the location of the stolen bank plates, then the police
would not testify against him during the trail.128 The police assured Baxter that if the
information proved accurate then they would not bring the stolen plates as evidence
against him during his trial.129 Baxter relented and provided them with information
regarding the location of the stolen bank plates. Following Baxter’s capture in November
1853, a group of offices left Ravenna and travelled to New Brighton, Pennsylvania, a
126
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small port town on the Ohio River. When the police arrived at New Brighton, they
discovered banknote plates engraved with the five and ten-dollar denominations of the
bills of the Ohio State Stock Bank.130 One newspaper described the plates as so
“accurately engraved” that their counterfeits deceived “even the best judges” of money
during the past year.131 Furthermore, the paper speculated that the excellent design of the
counterfeit money, coupled with the extent of the counterfeiting network, caused
“considerable losses to the business community.” 132 Thus, through Baxter’s cooperation,
Ohio and Kentucky law enforcement agencies finally destroyed the counterfeiting
network that flooded their economies with counterfeit Ohio State Stock Bank notes
during the past few years and put an end to Baxter’s career as a counterfeiter, at least in
Ohio.133
The Ohio State Stock Bank counterfeiting ring offers several insights into how
counterfeiting worked in and around Cincinnati, across the state of Ohio, and along the
Ohio River during the 1850s, and the lengthy amount of time it took Ohio and Kentucky
law enforcement to put an end to the gang. From the initial arrests at Samuel Towner’s
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home in Cincinnati in the summer of 1853, to Ravenna’s Court of Common Pleas
conviction of Baxter in June 1854 for dealing in counterfeit money, close to a year passed
before the Kentucky and Ohio law enforcement agencies completely destroyed the Ohio
State Stock Bank counterfeiting ring and placed several of its prominent members in
jail.134 The geographical extent of the counterfeiting group reveals that they operated
either within small port towns and cities located along the Ohio River, or in the smaller
towns and wooded areas on the outskirts of Ohio’s large urban centers. Finally, if we
plot the known locations of the gang on a map, it becomes clear that the gang used the
Ohio River to transport their counterfeit money from northern Ohio and Pennsylvania
down to Cincinnati. The Cincinnati and Covington police found the Ohio State Stock
Bank plates at New Brighton, Pennsylvania, indicating that the counterfeiters created the
counterfeit bills in the small river town. Next, the counterfeiters likely shipped the
money south on the steamboats whose passengers knowingly, and unknowingly, spread
the money as they travelled down the Ohio River.135 Furthermore, the charges of dealing
in counterfeit money brought against Milton Parker and William McGreary in Cincinnati
indicate that the men obtained the shipments of counterfeit money from the ships that
travelled the Ohio River and sold the money to Cincinnati’s counterfeit dealers, as
represented in the arrests of Marshall and the other dealers who operated in Cincinnati’s
134
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hinterlands.136 In turn, Lewis Dolman’s charge of uttering counterfeit money in
Cincinnati reveals that the gang started passing the money in Cincinnati before it likely
radiated outward across Ohio and along the Ohio River.
In addition to offering the group key avenues for spreading counterfeit money,
Cincinnati and other towns on the Ohio River offered the Ohio State Stock Bank
counterfeiting network advantages not found in the interiors of Ohio and Kentucky.
Rinaldo Baxter successfully exploited the Ohio River border to escape from jail in
Covington, Kentucky and disappeared from view for over a year. William Marshall also
successfully escaped Cincinnati law enforcement, avoided going to trial for his role in the
counterfeiting network, and vanished. The constant activity of places like Cincinnati and
Covington Kentucky, the arrival and departure of steamboats everyday, the influx of new
faces, and the departure of familiar ones, the arrival of passengers and their money from
other states, created a bustling and chaotic environment. That meant that if a
counterfeiter successfully avoided capture, or successfully escaped from law
enforcement, then port towns and river cities offered the escaped prisoner boundless
opportunities to blend in and make good on their escape.137 They could then board a
steamship bound for other port towns along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to start their
criminal activities anew, especially during a period of time when law enforcement
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agencies rarely shared information or cooperated together.138 The lack of cooperation
among nineteenth century police makes the relationship between the Cincinnati and
Covington police all the more unusual.
Furthermore, several intriguing clues emerge about the network’s sophistication
and the makeup of its members, offering historians a glimpse into the social aspects of
Cincinnati’s counterfeiting underworld. While the locations of the arrests point to the
possibility that the network used the Ohio River to circulate its counterfeit money, at least
one of the men arrested at Samuel Towner’s home, Quincey Hurschey, worked for a local
railroad company. Police learned that Hurschey worked as a large “subcontractor” for the
Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company meaning that it is quite possible that Hurschey’s
job on the railroad provided the group with another avenue to spread its counterfeit
currency. 139 It also appears that the group utilized other rail lines to spread their
counterfeit money, as reported in Washington D.C.’s Weekly National Intelligencer. The
Intelligencer argued that a group of “recently arrested” counterfeiters were responsible
for the “immense quantities” of counterfeits, which included counterfeit notes on the
State Stock Bank of Ohio, found along the Ohio and Pennsylvania railroads.140 Thus, in
addition to acting as a stop for the steamships that travelled the Ohio and Mississippi
Rivers, Cincinnati’s role as a hub for several of the region’s rail lines offered local
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counterfeiters another potential avenue, besides the Ohio River, to distribute their
counterfeit money across the Midwest and South.141
It is also possible that the Ohio penitentiary inadvertently played a role in the
formation of the plot to counterfeit the notes of the Ohio State Stock banks.
Circumstantial evidence indicates that William McGreary and Milton Parker, despite the
penitentiary’s requirements governing inmate silence, found time to exchange
information about their counterfeiting experiences while they served their prison
sentences in the Ohio penitentiary.142 Both men served their prison sentences during the
same time and the state pardoned both men within a few months of each other. Yet,
within a short amount of time, both McGreary and Parker found their way to Towner’s
141

Counterfeiters in Ohio and across the South employed railroads to help spread counterfeit currency. The
February 18, 1855 Washington Sentinel carried a story from the Cincinnati Gazette published in October
1854. The Gazette noted that police arrested John Young, a wholesale dealer of counterfeit money.
Young, possibly in an effort to avoid jail time, informed the authorities that some of Cincinnati’s most
“well known citizens,” had established another counterfeiting ring in Cincinnati. Young’s information led
the police to a water station house that serviced the trains of the Lebanon, Mason, and Monroe Railroad, a
local line that connected Cincinnati to the small towns north of the city. When the police searched the
water station, they found close to thirty thousand dollars in counterfeit money on the Northern Bank of
Kentucky, the Bank of Kentucky, the State Bank of Ohio, the State Bank of Indiana, and money on banks
in Virginia, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and New York. Police also found boxes full of uncut sheets of
money nearly ready for distribution and the bank plates needed to counterfeit the ones of the Northern Bank
of Kentucky and the twos of the State Bank of Indiana. The November 3, 1854 edition of the Washington
Sentinel reported that Virginia police arrested Hezekiah Hudson on a local train. When the police searched
Hudson, they found ten thousand dollars worth of counterfeit money on various North Carolina banks. On
August 24, 1860, the Memphis Daily Appeal reported that local police arrested a doctor named for dealing
counterfeit money. The doctor lived along the Memphis and Ohio Railroad. Finally, the Wilmington
Journal, published in North Carolina, noted in its November 16, 1855 issue that the executives of the
Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company submitted a report to their stockholders noting that the
company accepted over one hundred and thirty dollars worth of counterfeit money over the past few
months. The paper also contained a report from the Wilmington and Weldon railroad that reported the
company accepted close to six hundred dollars in counterfeit money over the course of its earnings during
the year 1855. Two years later, on November 25, 1857 the Weekly North Carolina Standard noted that the
Wilmington and Weldon railroad accepted more than nine hundred dollars worth of counterfeit money over
the course of its annual earnings. Obtained from the Library of Congress, Chronicling America: Historic
American Newspapers site (https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov).

142

One of the duties of the penitentiary’s “Assistant Keepers,” notes that they were to make sure that the
convicts labored “diligently, in order and in silence.” Ohio. General Assembly. Documents Including
Messages and Other Communications Made to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the State of Ohio, pg. 220

79

Cincinnati home shortly after the state released them from prison and reinserted
themselves into Ohio’s counterfeiting underworld.143 The apparent ease in which both
McGreary and Parker returned to counterfeiting, and also found others to work with on a
larger counterfeiting operation, indicates that Cincinnati’s counterfeiters knew each other
and were willing to work together despite prior convictions for counterfeiting.
Additionally, the counterfeiting network reveals that the region’s questions and
concerns about the stability of the nation’s money supply mirrored those found across the
United States. Several United States newspapers used the Ohio State Stock Bank
counterfeiting network as proof that both the state of Ohio and the rest of the United
States needed to improve the quality of its paper money in order to avoid counterfeiting.
Following the arrest of the Samuel Towner branch of the network in Cincinnati, the
Cincinnati Inquirer blamed the poor engraving and design of the region’s bank bills for
the presence of so much counterfeit money in the city.144 The paper reasoned that
counterfeiters targeted the bills of the Ohio State Stock Bank due to their “coarse and
unskillful” designs and argued that the banks that designed and circulated poorly
engraved bills assisted the counterfeiter and acted as a party to their crimes.145 The
Inquirer’s editorial made explicit its convictions that some banks and their owners acted
143
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as little more than counterfeiters themselves, thus connecting the legitimate side of
Cincinnati’s capitalist economy, its banks and banknotes to its shadowy counterpart, the
counterfeiters and their fake notes.146 The editorial makes clear that 1850s Cincinnati
wrestled with similar questions in regards to banking and counterfeiting that took place
across the United States during the mid-nineteenth century, showing that questions about
banknotes and counterfeiting worried Cincinnati as much as it die the nation’s financial
centers in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia.
Other nineteenth-century newspapers contained articles that advocated for
changes in the nation’s banking practices in order to deter counterfeiting. Thompsons’s
Autographical Detector states, “all false systems of banking, whether practiced by
individuals or authorized by State Legislatures” acted as one of the reasons for their
publication.147 The Detector believed that banks should cover the costs of their note
circulation in an effort to protect the public from counterfeits. 148 Ironton, Ohio’s, Spirit
of the Times believed that poorly designed bank notes made banks parties to
counterfeiting and the paper’s editors offered a series of suggestions that addressed the
nation’s counterfeiting problem and would aid in its decline.149 The paper’s suggestions
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appear reasonable and easy to adopt, which further underscores its editor’s beliefs that the
failure of the nation’s banks to act against counterfeiting meant they bore some
responsibility for the proliferation of counterfeit money. Finally, the paper’s stance
suggests that its readers and local communities possibly believed that counterfeiting and
counterfeit notes hurt the public and local economies more than the banks.150 After all,
the counterfeit note more often ended up in the hands and/or register of local businesses
rather than in the vaults of the bank.
As noted throughout this chapter, several United States newspapers lamented the
high quality of the counterfeit Ohio State Stock Bank notes and counterfeit detectors
provide evidence of their quality. In regards to the counterfeit tens of the Ohio State
Stock Bank’s Dayton Branch, a counterfeit detector informed its readers to look at the
bill’s imagery from the genuine note and compare it to the counterfeit.151 The detector
informed its readers that the lines “forming the mountain run lengthwise, nearly on a
parallel with the top of the cars” on the genuine note while on the counterfeit, the lines
were “almost perpendicular.” 152 The detector also wanted its readers to note that the
wreath on top of the woman in the genuine note “nearly touch the border of the top of the
note” while the wreath in the counterfeit lay “at a greater distance from the border” of the
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top of the note.153 With such vague descriptions and images to guide them, it is easy to
understand American’s frustrations with the regions counterfeit detectors. One
newspaper likely contributed to American’s frustrations with counterfeiter detectors
when it speculated that certain counterfeit detectors aided the Ohio State Stock Bank’s
counterfeiters in their creation of high quality counterfeit notes.154
Indeed, the Ohio State Stock Bank counterfeiters created such a high-volume of
quality counterfeit notes, that they forced Ohio to alter the designs of the bank’s bills. On
December 23, 1853, Ohio’s state auditor submitted his report to Ohio’s General
Assembly in which he summarized the impacts of the counterfeit notes on the state’s
stock banks.155 The report notes that an uncertain number of counterfeit notes “annoyed
and startled” Ohio’s business community and described the notes as being printed from
the genuine engraving plate and filled with forged signatures.156 According to the
Cincinnati Commercial, published in the New York Herald, the state entrusted a
Cincinnati engraving firm, Rawdon Wright, Hatch, and Edison, to create the bank’s
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notes.157 One of the company’s engravers, Ransel Lamb, confessed to Cincinnati police
that he stole the plates and started the process of counterfeiting the state stock bank’s
notes.158 The report revealed that, “as a consequence of this fraud it has been found
necessary to abandon the use of the banknote plate heretofore in use.”159 In order to reinstill the public’s confidence into the Ohio Stat Stock Bank’s notes, the new plates
would consist of “such a design and artistic execution” that would “discourage all
attempts to counterfeit” the new notes.160 Thus, not only did the counterfeiting network
interfere with Ohio’s local economies, the men created and circulated enough high
quality counterfeit currency that it forced the state of Ohio to alter its banking policies
and to design new currency for the state’s stock banks.
Ohio’s state auditor report weaves together the threads of the Ohio State Stock
Bank counterfeiting network into a single cohesive strand about counterfeiting and
policing in Cincinnati in 1853. The report demonstrates that, in the above case, a
counterfeiting network created and circulated enough high quality notes that it forced
Ohio to adopt new designs for the Ohio State Stock Bank’s bills. Ohio’s legislature felt
the need to introduce new bank bills in order to instill public confidence in the bank’s
notes, the state’s business community was startled and annoyed, which indicates that they
found the notes a nuisance rather than a serious threat to their businesses. The business
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community’s annoyance at the presence of the counterfeit bills, however, reveals that it
took the presence of counterfeit money as a matter of course of doing business in
Cincinnati. The report shows that Ohio’s legislature agreed with the state’s newspapers
that called for a better-designed bank plate deter the region’s counterfeiters.
For Cincinnati, the late 1840s and early 1850s brought its police into contact with
several prominent counterfeiters and their networks. The encounters between
counterfeiters and police in Cincinnati reveal both the intricacies and scope of the Ohio
River Valley’s counterfeiting underworld and the extensive efforts of Cincinnati’s police
to put an end to counterfeiting in the region. Through the department’s efforts to police
counterfeiting in the 1840s and 1850s, we see how Cincinnati’s police fostered links
between the city and its rural hinterlands, even reaching across the Ohio River into
Kentucky’s that forged an additional link between Kentucky’s hinterlands and Ohio’s
primary urban center. The presence of a sizable market for counterfeit coin in Cincinnati
demonstrates the differences of the city’s counterfeiting underworld from its East Coast
counterparts. Cincinnati’s police devoted significant time and effort towards successfully
destroying a major counterfeiting ring, the Ohio State Stock Bank network, and the state
sentenced many of its main actors to prison, showing that the region’s police could
devote significant resources to fighting counterfeiting. Despite the department’s arrests
of prominent counterfeiters such as Lewis and Sarah Sleight, John Frisby, Milton Parker,
Lewis Dolman, and William Kelly, many of them returned to the region’s counterfeiting
underworld, revealing the powerful draw of counterfeiting in Cincinnati. Yet, Cincinnati
police, with occasional assistance from their Kentucky counterparts, built cases against
key counterfeiters in order to secure their convictions in Ohio’s courts in an effort to
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safeguard and regulate the region’s commerce. Lastly, the actions of the Cincinnati
police in 1840s and 1850s illuminates the growth and expansion of counterfeiting and
policing in the city, a process that continued during the late 1850s, when Cincinnati
police expanded their reach into Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and western Virginia.
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III. CHAPTER TWO
The Detection of Counterfeiters: Counterfeiting and Policing along the Ohio River
During the Late 1850s

Cincinnati’s effort at fighting counterfeiting during the early 1850s provides a
look into the counterfeiting underworld of the Ohio River. It shows how the region’s
counterfeiters operated, the market in Cincinnati for counterfeit coin, and the partnerships
that the region’s counterfeiters forged with each other in an effort to mask their illegal
operations from police. Unlike the police in other parts of the United States, however,
Cincinnati’s police undertook extensive efforts to put an end to the region’s
counterfeiting underworld. While the police arrested several counterfeiters in the nearby
rural towns in Ohio and northern Kentucky during the early 1850s, the department further
expanded its geographical efforts to deter counterfeiting throughout the decade, reaching
into southwestern Indiana, Illinois, and even western Virginia, in their pursuit of the
region’s counterfeiters. The department further refined the tactics it employed to crack
the region’s counterfeiting underworld, occasionally placing officers undercover in an
effort to ascertain the makeup of a network. Just as Cincinnati’s police ramped up its
efforts to deter counterfeiting, the region’s counterfeiters utilized increasingly
sophisticated methods to create and pass counterfeit money undetected into the Ohio
River economy. At the same time that slavery threatened to tear the United States apart
along the Ohio River, the policing of counterfeiting in the region on the eve of the Civil
War illuminates how both police and counterfeiting knit the area together. As Cincinnati
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policed counterfeiting throughout the Ohio River Valley during the 1850s, it reveals how
one group of municipal police in Ohio carried out the authority of the state to help
regulate and protect local economies from counterfeiting.
During the second half of the 1850s, Cincinnati police expanded the scope of their
efforts to rid the area of counterfeiting by shifting their attention west to nearby rural
Indiana. While southern Indiana dealt with counterfeiting at a much lower rate than
nearby Cincinnati, it still needed help in arresting and removing the local counterfeiters
that operated in the region. By the 1850s, Indiana’s sheriffs and deputies had built a
reputation of being poorly qualified for their jobs.1 In 1852, Indiana’s legislature passed
laws legalizing the creation of private vigilante groups to help supplement weak policing
in the state’s efforts to deter serious crime.2 Within the framework of weak and
ineffective policing, it is clear why some Indiana officials requested Cincinnati’s help in
capturing the counterfeiters who operated in their small towns. Through its policing of
counterfeiting in western Indiana, Cincinnati pulled the region further into its orbit that in
turn demonstrates the interconnectedness of the Ohio River Valley during the late 1850s.
Through the policing of counterfeiting, borders, the political border of the state lines, the
municipal borders that separated cities and towns, and the geographical border of the
Ohio River, vanish, which in turn provides an alternative perspective on the region that
often appears fragmented and separated in the histories of the United States. The policing
of counterfeiting also reveals the power and scope of Ohio’s reach throughout the Ohio
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River Valley. In turn, Ohio’s efforts to police counterfeiting throughout the region shows
that the state helped protect key the economic transactions that undergirded the nation’s
capitalist system from counterfeiting. The late 1850s continue showing how Cincinnati’s
law enforcement forged links between the region’s largest urban center and the rural
portions of the Ohio Rive Valley.
In Indiana, Cincinnati police arrested counterfeiters who operated in the central
and western portion of the state, near the city of Indianapolis, showing the expansion of
Cincinnati’s power into Indiana. In August 1857, Cincinnati police arrested five dealers
of counterfeit money in Bartholomew, Decatur, Delaware, and Rush counties in Indiana.3
The location of the above counties are important as two of them lay close to Indianapolis,
indicating that even Indiana’s capitol lacked the capabilities, or desire, to police
counterfeiting in the state. The men’s social statues, four of the arrested counterfeiters
worked as doctors in the region, one of whom the paper described as being “respectably
connected,” could have played a role in deterring the local police from arresting the
dealers.4 After they arrested the men, the police also obtained a large quantity of
counterfeit banknotes on various banks across the United States in addition to a large
amount of counterfeit coin.5 One newspaper indicated that the police were watching the
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men for sometime as they surprised one of the men before he could hide or destroy the
counterfeiting equipment and that he “never dreamed he was under suspicion.”6 The
above arrests indicate that both urban and rural Indiana law enforcement lacked the
capabilities of arresting the well-connected counterfeiters in the state and that Cincinnati
police stepped in to accomplish the task. In doing so, Cincinnati police helped safeguard
the region’s economic transactions from counterfeiting, providing a glimpse into Ohio’s
capabilities of policing the region.
Despite the above arrests, counterfeiters still operated in some of the same Indiana
counties and Cincinnati police returned to the region just a year later to arrest more of the
local counterfeiters. Perhaps in an effort to ensure a longer lasting impact, rather than
simply arresting the suspected counterfeiters, the Cincinnati police implemented a
complex undercover operation in order to try and obtain a clearer picture of the gang’s
activities and the scope of its operations. Allegedly, the gang of counterfeiters operated
in Indiana for the better part of the past year, revealing the incapacity of Indiana’s rural
police to stop the gang. By 1858, local officials reached their breaking point when the
counterfeiters escalated their operations to a “wholesale” level.7 One possible
explanation for the police’s failure to deter the counterfeiters emerges in a local
newspaper article that described the gang as a mixture of counterfeiters and “men of fair
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character.”8 The “men of fair” character description is important as it implies that some
of the criminals could be well connected politically. By the mid-nineteenth century,
many municipal departments across the United States placed their police under the
bipartisan authority of city boards that consisted of elected officials in an effort to remove
them from the control of a single politician.9 Prior to a group of elected officials
overseeing the makeup of their police, many places allowed a single official, such as the
mayor, to hire police that effectively made policing a patronage job, one that elected
officials handed out to their followers as a reward for their support.10 By placing police
under the control of a board of elected officials, municipal governments attempted to
limit the power that a single person held over the police.11 While the above process
occurred in the nation’s cities, it is possible that a single elected official in a rural town,
like those found in Indiana, still appointed their police. As such, if the “men of fair
character” involved in the counterfeiting gang helped some of the Indiana police obtain
their jobs, then the fear of losing that job could act as a deterrent to keep local police
from arresting the counterfeiters. Thus, rural Indiana provides a look at inability of
Indiana’s civil servants to employ their state’s power to put a stop to counterfeiting.
Furthermore, when local police actually apprehended one of the gang members, the gang
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used its numbers to help the captured member avoid punishment.12 The two examples of
Cincinnati police arresting counterfeiters in southwestern Indiana indicate that in regards
to counterfeiting, rural Indiana’s police acted in a similar manner as the rural police in the
New England states, as both were helpless to put an end to the counterfeiting operations
in their midst.
Revealing the local police’s lack of power over the gang of counterfeiters and
their fear of reprisals, Decatur’s sheriff travelled to Cincinnati and asked for the
department to arrest the counterfeiters. After the sheriff presented his case to
Cincinnati’s police, they agreed to send one of their officers, a man named Gardiner, to
infiltrate the gang. The detectives ordered Gardiner to act as a “pretend accomplice” of
the gang in order to gain their trust so that the police could obtain evidence of their
activities that would allow them to arrest the criminals.13 Shortly after the meeting,
Gardiner travelled to Decatur County and adopted his assumed identity of rogue and
counterfeiter. In order to gain the counterfeiters’ trust, Gardiner crafted an identity of a
counterfeiter on the run from law enforcement. Gardiner informed the Indiana
counterfeiters that he and a former partner worked in the region’s counterfeiting
underworld before they ran afoul of the police. Gardiner confessed to the Indiana
counterfeiters that while he successfully avoided capture, the police arrested his partner.14
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Within a short amount of time, Cincinnati’s police had met the sheriff’s request and laid
the groundwork for the gang’s arrest.
Revealing the increasing sophistication of the Cincinnati police and the innovative
ways they fought counterfeiting in the region, the police wrote fictional letters to
Gardiner that bolstered his credibility as a fellow criminal and counterfeiter. The
Cincinnati police postmarked the letters from Cincinnati and adopted the persona of a
fellow counterfeiter and co-conspirator.15 When Gardiner received the letters in Decatur,
he showed the other counterfeiters the letters in an effort to further ingratiate his position
within the gang. The Cincinnati postmark lent Gardiner’s letters an air of credibility and
the Decatur gang believed Gardiner’s claims that he was a fellow counterfeiter.16 The
credibility that Cincinnati’s postmark granted Gardiner’s letters indicates that the city’s
counterfeiting underworld held sway in nearby rural Indiana. The letters from
Cincinnati’s “counterfeiters” helped Gardiner’s efforts to pass as a criminal in an inverse
of the process that played out when shovers of counterfeit money tried to pass as ordinary
people when they bought goods with fake money. Both the undercover officer and the
passer employed tools to establish parts of their identities that helped them achieve their
respective goals.
The letters successfully established Gardiner’s position in the Decatur gang and
the undercover officer spent several days observing the group and gathering evidence of
their operations. Over the course of his investigation, Gardiner learned about the gang’s
15
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counterfeiting operations, how they manufactured the counterfeit coins, and their
methods for inserting the counterfeit money into the local economy. After Gardiner
obtained enough evidence of their guilt, Decatur’s sheriff captured five members of the
gang and took them into custody.17 Gardiner obtained enough evidence of the men’s
guilt, and testified in court about the counterfeiter’s activities, that an Indiana court
decided to hold the men for trial. The court set their bail at five hundred dollars apiece
and officials escorted the men from the courthouse and to the local jail.18 Through their
operation, the Cincinnati police successfully removed the gang from operating in, and
undermining, the region’s economy.
In addition to stopping the counterfeiting of the southwestern Indiana
counterfeiters, thereby removing a source of counterfeit money from the region, the
actions of the Cincinnati police aided Indiana’s efforts to attract immigrants to the region.
Prior to the removal of the counterfeiters, Indiana newspapers believed that the region’s
counterfeiters, their extensive numbers and their abilities to avoid punishment, gave the
region a bad reputation.19 As such, the counterfeiter’s damaged Indiana’s “character and
interests.”20 In doing so, the Indiana counterfeiters deterred “respectable and honest
immigrants” from settling in the area, as “no person will entrust property within the range
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of their depredations.”21 The newspaper’s use of the terms “respectable and honest” to
describe the type of immigrants it wished to attract, sounds similar to the language used
to describe the legitimate aspects of nineteenth century capitalism. Furthermore, the
paper’s anxiety over the fear that people would not entrust their property while the
counterfeiters operated in the region unpunished, also reveals a desire to settle the region
according to the ethos of capitalism. Since property underlay the foundation of
capitalism, if a region could not safeguard it from criminals, then it could not lay the
groundwork to protect one of capitalism’s basic tenets. Therefore, by removing the local
counterfeiters, Cincinnati police served the booster aspirations of Indiana by making the
region attractive for prospective immigrants and their property. In doing so, Cincinnati
police laid the groundwork for key tenets of capitalism to take hold in the region. In
effect, the state of Ohio, through the Cincinnati police, regulated Indiana’s public welfare
by removing the region’s counterfeiters that in turn helped protect the integrity of the
local capitalist economy that further shows the wielding of state power throughout the
region.
After removing the counterfeiters in southwestern Indiana in 1857 and 1858,
Cincinnati police turned its attention to policing the crime closer to the city, applying the
tactics from their Indiana operations towards Ohio’s counterfeiters. In 1859, the nearby
town of Oxford, Ohio requested Cincinnati’s help in arresting a local group of
counterfeiters and criminals who operated with impunity in the town. Cincinnati sent one
of its officers, described by one newspaper as “one of the sharpest and most skillful rogue
21
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catchers in the West” to aid the town’s efforts to arrest the counterfeiters and criminals.22
Demonstrating that they learned valuable lessons from the policing of counterfeiting in
southwest Indiana, the Cincinnati police implemented a similar undercover operation to
catch the Oxford counterfeiters. The police once again tasked Gardiner with infiltrating
the gang in order to bring it down from the inside. Gardiner agreed to capture the Oxford
criminals, adopted a fake identity, and travelled to Oxford to carry out to planned
undercover operation.23 In an effort to further establish Gardiner’s fictional identity, the
Cincinnati police sent Gardiner letters from his “wife” in St. Louis who wrote that police
had searched their home and were looking for him.24 Once again, the letters served to
solidify Gardiner’s identity and standing with the counterfeiters and he infiltrated the
criminal group. After he arrived at Oxford and infiltrated the gang, Gardiner “learned
many of their secrets,” and obtained clear evidence of the men’s guilt.25 Gardiner’s
information allowed the Cincinnati police to arrest and charge two of its members with
counterfeiting, one of whom offered to provide additional evidence of the gang’s
activities in an effort to obtain a reduced sentence.26 The undercover operation allowed
the Cincinnati police to infiltrate the gang, break its operations in the town of Oxford, and
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remove them from the region. The police’s efforts to rid a nearby town of its criminal
element provides further evidence of the ways that Cincinnati’s municipal police wielded
the city’s influence over the surrounding countryside. Oxford’s request for help from the
Cincinnati in 1859 reveals that the small towns surrounding Cincinnati turned to the city
for help, indicating their belief in the power of its police to solve the towns’ problems
with its criminals.
The similarities between the Oxford case in 1859 and the Indiana cases from 1857
and 1858 reveal that Cincinnati’s police adopted and refined successful techniques that
helped rid the region of its counterfeiters. The three cases show that Cincinnati police
supplemented and outright supplanted local law enforcement when they were incapable
of dealing with local counterfeiters. Additionally, the people in all three cases willingly
allowed Cincinnati’s police to operate within their jurisdictions in order to bring an end to
groups of counterfeiters who operated with impunity. The three cases show that
Cincinnati police implemented several lengthy and organizationally complex undercover
operations to successfully infiltrate the region’s counterfeiting networks and destroy them
from within. The police’s success in destroying local counterfeiting operations helped to
further pull the region into Cincinnati’s influence that also safeguarded the local
economies of the surrounding towns from counterfeiting. The small town’s requests for
help in dealing with their counterfeiters and criminals further shows the contrasts
between the policing of counterfeiting along the Ohio River and its de facto acceptance in
other parts of the United States.
Furthermore, the previous two cases also reveals that as the Cincinnati police
refined their techniques fighting counterfeiting in southern Ohio during the early 1850s,
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the department expanded the geographical scope of its efforts in to the west. Previous
counterfeiting cases in Cincinnati show that the department arrested counterfeiters in
other Ohio cities and towns such as Cleveland, Ravenna, and Darrtown. The cases from
the early 1850s also showed that Cincinnati policed rural counterfeiters in northern
Kentucky and travelled to western Pennsylvania to capture counterfeit bank plates. The
Indiana cases show, however, that by 1857, Cincinnati police felt equally comfortable
pursing counterfeiters westward, into Indiana. The department’s westward expansion into
Indiana shows that the region turned to Cincinnati, rather than Indianapolis, for aid in
dealing with their counterfeiters. Rural Indiana’s request to Cincinnati for help fighting
counterfeiting provides a look at the interconnectedness of the region, revealing some of
the hidden links between southern Indiana and Ohio. Through Cincinnati’s policing of
counterfeiting in southern Indiana, Ohio’s strong state power penetrated into its western
neighbor that in turn further reveals the power and reach of Cincinnati, and by extension
Ohio, throughout the Ohio River Valley
Additionally, the department’s undercover police work in southern Indiana and
Ohio hints at the important role that trust played in the department’s efforts to rid the
Ohio River Valley of counterfeiting. Cincinnati police trusted in Gardiner’s abilities to
carry out multiple intricate and complex law enforcement operations designed to entrap
and arrest the region’s counterfeiters. In turn, Gardiner trusted in the department’s
capabilities to create compelling evidence that would establish crucial components of a
criminal identity that limited the dangers of infiltrating the counterfeiting gangs. By
enacting successful undercover operations in Indiana during the 1850s, Cincinnati police
sought to remove counterfeiters from that area, possibly in recognition of the fact that the
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structure of the region’s commercial economy meant that any counterfeit money created
in southern Indiana would likely find its way into Cincinnati. Thus, the Cincinnati
police’s multiple undercover operations throughout the region years apart reveals the
department’s desire to police and deter counterfeiting in both Ohio and Indiana. In order
to successfully carry out their operations, however, Cincinnati police relied on and trusted
each other to an extent rarely seen in other nineteenth-century police departments.
At the same time that Cincinnati police developed more professional and
sophisticated techniques to police counterfeiting in the region, many counterfeiters along
the Ohio River crafted equally creative responses to avoid detection and capture from the
police. While Cincinnati police arrested quite a few counterfeiters in 1859, one family of
counterfeiters, Indiana’s Johnson family, plagued Cincinnati and the Ohio River Valley
with their high quality counterfeit notes and an innovative counterfeiting operation
headquartered on a small ship that travelled the Ohio River. By the late 1850s, at least
three members of the family, John Johnson and his two sons Ira and Elijah, worked as
counterfeiters along the Ohio River Valley. The three counterfeiters operated along the
Ohio River, from Rising Sun, Indiana to Parkersburg and Wheeling, Virginia and by the
mid-1860s, they shifted west, towards Indianapolis, where they worked with a loose
confederation of counterfeiters that included Louis Sleight and John Frisby.27 As
Cincinnati’s encounters with the Johnsons span several years, their efforts to try and
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arrest the family showcases the seriousness of counterfeiting along the Ohio River, as
well as Cincinnati’s resolve to rid the city and the Ohio River Valley of counterfeiting.
Cincinnati’s first encounter with the Johnson family in 1859 demonstrates that
city’s continued demand for specie, regardless of its origin, two years after the United
States Congress banned the circulation of foreign coins.28 As such, the coin forgers in
Cincinnati reveal that they expected to find a ready market for their products that in turn
provides evidence that Cincinnati’s economy still dealt in foreign specie. While foreign
coins may have largely disappeared from circulation in the United States by 1857,
Cincinnati’s demand for counterfeit specie indicates reveals that foreign coins still
circulated along the Ohio River Valley.29 In 1859, Cincinnati police attempted to put a
dent in the supply of the region’s counterfeit coins by arresting John Johnson and
Frederick Hendricks. When the police searched the men’s residence in Cincinnati, they
found counterfeit gold pieces, counterfeit five-franc pieces, fake half-dollars, and a
“counterfeiter’s kit of tools.”30 When the police captured Hendricks as he attempted to
flee to St. Louis via train, they found close to one thousand dollars worth of counterfeit
coin in his possession.31 It appears that Cincinnati’s appetite for foreign specie remained
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strong throughout the 1850s, revealing one of the quirks of the region’s counterfeiting
underworld.
Taking a closer look at John Johnsons’ arrest in 1859 reveals interesting parallels
to the arrest of James Fields in Cincinnati eleven years ago in 1848 that indicates the two
men likely knew each other and forged a working relationship in the region’s
counterfeiting underworld. In regards to their illicit business practices, both Fields and
Johnson counterfeited French coins, indicating that both men expected to find a ready
market for the coins in Cincinnati’s commercial economy in the late 1840s and 1850s.32
Another connection between the two men emerges in the locations of their arrests. When
Cincinnati police arrested James Fields in 1848, they found the counterfeiter at a house
on Cincinnati’s Baum Street.33 When Cincinnati police arrested John Johnson in 1859,
they also found his counterfeiting operation at a house on Baum Street. A map of
Cincinnati from 1855 reveals that Baum Street was not a long, or large, street, it appeared
to consist of a free hundred feet before it ended. The close proximities of the two men’s
arrests suggest that Fields may have informed Johnson where to set up his operation in
Cincinnati. The clearest connection between the men, however, results from the fact that
both men resided in Rising Sun, Indiana in 1859.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the small town of Rising Sun, Indiana, located
on the Ohio River attracted several prominent counterfeiters and reveals that some of the
32
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regions counterfeiters may have started shifting their operations to nearby towns in an
effort to avoid Cincinnati’s police. For example, Daniel Brown, one of the nation’s most
prominent counterfeiters in the first half of the nineteenth century, built a home at Rising
Sun.34 Both the Johnson family and James Fields lived in the small town of Rising Sun,
Indiana, by 1859 and at least one Chicago newspaper speculated that Fields and the
Johnson family worked together to pass counterfeit money in the Ohio River Valley.35
Just four months after the Cincinnati police arrested John Johnson for counterfeiting in
1859, the city’s police travelled to Rising Sun and arrested James Fields who worked as a
“wholesale dealer” in both bogus coins and counterfeit notes.36 Lastly, in 1860
Cincinnati police arrested Nelson Driggs in Rising Sun, after he fled Cincinnati in a
failed attempt to set up a counterfeiting operation in the city.37 With the Cincinnati police
going to significant lengths to deter counterfeiting in both their city and the surrounding
areas, it is not surprising that the region’s counterfeiters would attempt to relocate their
operations to a small town like Rising Sun. Indeed, Rising Sun provided some of the
advantages for counterfeiting found in Cincinnati: access to the Ohio River to spread
counterfeit money, the option to escape the area via a ship on the Ohio River, and the
town lacked a police force that could match Cincinnati’s abilities to pursue and arrest
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counterfeiting. The Cincinnati police, however, negated the advantages of trying to
relocate a counterfeiting operation to Rising Sun by travelling to the town and arresting
its counterfeiters.
Perhaps recognizing the extensive efforts that Cincinnati undertook to police
counterfeiting throughout the Ohio River Valley, the Johnson family attempted to create
an innovative counterfeiting operation to avoid the Cincinnati police. Following Fields’
arrest at Rising Sun in 1859, Cincinnati placed the Johnson family under surveillance,
watching the family for evidence of counterfeiting.38 While the detectives observed and
charted the family’s movements and they noticed that Ira Johnson, John Johnson’s son,
made frequent trips between Cincinnati and Covington, Kentucky.39 Two Cincinnati
detectives followed Ira on his next trip across the Ohio River, where they learned that Ira
recently purchased a flatboat and stored it in Covington. The detectives believed that the
Johnsons planned to use the boat to simultaneously trade along the Ohio River and pass
their counterfeit money into the river’s small towns.40 Before the Cincinnati police could
arrest the Johnsons, the counterfeiters left Covington on their boat and travelled south on
the Ohio River. In order to put a stop to the family’s counterfeiting operation, the
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Cincinnati police obtained their own ship and pursued the counterfeiters down the Ohio
River.41
The Johnsons’ plan to pose as traders and pass counterfeit money along the Ohio
River encompasses some of the key reasons as to why counterfeiters chose to operate in
the Ohio River Valley during the late 1850s. Furthermore, their mobile counterfeiting
operation hints at the Johnson’s counterfeiting skills and ingenuity in their efforts to pass
counterfeit money along the Ohio River undetected. In the short amount of time that
separated the Johnsons flight from Covington and the police’s pursuit of the
counterfeiters, the men successfully passed counterfeit money in several rural
communities along the Ohio River, revealing their skills as shovers of counterfeit money
the high-quality of their fake money.42 Using a ship to travel and pass counterfeit money
simultaneously allowed the men to pass more counterfeit money across a larger
geographical area while also leaving the area before people realized that the notes they
obtained from trading with the Johnsons were counterfeit. After pursuing the
counterfeiters down the river, Cincinnati police finally caught up to the family near
Louisville, Kentucky and arrested the men before they could continue passing money
along the river.43 When the police searched the ship, they found one and two-dollar notes
on the Bank of Kentucky, threes on the Southern Bank of Kentucky, and spurious gold
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dollars that totaled close to six thousand dollars worth of counterfeit currency.44 The
detectives also found the equipment to create counterfeit money such as a banknote press,
engraving tools, ink, the materials needed to print the colored backs of the notes, and a
large amount of banknote paper.45 More importantly, the officers found bank plates, used
to create counterfeit money, onboard the boat.46 All of the confiscated evidence indicates
that the Johnson’s ship functioned as a mobile counterfeiting operation, one that travelled
along the Ohio River and passed low denomination counterfeit bills and coin into the
Ohio River economy. After the detectives apprehended the counterfeiters, they escorted
the Johnsons across the Ohio River, to Jeffersonville, Indiana. The Jeffersonville court
examined the charges against the counterfeiters, determined that enough evidence existed
to conduct a trial, and set their bail at two thousand dollars a piece.47 When the Johnsons
failed to post bail, the officers took the men to prison.48 While the Johnson’s waited for
their trial, two of the detectives travelled to their house at Rising Sun in an effort to locate
the other bank plates that the counterfeiters used for the counterfeiting operation. The
detective’s search, however, turned up empty and the officers failed to locate the plates.49
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A closer look at the Johnson counterfeiters reveals that each member of the family
occupied an important role in the mobile operation. First, John Johnson helped plan the
mobile counterfeiting operation and engraved the bank plates with the designs of the
counterfeit notes. More importantly, John Johnson’s occupation as an engraver provided
the counterfeiters with crucial knowledge needed to purchase the supplies and equipment
for counterfeit notes, such as the engraving tools and ink found on their boat. Johnson’s
career as an engraver also provide the family with knowledge of how to engrave the
banknote plates that the Cincinnati police found onboard their ship. The capture of John
Johnson removed an important asset to the region’s counterfeiting underworld, a man
who knew how to engrave banknote plates and who planned and participated in an
innovative mobile counterfeiting operation. Furthermore, John Johnson also knew the
local market for counterfeit currency as prior to his arrest in 1859, Johnson went to prison
in the Jeffersonville, Indiana, penitentiary for counterfeiting.50 An informative, though
likely exaggerated, estimation of John Johnson’s activities as a counterfeiter emerges in a
local paper that speculated Johnson was one of, if not the most, extensive counterfeiters
operating in the west.51 While John Johnson engraved the banknote plates and supplied
the necessary information about the region’s counterfeiting market, his son Ira worked as
the gang’s forger, the man who created the fake signatures found on the counterfeit bills.
Allegedly, Ira forged high-quality signatures, signing the counterfeit money with “great
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skill” that aided the gang’s efforts to pass their counterfeit money along the rural Ohio
River Valley.52 With John Johnson engraving the bills, obtaining the necessary supplies,
and implementing his knowledge of the region’s counterfeiting underworld, and Ira
Johnson’s skill in forging the signatures found on the bank notes, the two created a
formidable team. John Johnson’s other son, Elijah also provided the operation with
vague “valuable services” to the counterfeiting operation.53 While Elijah’s role in the
operation is unclear, it is possible that he played a role in passing the counterfeit money,
as the Secret Service arrested him for that particular crime in1865, when he tried to pass
counterfeit treasury notes.54
The Johnsons’ mobile counterfeiting operation reveals one of the ways that the
region’s counterfeiters evolved in response to Cincinnati’s powerful police force. A
mobile operation allowed the Johnsons to create counterfeit bank notes on their ship, far
from the attention of the Cincinnati police. Rather than running their operation in a fixed
location that left them open to discovery, if the police wanted to raid the Johnsons’
mobile operation then they had to go to more extensive efforts to destroy the
counterfeiter’s operation. The mobile counterfeiting operation would have likely been
quite successful in other parts of the United States, as a lack of cooperation plagued
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United States law enforcement until the late nineteenth century.55 As such, the Johnsons’
counterfeiting operation on a ship allowed the men to traverse the multiple state,
municipal, and political boundaries found throughout the Ohio River Valley that attracted
counterfeiters to the region.56 The family’s strategy of creating the money on board a
ship, and then passing it as they traded down the Ohio River was quite innovative, and
shows that the small trading boats that travelled the Ohio River offered counterfeiters key
opportunities to pass fake currency.
Additionally, unless rural police suspected the Johnsons of passing counterfeit
notes prior to their arrival in the town, then they would have little reason to search their
ship for evidence of counterfeiting. Recall, that Cincinnati’s police only discovered the
operation after they placed the Johnsons under surveillance, a process likely beyond the
scope of rural police. Furthermore, lack of communication made it difficult for one town
to warn their neighbors downriver of the Johnsons’ illicit activities. Therefore, by
counterfeiting the notes on board the ship, the Johnsons attempted to limit the number of
people who could both discover and put a stop to their counterfeiting operation. By
establishing their operation on a ship, the Johnsons’ attempted to solve one of the major
problems that confronted counterfeiters across the United States: where to establish their
operations. While the Johnson’s addressed the question of location through a fairly
unique approach, other nineteenth-century counterfeiters established their operations in
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out of the way and unlikely places, such as caves, in order to avoid unwanted attention.57
By counterfeiting and dealing the notes from a ship, the Johnson counterfeiters attempted
to minimize the risk of discovery either by police or unwanted people passing by.
Furthermore, the Johnsons’ decision to pose as traders and use their boat as a
mobile trading operation reveals a creative solution to the problem of passing a high
volume of counterfeit notes undetected within a short period of time. Given the difficulty
that both nineteenth-century police and business owners faced in attempting to trace a
counterfeit note back to its original source, it would be next to impossible for them to
trace a counterfeit note to a mobile operation on a boat that travelled the Ohio River. Not
only did the Johnsons create their counterfeit money on board the ship, all they needed to
do to pass it on to people was to have it ready to go during their business transactions. At
least one paper believed that the Johnsons’ planned to pass their counterfeit money
“under the pretense of trading.”58 The Johnsons’ knew that their best chance for passing a
large amount of counterfeit money in a short period of time involved exploiting
legitimate business transactions.
The Johnsons’ use of low denomination counterfeit bills further reveals that the
region’s counterfeiters made pragmatic choices in regards to the notes they counterfeited
that also provides insights into the rural Ohio River economies. The Johnsons believed
that they could pass low denomination counterfeit notes along the Ohio River more easily
than trying to pass a higher denomination counterfeit bank note. Lower denomination
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notes attracted less attention during a business transaction and also allowed the Johnsons
to pass multiple counterfeit notes when they made change during their transactions.
Finally, the Johnsons’ choice to counterfeit bills on the Bank of Kentucky and the
Southern Bank of Kentucky indicates that people who lived and worked along the Ohio
River recognized those banknotes and preferred them in their business dealings. All of
the Johnsons’ decisions in regards to their mobile counterfeiting operations point to the
fact that the men understood the counterfeit economies along the Ohio River, crafted their
notes accordingly, and built an operation designed to deter the police from noticing and
stopping their operation.
That the Cincinnati police expended the time and effort to pursue and arrest the
Johnson family down the Ohio illustrates the continued growth of the Cincinnati police,
the application of lessons learned from its previous encounters with the region’s
counterfeiters, and Ohio’s abilities to regulate the local economies found on the Ohio
River. Rather than allow the Johnsons to pass their counterfeit money well beyond the
city of Cincinnati, the city’s police obtained their own ship and pursued the counterfeiters
hundreds of miles down the Ohio River, further demonstrating the seriousness and reach
of their efforts to rid the region of counterfeiting. The police’s efforts to pursue the
Johnsons down the Ohio River, despite the fact that the counterfeiters passed notes well
beyond Cincinnati’s boundaries, hints at possibility that the police understood the
interconnectedness of the rural and urban economies along the Ohio River. After all, if
the Johnsons successfully passed their counterfeit notes into a nearby rural town, then
Cincinnati’s role as a commercial center on the Ohio River made it was possible, even
likely that the note would make its way into Cincinnati’s commercial economy. Thus,
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Cincinnati’s extensive efforts to pursue the Johnson counterfeiters down the Ohio River
resulted in their removal from the region’s counterfeiting underworld that in turn served
the economic interests of the rural and urban communities along the Ohio River.
Despite their arrests and an appearance before a Jeffersonville, Indiana
court for counterfeiting in 1859, the Johnsons returned to counterfeiting within a matter
of months. In the summer of 1860, Cincinnati police noticed that a high quantity of
counterfeit Bank of Kentucky ten-dollar notes circulated in the city. Given the bank’s
stature as a state bank, and the low denomination of the bills, the counterfeit ten-dollar
bills easily infiltrated Cincinnati’s economy. Cincinnati police needed to quickly figure
out where the bills were being produced before more of the counterfeit currency entered
the region’s economy. In an effort to determine the source of the counterfeit money,
Cincinnati police once again placed one of their officers undercover in Cincinnati’s
counterfeiting underworld. Within a short amount of time, the undercover officer
successfully infiltrated the counterfeiting network and revealed in a coded letter that the
majority, if not all, of the counterfeit Bank of Kentucky money originated from a rural
area close to Parkersburg, Virginia. 59 After learning the source of the counterfeit money,
Cincinnati police travelled to Parkersburg and arrested the group responsible for creating
the fake currency, which included a familiar face: Ira Johnson.60 Just a few months later,
in October 1860, police arrested John Johnson when he passed counterfeit money in
59
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Butler County, Ohio. Johnson escaped Butler’s jail and made his way to his extended
family in Wheeling, Virginia. Butler officials sent a letter to Wheeling’s local
government urging them to be on the lookout for Johnson. After they received the letter,
local police arrested Johnson and escorted him to Wheeling’s jail.61
Both John and Ira Johnson’s reappearances throughout the Ohio River Valley
helps reconstruct the movements of the counterfeiters to reveal that they operated within
a limited geographical area that also betrays how they viewed the region’s police. In
terms of their geographical reach, the Johnson’s operated in the states that bordered the
Ohio River. The family lived for a time in Rising Sun, Indiana, before finding their way
into Cincinnati’s counterfeiting underworld. The Johnson’s travelled as far south as
Louisville, Kentucky in their efforts to pass counterfeit money along the rural Ohio
River. Lastly, the family operated in western Virginia and also attempted to evade
capture from police in that state as well. Perhaps the Johnsons’ believed that once they
left an area, the Cincinnati police would leave them alone, a tactic United States
counterfeiter’s commonly employed in their efforts to frustrate local law enforcement.
Furthermore, if the Johnsons’ believed they could exploit the region’s various boundaries
to escape the Cincinnati police, by contrast they believed that the region’s rural police
lacked the capabilities to put an end to their counterfeiting operation. The extensive and
repeated efforts by Cincinnati police to arrest and remove the men from the region,
highlights the relative weakness of the surrounding rural police; a weakness that was on
display when southwestern Indiana turned to Cincinnati for help in dealing with their
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local counterfeiters. The Ohio River Valley counterfeiters, however, often realized too
late that Cincinnati’s police operated differently than the urban and rural police who
operated across the United States, as the department pursed and arrested counterfeiters in
Indiana, Kentucky, and western Virginia.
While the Cincinnati police arrested counterfeiters in Indiana, Kentucky, and
Virginia, the department furthered the scope of its operations and its reach in 1859 when
they arrested a group of counterfeiters in Illinois who planned to pass counterfeit bills on
New Orleans’ Canal Bank along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. Other than
demonstrating the increased reach of the Cincinnati police, the Canal Bank counterfeiting
network illustrates one of the connections between the Ohio and Mississippi River
counterfeiting underworlds. The illicit connections between the Ohio and Mississippi
counterfeiting underworlds demonstrates one of the ways that the region’s illicit economy
followed the path of the nation’s capitalist system. The Canal Bank counterfeiters further
reveal the illicit connections between the Ohio and Mississippi River counterfeiters by
fostering connections with counterfeiters in Memphis and St. Louis. The Cincinnati
police first encountered the counterfeiters in late 1859, when a Cincinnati detective
arrested one of its members on a train in Illinois.62 After the detective interrogated the
counterfeiter, he pursed the man’s partners into Missouri, where he arrested the alleged
leader of the counterfeiters. In the man’s possession, the detective found close to two
thousand dollars in counterfeit tens on the Canal Bank of New Orleans. One paper
described the counterfeit tens as “most admirably executed” that “deceived some of the
62

“Discovery of a Quarter of a Million Dollars in Counterfeit Bank Notes,” The Penny Press, December 1,
1859. From the Library of Congress, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers site
(https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85025750/1859-12-01/ed-1/seq-3/).

113

very best judges.”63 The detective also found papers in the man’s possession that
indicated that the group specialized in counterfeiting, dealing, and passing counterfeit
tens on the Canal Bank of New Orleans. The confiscated papers also claimed that the
counterfeiters created a quarter of a million dollars worth of the counterfeit notes in
Indiana and meant to “circulate it simultaneously” throughout the west and south.64 In
order to effectively distribute the money across the region, the counterfeiters planned to
pass the money in Cincinnati, New Orleans, and St. Louis.65 The papers claimed that a
group of men left Cairo, Illinois, bound for New Orleans with plans to pass the
counterfeit money south as they travelled on the Mississippi River.66 The counterfeiters
planned to sell and pass the counterfeit money into their respective cities at the same time
in order to pass as much of the fake money into circulation before police realized what
was happening in their cities.67
Through the Canal Bank counterfeiters, the links between the counterfeiting
underworlds found along the Upper South and the Deep South are revealed. The
Cincinnati police’s arrest of the counterfeiters in Illinois and Missouri shows the
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expansion of Cincinnati’s reach into other parts of the nation. The Canal Bank
counterfeiters targeted key cities in the region’s commercial economy, Cincinnati, St.
Louis, and New Orleans, in which to pass their counterfeit notes. By passing their
counterfeit notes in the region’s major urban centers, the Canal Bank counterfeiters
insured that the notes would circulate far and wide from the original distribution point.
Cincinnati, St. Louis, and New Orleans functioned as a major import and export centers
in the Ohio and Mississippi River commercial economies, pulling different regional
markets into their influence that connected to the nation’s larger capitalist system.
Therefore, by passing the money in Cincinnati, the counterfeit currency entered into
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky and Virginia. Passing counterfeit money in St. Louis
meant that it could circulate into the nation’s frontier economies in the West. Finally,
New Orleans offered the possibility of the money circulating throughout the Deep South,
into Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas. While circulation into Texas may appear
farfetched, the Dallas Herald warned its readers to be on the lookout for counterfeit tens
on the Canal Bank of New Orleans, indicating the possibility that the counterfeit currency
could circulate deep into Texas. The Herald specifically noted that the information
regarding the counterfeit notes originated from a counterfeiter arrested in Cincinnati who
also possessed papers revealing that men left Cairo, Illinois with a large amount of
counterfeit money meant for circulation throughout the South.68 When taken together, the
articles about the Canal Bank counterfeiters reveal that communities from central Texas,
to southern Ohio, from southern Louisiana, to western Tennessee, people across the
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United States worried about finding the counterfeit money in their local economies. Thus,
the Cincinnati police’s discovery of the Canal Bank counterfeiters demonstrates that their
efforts to fight counterfeiting along the Ohio River Valley contained the potential to
impact other communities far beyond Cincinnati, such as Dallas in the west and Memphis
and New Orleans in the Deep South.
Furthermore, the Canal Bank network underscores the importance of
counterfeiting the notes of a reputable bank, one that held regional credibility and whose
notes would not be out of place in the rural and urban communities along the two rivers.
Across the South, New Orleans’ banks carried an air of stability not found in many banks
across the South and circulated across the nation.69 The Canal Bank’s location in New
Orleans, the South’s major financial center, meant that people across the South, and along
the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, likely recognized the name of the bank, if not its bills.
Furthermore, the counterfeiters not only relied on New Orleans’ financial reputation to
give their notes credibility, they also created high quality counterfeit notes that helped
ensure their passage into the local river economies. Given the papers vague descriptions
of the counterfeit Canal Bank notes, they noted that the word “ten” was a slightly lighter
shade in the counterfeit, that a “flourish” existed between the words “Canal Bank,” and
that a line connected the two “lls” found in the word “dollar,” their high quality likely
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ensured that people refused the genuine bills of the Canal Bank as often as they accepted
its counterfeits.70
Cincinnati’s efforts to deter and eliminate counterfeiting along the Ohio River,
across the state of Ohio, and even across other state’s borders, rivals in scope, and
exceeds in complexity, the efforts of other nineteenth-century police departments. While
it is of little surprise that the nation’s financial centers of New York, Boston, and
Philadelphia, paid special attention to the nation’s financial criminals, it was the city of
Cincinnati, a place not known for its financial complexity, that housed one of the nation’s
most sophisticated anti-counterfeiting operations during the mid-nineteenth century. For
the Cincinnati police, the late 1850s and early 1860s brought an end to many of the
prominent counterfeiters and networks that operated near Cincinnati. Cincinnati’s police
travelled into western and southern Indiana to arrest the region’s rural counterfeiters
when local police were unable to put an end to their activities. The police refined and
implemented their undercover operations with great success, infiltrating the
counterfeiting networks in rural Indiana, Ohio, and western Virginia. The department
expanded the scope of its powers into central Illinois, where it arrested members of the
Canal Bank counterfeiters who planned to pass thousands of dollars of counterfeit money
along the Mississippi River and into the South. Cincinnati police’s discovery of the
Canal Bank counterfeiters reveals a connection between the Ohio River counterfeiters
and the Mississippi River counterfeiting underworld that provides a clue into the
expansiveness of both underworlds. After all, just as the legitimate side of the United
70
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States’ capitalist economy knit the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers together, so too did its
underground counterpart. Given that both the nation’s capitalist and slave economies
spread westward, it makes sense that equally sophisticated underground economies
followed their progression across the United States. Counterfeiting in the South,
however, carried far more dangerous consequences than it did in New England and
Cincinnati, consequences that occasionally turned deadly.
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IV. CHAPTER THREE
Wholesale Outrage and Retributive Justice: Responses to Counterfeiting in the
Deep South
Perhaps it is no surprise that given their operations along the borders of the
nation’s capitalist and slave economies the region’s counterfeiters entangled themselves
in more than the economic politics of the United States. Occasionally, the region’s
counterfeiters found themselves involved in the preeminent issue that the United States
had grappled with since its very inception: slavery. In an effort to exert their control
over the enslaved, southern cities and rural areas established powerful police forces that
should have made them powerful tools in the region’s efforts to fight counterfeiting. A
close examination of counterfeiting along the rural areas of the Mississippi River,
however, indicate that local police were either too ill-equipped to deal with counterfeiting
or devoted most of their time towards policing the enslaved. The local judicial system’s
inabilities to effectively punish counterfeiting in the region forced some rural southerners
to take matters into their own hands. In an effort to put a permanent end to counterfeiting
in their midst, some rural areas on the Mississippi resorted to killing counterfeiters that
served as a warning to other counterfeiters who may have thought about setting up their
operations in the rural Deep South. While the rural vigilantes along the Mississippi River
employed different methods than Cincinnati’s municipal police to deter counterfeiting,
the vigilante’s still pursued a similar goal: the removal of counterfeiting from the region
that in turn safeguarded the integrity of local economic transactions. By protecting the
integrity of the local economy from counterfeiting, the vigilante’s actions served the
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public good and safeguarded the economic interests of the nineteenth-century American
state.
The exploration of the rural Mississippi River Valley’s responses to counterfeiting
provides a look at how rural communities in the Deep South attempted to deter
counterfeiting in one of the United States’ prominent geographical borders. In addition to
closely examining counterfeiting in the geographical borders of the United States,
counterfeiting along the rural Mississippi River in the Deep South reveals how rural
communities in the region responded to the crime when they lacked the option to call on
a well-organized police force. In doing so, we can then compare and contextualize the
rural Deep South’s responses to counterfeiting that provides a more nuanced picture of
counterfeiting’s acceptance or deterrence across the United States during the nineteenth
century. Furthermore, looking at how the rural areas along the Mississippi River
responded to counterfeiting also helps further our understanding of how counterfeiting
worked in the different regions of the United States, not just in the commercial northeast
and in the free states of the Midwest. Lastly, the exploration of rural counterfeiting on
the Mississippi River sheds light on how some rural communities in the Deep South
supplemented weak judicial institutions by resorting to punishing counterfeiting through
vigilantism and violence. The chapter contextualizes the region’s responses to
counterfeiting in the 1840s by showing that they contain echoes and connections to the
region’s earlier responses to the Murrell gang of criminals, whose alleged presence
throughout the Mississippi River Valley in the late 1830s, ignited a violent response
against the region’s criminals and against a group of gamblers in Vicksburg, Mississippi.
In revealing the connections between the region’s violent responses to the Murrell gang
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and Vicksburg gamblers in the 1830s, to the region’s responses to counterfeiting in the
1840s, the chapter argues that they can be contextualized as the Deep South’s efforts to
safeguard the integrity of key pieces of the region’s capitalist system. The Murrell gang
allegedly planned to organize a slave revolt to hide the gang’s efforts to rob the region’s
banks, Vicksburg’s gamblers obtained wealth through speculation and enticed other
young men to get rich quick that led to financial ruin, and the region’s counterfeiters
acted to undermined the very paper currency that facilitated the region’s economy.
Lastly, while on the surface it appears that the region responded violently to
counterfeiting, a deeper look reveals that those responses often resulted from instances
when counterfeiters participated in slave and horse stealing, or when they consistently
avoided punishment for their crimes. As such, the region’s responses to counterfeiting
unconnected to other crimes paints a picture of a region that held more in common with
the Midwest and East Coast United States, in terms of policing counterfeiting, than was
previously known.
The study of counterfeiting and vigilante policing helps provide additional insight
into the commercial and financial world of the rural Mississippi River that is missed by
other works that focus on the chaotic nature of the region following the removal of the
Creek and Cherokee during the 1830s. Works that typically focus on the financial world
of the Deep South and on the Mississippi River tend to examine the role of credit and
paper currency in the acquisition of land and slaves and how some people believed that
they could find a new start in the region.1 The works that look at the southwestern United
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States examine how the acquisition of land and slaves in the Deep South to produce
cotton integrated the region into a global market that in turn was reinvested in the area
through the availability of more credit that could be used to buy land, slaves, and cotton.
The region’s links to a global economy, however, also carried dire consequences, as seen
in the panic of 1837 when many planters defaulted on their debts.2 The macro focus on
the Deep South levels the experiences of an entire region into a story that focus on the
experiences of slave owners and would-be slave owners and cotton farmers that leaves
out the stories of other people who settled in the region. While the encompassing land
rush in the 1830s called to the Deep South those who wished to make money from cotton
and the enslaved, it also called counterfeiters to the area as well. Counterfeiters likely
found the chaotic financial conditions in the newly opened Deep South ideal, as currency
from all over the United States, and possibly the world, facilitated the region’s economic
transactions.3 Therefore, by looking at counterfeiting and the region’s attempts to police
it, often through vigilante methods, we also gain a better understanding of the other
people who populated the region, beyond slave owners.
Additionally, the focus on counterfeiting and policing in the Mississippi River
Valley, results from the fact that it was one of the few regions in the Deep South, other
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than New Orleans, where counterfeiters congregated, albeit in far fewer numbers than
found in the nation’s urban centers. The majority of the evidence for counterfeiting in the
South during the nineteenth century indicates that counterfeiters avoided establishing
major counterfeiting production sites in the South’s interior. One possible explanation for
the lack of counterfeit production sites in the South could be attributed to region’s
constant policing of slavery and its continuous scrutiny of outsiders.4 After demonstrating
the extent and presence of counterfeiting networks along the Ohio River, however, it is
clear that counterfeiters did not need to establish production sites in the South to either
circulate money in the region or to make money through the selling and/or passing of
counterfeit notes. If anything, the South’s financial system, one that favored the
circulation of lower denomination notes and lacked specie as a viable circulating
medium, offered counterfeiters ideal opportunities to pass counterfeit notes and an even
greater incentive for counterfeiters to forge coin in a specie starved economy.5 The South
made for an excellent environment to circulate counterfeit notes and its reliance on, and
connections to, the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers for trade meant that counterfeiters did
not need to establish their operations in the South to be able to circulate their notes in the
region.
4
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Counterfeiters did, however, congregate along the Mississippi River in the Deep
South as it provided them with key advantages to set up a counterfeiting operation that
were missing from the South’s interior. For example, trade along the Mississippi River
offered counterfeiters commercial cover to pass counterfeit notes. River trade, coupled
with the presence of various banknotes from across the nation, provided counterfeiters
with countless opportunities to pass their fake notes, opportunities lacking in the South’s
interior rural economies. The steamboats that travelled the Mississippi River offered
counterfeiters important opportunities to escape police pursuit and helped reestablish
their operations in other regions of the United States. Lastly, while the Deep South
contained both organized police and quasi-police in the form of the various slave patrols
that operated throughout the South, southern police were primarily concerned with the
policing of slavery, not with trying to pursue and arrest the counterfeiters when they fled
on the Mississippi River.6
Furthermore, the Mississippi River economy not only acted as the end point for
the region’s internal commerce (i.e. bringing cotton from a plantation and loading it onto
ships bound for New Orleans), but it also carried goods from the nation’s urban centers to
the rural river towns, meaning that it simultaneously functioned as a starting point for the
South’s internal commerce as well.7 The structure of the Mississippi River economy
followed a fairly straightforward path that illuminates the countless opportunities for
counterfeit money to enter it undetected. The trading ships that travelled on the river
6
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offloaded their wares into the region’s cities and towns, where their residents purchased
the goods with coin and paper currency, and occasionally with counterfeit money. If a
storeowner found out they received counterfeit money after the fact, they could either
destroy the money and realize a loss of profit or pass the counterfeit money to the next
customer, which then reinserted the counterfeit money into the local economy.8 In turn,
that person either passed the counterfeit money along in a future business transaction in
the town/city/countryside or figured out that it was a fake note and possibly tried to
redeem it at a local bank. Either way, the basic economic transactions begun along the
river communities facilitated the insertion of counterfeit notes into the South’s rural and
urban economies. The structure of the Mississippi River economy meant that it offered
countless opportunities for counterfeit money to enter the Deep South, while also
ensuring its continuous circulation until someone recognized that a note was counterfeit.
Before continuing, it is important to explain a few arguments and terminologies
that appear in the next two chapters. First, this chapter does not claim that counterfeiters
in the Deep South made concentrated efforts to buy slaves and land with counterfeit
money that in turn provided them with the social and political privileges that
accompanied the ownership of land and slaves in the South. The purchase of land and
slaves conferred on the buyer economic, political, and social clout that invited close
scrutiny of the transaction; hardly the ideal circumstances to pass a counterfeit note. Few
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examples exist of a person knowingly buying either slaves or land with counterfeit
money, although it occurred sporadically across the region during the nineteenth
century.9 Rather, the region’s economic, political, and social foundations in the enslaved
economy provided its citizens with key incentives to heavily police their communities
through both state sanctioned and vigilante methods in regards to slavery, but not
counterfeiting. Therefore, the hyper-policing in the South, when coupled with the role of
violence in white male southerner’s understanding of honor, produced occasionally
violent responses to counterfeiting in ways not seen in the North.
Finally, while not a main point of the work, it is important to note that by looking
at counterfeiting along the South’s borders and in New Orleans, counterfeiting provides a
glimpse into the ways that non-planters participated in the United State’s larger capitalist
market system. One of the key arguments of Stephen Mihm’s work is that counterfeiting
worked as kind of shadow capitalism that provided the nation’s communities, especially
its rural ones, with access too much needed and highly sought after paper money.10 In
turn, paper money facilitated basic economic exchanges that allowed rural and other
communities to participate in the nation’s emerging capitalist system. Therefore, the
9
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study of counterfeiting provides a counterintuitive glimpse into the ways that nonplantation, and non-slave owning, southerners participated in capitalism during the
nineteenth century.
Furthermore, for the purpose of clarity, the next two chapters of the dissertation
uses the term “southerner” as a general description for white males in the South. The
reliance on the general term “southerner” does not advance a claim that counterfeiting
only impacted white males or that white women and people of color’s thoughts about
counterfeiting are unimportant. As will be seen in New Orleans, groups of women both
successfully counterfeited their own currency and passed counterfeit money into New
Orleans’ market economy, actions that often confused their male counterparts. Rather, the
use of the term in the work is with the understanding that white males created the primary
bulk of the evidence found in the work that they meant for other white males to consume.
Lastly, before exploring responses to counterfeiting along the Mississippi River
and in parts of the rural South, one final point regarding the sources found in this, and the
other, chapters must be made. The earlier chapters of the work relied on newspaper
accounts, judicial sources, and state crime statistics, to gain a better understanding of the
Ohio River’s counterfeiting underworld. In order to reconstruct counterfeiting in the
rural Mississippi River Valley, however, this chapter is primarily reliant on newspaper
accounts that reported on the region. When treated with caution, nineteenth-century
newspapers provide a key window through which to view a local community’s responses
to counterfeiting that in turn sheds light on its values and priorities. Nineteenth-century
newspapers, however, fiercely competed for readers and in order to increase circulation
numbers, many papers exaggerated the seriousness and extent of a particular
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counterfeiting incident. Therefore, when possible, the chapter consults multiple stories of
a single event in an effort to corroborate the information with as many sources as
possible. Newspaper accounts of counterfeiting, however, are still valuable even without
evidence corroborating every part of their accuracy. While the “data” (the names, places,
and other pieces of information) are important, the primary value of the newspaper stories
reporting on counterfeiting in the rural South are the details that they inadvertently reveal
in their stories; details that shed light on how and why rural white male southerners
reacted towards counterfeiting in ways not seen in other parts of the United States.
In order to contextualize southern responses to counterfeiting, along the
Mississippi River, it is important to understand the region’s uneasy history with
counterfeiting. When the United States government removed the Creek and Cherokee
from the southwestern United States in 1836 and 1838, the resulting land boom and
speculation frenzy offered counterfeiters a unique opportunity to purchase rich cotton
land with fake money.11 Additionally, the land boom and speculation in the newly
opened Native American territory offered counterfeiters and shovers a golden opportunity
to purchase the keys to political, social, and economic status in the South: land and
slaves. When the United States government opened its auctions for the Creek and
Cherokee lands, counterfeit notes appeared in the economic chaos that characterized the
frenzy of the land sales.12 In May 1834, the Congressional Globe reported that someone
either knowingly or unknowingly used a counterfeit one hundred-dollar bill on the Bank
11
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of the United States to purchase land from Uriah Mitchell, who worked as the receiver of
public money for the land in the Cahawba land district in Alabama. 13
During the nineteenth century, counterfeiters frequently targeted the currency of
the Second Bank of the United States due to its stability and its recognition by Americans
as a stable financial institution in the United States regardless of where Americans lived
in the nation.14 The steadier the banking institution, the more likely people accepted its
notes as genuine, which in turn attracted counterfeits of the bank’s notes.15 The stability
of the Second Bank of the United States lends credit to the argument that Mitchell
accepted the counterfeit hundred-dollar as a genuine note and in turn, sold its owner
Creek land. Bank of the United States currency offered the appearance of stability in a
place, Alabama, and time, 1830s, when both land speculation and the proliferation of a
variety of bank notes created a financial atmosphere of instability and chaos, in which a
person could easily pass counterfeit notes unnoticed. Additionally, following the removal
of the Cherokee in 1838, United States officials realized that an individual or a group of
people purchased some of the former Cherokee lands with counterfeit money.16
Therefore, the chaotic and quick land speculation deals that characterized the buying and
selling of the former Native American lands in the Deep South made it extremely
difficult, if not outright impossible, for United States officials to determine both the
source of the fake notes and to connect the notes to the land that the government sold in
13
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exchange for the note. The use of counterfeit currency to purchase Native American
lands in the Deep South shows that the threat of someone buying land, and by extension
status, though illegal means could be a pressing concern to white southerners.
With the removal of the Creek in 1836 and the Cherokee in 1838, the South
continued its westward expansion towards the Mississippi River, and counterfeiters
followed the nation’s expanding western borders. In 1835, southerners who lived in
Memphis, Tennessee voiced concerns about counterfeiters who operated in the Arkansas
Territory, on the other side of the Mississippi River. One of the concerned citizens, a
man named Charles McLean, wrote a letter to Elijah Hayward, the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, in which McLean described a situation where several prominent
citizens of Memphis were concerned about a “law-less band of freebooters” who paid for
their purchases in counterfeit notes and squatted on the public lands in Arkansas.17
McLean and other citizens argued that the group of counterfeiters threatened the integrity
of the Mississippi River trade, all the way up to its junction with the Ohio River and into
the states of Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois.18 McClean’s letter specifically
demonstrates that some people in the region recognized that counterfeiting contained the
potential to undermine a key portion of the nation’s capitalist economy, and the state
needed to act in order to protect the region from counterfeiting. Lastly, when Charles
McLean’s specifically mentioned that the citizens of Memphis were “in perpetual fear of
losing our Slaves” to the counterfeiters across the river, he further reveals one of the ways
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that counterfeiters and their currencies threatened a key foundation of southern
capitalism, the region’s control over the enslaved.19
The linkages between counterfeiting and slave stealing in McLean’s letter indicate
that the counties in Mississippi remembered the fallout from a region wide mass hysteria
incited by an 1835 pamphlet written by a man named Virgil Stewart. Stewart’s pamphlet
claimed that a group of criminals belonging to a gang ran by John Murrell planned to
incite a slave rebellion on Christmas day in 1835 in order to mask several planned bank
robberies.20 After two women allegedly heard the enslaved talking about the plot, a
group of planters sought to stop the insurrection before it could happen and searched for
members of the gang.21 When the planters interrogated the slaves, they obtained
information that implicated two white men in the plot who planned to aid their
insurrection.22 In an effort to circumvent the alleged planned rebellion, the region’s
planting class executed all the suspected members of the alleged plot and believed they
had avoided a terrible fate. In reality, Stewart over emphasized the group’s organization
and reach and the men planned no such insurrection. The Mississippi River Valley,
however, remained on high alert for any perceived slave insurrection.23 At the same
time, nearby Vicksburg worried about the poor white men who made money gambling
rather than through “traditional” means and viewed these men as the perpetrators of “all

19

Clarence Carter, The Territorial Papers of the United States, pg. 1059

20

Rothman. Flush Times and Fever Dreams, pg. 73

21

Rothman. Flush Times and Fever Dreams, pgs. 91-92

22

Rothman. Flush Times and Fever Dreams, pgs. 119-127

23

Rothman. Flush Times and Fever Dreams, pg. 131

131

of the disturbances and crime” that plagued the city.24 The combined fears of a slave
insurrection that contained the participation of poor whites, who may or may not have
been professional gamblers, held sway over the region’s imagination for several years.
As such, the region responded quickly and violently to assert its control over both the
enslaved and the region’s economy system. By targeting the gamblers, southerners in the
Deep South also sought to reinforce the importance of obtaining wealth through hard
work and discipline, two key parts of nineteenth-century capitalism’s ethos. In doing so,
the violent responses served to protect the parts of the local capitalist system from thieves
and gamblers that reveals the region’s vested interest in the nation’s expanding capitalist
system.
McLean’s letter, however, does not specifically mention if the counterfeiters near
Memphis were members of the “Murrell Gang.”25 There are clues in his letter, however,
that McLean left open the possibility that the gang near Memphis was affiliated with, or a
part of, the Murrell syndicate. In McLean’s letter, the strongest piece of evidence linking
24
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this group of counterfeiters to the gang emerges when he wrote that a Tennessee court
recently sentenced one of the criminals from Arkansas to ten years imprisonment in the
Tennessee state penitentiary for slave stealing.26 McLean is almost certainly talking
about John Murrell, the alleged leader of the Murrell gang whom in 1834 a Madison,
Tennessee court tried and found guilty of slave stealing.27 Whether McLean’s
counterfeiters were associated with the Murrell gang or not, the counterfeiters’ theft of
slaves troubled those who lived across the Mississippi River. Newspaper references to
the specter of the Murrell gang constantly reminded their readers to be extra vigilant over
their enslaved, lest their lack of control over the slaves, their property, lead to a violent
rebellion that threatened the southern social order.
During the mid-1830s, southerners continued linking counterfeiters to both slave
stealing and to the Murrell gang, showing how the region used the specter of the
criminals to protect key parts of the region’s capitalist system. Less than a month after
McLean wrote his letter, the Southern Recorder reported in August 1835 that members of
the Murrell gang threatened to incite a slave insurrection in Vicksburg, Mississippi and
that Murrell was involved in passing counterfeit notes in Tennessee.28 Six months after
McLean’s letter, the Federal Union wrote that people in Little Rock, Arkansas executed
Jon Tipton, an alleged member of the gang.29 The paper described Tipton as slave stealer
involved in the “passing of counterfeit currency” and “one of the most audacious rascals
26
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of the Murrell gang.”30 For Little Rock’s citizens, violence provided the appropriate
deterrent to counterfeiting and slave stealing, not the muted justice found in the state’s
courtroom. Indeed, it appeared to southerners along the Mississippi River that members
of the Murrell gang operated throughout the South and that the gang of counterfeiters,
slave stealers, and horse thieves threatened to topple southerner’s rigid control over the
enslaved; control southerners employed to maintain their hold over their communities.
Southerners believed slave stealers threatened the foundations of profit on which the
system of slavery rested and in doing so they also threatened the integrity of the capitalist
system itself.31 By consistently liking counterfeiters to slave stealers, southerners
demonstrated the seriousness of the threat that counterfeiting posed to the social and
economic foundations of their way of life. Along the Mississippi River, therefore,
counterfeiters needed to be dealt with quickly in order to protect the Deep South’s social
and economic worlds.
In 1838, southern newspapers continued linking counterfeiters to slave stealing.
On August 7, 1838 the Federal Union exposed the dangerous link between the two illicit
professions when it published the confession of a counterfeiter named William Clark who
the state planned to execute for the crime of stealing the enslaved from a plantation.32
The Federal Union published the confession to “throw some light on the mysterious
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disappearance” of slaves in Mississippi.33 The Federal Union noted “an extended and
well organized gang” practiced “their feats of villainy upon the property of the
community.”34 Clark and his confederates kidnapped slaves in Mobile, Alabama and
took them to Houston, Texas where they sold the enslaved to new masters. The men who
bought the slaves in Houston were brothers who went by the last name Elliott. Clark
reported that the Elliot’s were “involved in counterfeiting” and that he possessed the
plates that the Elliot’s used to counterfeit bank notes on New Orleans banks.35 It is
evident in the language that prefaced Clark’s confession that the Federal Union’s editors
believed that counterfeiters threatened the property, in the form of the enslaved, of
southerners throughout the South, especially in Mississippi. Therefore, the paper’s
publication of Clark’s confession allowed southerners to see the state establish and then
reassert control over a narrative in which southern males mastered both their fate, and
more importantly, their property, the enslaved. Additionally, the paper also published the
confession as a warning to counterfeiters and slave stealers of the consequences of their
actions. In the South, execution awaited the practitioners of counterfeiting and slave
stealing. For southerners, Clark’s execution meant the removal of a counterfeiter and
slave stealer from their midst and reasserted the state’s ability to regulate and protect the
region’s economy from a serious threat.
It appears, however, that the executions and imprisonments of individual
counterfeiters failed to serve as an adequate warning to the future counterfeiters who
33
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operated along the Mississippi River and in rural parts of the Deep South during the
1840s. In 1841, six years after McLean’s letter, and three years after Clark’s confession,
counterfeiters still operated along the Mississippi River. Indeed, the following example
demonstrates that violence still played an important role in southern reactions to
counterfeiting. Additionally, the example shows that the region’s judicial system faced
difficulties in effectively punishing the counterfeiters who operated in the newly
incorporated frontier territory of Arkansas. The lack of punishment for counterfeiting
offers one possibly explanation for the region’s use of violence towards their local
counterfeiters. Finally, the incident recounted below reveals that southerners continued to
link the crimes of counterfeiting and slave stealing together, showing how the region’s
economic system shaped southerners perceptions of counterfeiting in ways not seen along
the Ohio River and in the northeast United States.
In August 1841, New Orleans newspapers obtained information about the killing
of a group of counterfeiters on the Mississippi River from the captain of a steamship that
recently arrived in the city. The captain informed the Picayune’s reporters that a group of
people from Phillips County, Arkansas and Coahoma County, Mississippi, worked
together to destroy a gang of “counterfeiters and horse thieves” who operated along both
sides of the Mississippi River. 36 The counterfeiters and criminals allegedly operated in
the region for quite some time and did not fear retaliation from the local police and
judicial system. Fed up with the group’s defiant acts, a group of people from Arkansas
and Mississippi decided to permanently remove the counterfeiters from the region. The
36

“Lynch Law in Arkansas-Nine Men Executed without Trial,” New York Tribune, August 25, 1841. From
the Library of Congress, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers site
(https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030212/1841-08-25/ed-1/seq-2/).

136

men organized into a group, armed themselves, and then set out on a ship down the
Mississippi River to capture the counterfeiters. The captain revealed that after a few days,
the group captured twenty-seven counterfeiters and took the men to a secluded spot on
the Mississippi River. Next, the vigilantes bound the men’s hands and feet together and
drowned them in the river. The captain claimed that he met the armed vigilantes shortly
after they executed the counterfeiters and that they were in pursuit of a man named
Marian (Marion) Wright. Finally, the captain noted that as he travelled downriver
towards New Orleans, several people informed him that they had seen seven or eight
bodies floating down the Mississippi River.37 The captain’s story paints a picture in
which a group of people from Arkansas and Tennessee were so enraged at the group's
abilities to avoid punishment, that they took the matter into their own hands and killed the
counterfeiters and criminals. Through their actions, the vigilante’s removed the
counterfeiters from the region, which in turn eliminated a source of counterfeit money
that likely circulated throughout the Mississippi River Valley.
As newspapers across the United States picked up the story, more facts emerged
that simultaneously confirmed the majority of the captain’s account, and added new
information to the affair. Georgetown, Ohio’s Democratic Standard carried a story
originally published in the St. Louis New Era five days after the original New Orleans
Picayune account. The New Era’s story confirmed that the gang consisted of a group of
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counterfeiters while adding that other members of the group were gamblers.38 The
discrepancy, while mundane, is important when paired with another description of the
counterfeiters that emerged in an Illinois newspaper taken from the St. Luis Republican.
The Republican noted that the vigilantes inflicted “Lynch Law” on a number of
“counterfeiters, gamblers, negro stealers, and inland pirates.”39 The use of the term
“inland pirate” and the inclusion of “gamblers” is a likely reference to the title of Virgil
Stewart’s pamphlet that detailed the scope and operations of the Murrell gang in the
1830s.40 As such, the newspaper possibly invoked the ghost of John Murrell and the
Murrell gang in its references to the Mississippi counterfeiters in 1841. Therefore, the
New Era’s and St. Louis Republican’s description of the counterfeiters acting as both
gamblers and land pirates provides an additional explanation that region may have
responded violently to the counterfeiters due to its perceived problems with the Murrell
gang years ago.
The new information that emerged later on about the Mississippi River incident
provides insight into some of the ways that the presence of the enslaved and the South’s
efforts to police the enslaved and its communities influenced rural Mississippi’s
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responses to counterfeiting. For example, one explanation as to why the group of armed
citizens from Arkansas and Mississippi resorted to violence emerges in the Vicksburg
Whig article, published in the Southern Banner at Holly Springs, Mississippi. The
Vicksburg Whig described the criminals as both counterfeiters and robbers. The Whig,
however, also added the information that the group stole horses and, more dangerously,
stole enslaved from the region’s farms and plantations. Therefore, the counterfeiters’
abilities to undermine southern control over the enslaved meant that they, likely
unintentionally, rebuked the plantation owners’ beliefs in their abilities to assert their will
and control over the enslaved. In short, the counterfeiters forced some of the region’s
slave owners to the uncomfortable conclusion that they were, in fact, not masters over the
enslaved nor could they force the enslaved to stay on the planation, farm, or in the
community. As such, the counterfeiters and criminals now posed a serious threat to one
of the key tenants of white, male, southern identity and masculinity: their belief, and
expectation, that they could assert their will and control over the enslaved. Therefore, the
region’s slave owning class, and others, resorted to the one tool that allowed them
reassert in their own minds, and in the minds of their communities, their standing atop the
social order: extreme violence.
The actual methods that the vigilante’s employed to capture the Mississippi River
counterfeiters is a key piece of information that reveals the intricate planning put forth
into the efforts to remove the counterfeiters from the region. New Orleans’ newspapers
noted that the vigilantes from Arkansas and Tennessee obtained a trading boat and
disguised themselves as a group of traders travelling down the Mississippi River who
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stopped to sell their goods to the people living on its banks.41 When the disguised trading
boat stopped at one the gang’s suspected locations, the counterfeiters boarded the ship
and attempted to buy produce with counterfeit money. After the men passed the
counterfeit money, the hidden members on the ship captured the counterfeiters and
detained the men below deck. The entire process repeated itself until the group captured
the majority of the counterfeiters, and then they executed the criminals on the Mississippi
River. 42 The group’s adoption of the identity of a river trader indicates that they knew
the ruse would likely convince the counterfeiters to come on board their ship in an effort
to buy their produce with counterfeit money. By donning the disguise of a river trader,
the men gained clear evidence of the counterfeiter’s guilt, and only executed the men
after they had the evidence literally in hand. By purchasing produce with counterfeit
money, the Mississippi River counterfeiters followed a similar tactic as the rest of the
nation’s counterfeiters who mostly used counterfeit money to buy food and goods, like
clothing, rather than trying to pass counterfeit money in an effort to accumulate the
trapping’s wealth, or to even get wealthy.43
The execution of the counterfeiters on the Mississippi River offers a tailor made
story that blurs the lines between myth and reality which makes it difficult to figure out
what happened on the river’s banks in 1841. One of the key discrepancies in the
accounts is the reported number of men killed on the river. Initial reports indicate that
41
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the vigilantes drowned nine of the counterfeiters.44 The more outlandish stories believed
that the disguised traders killed upwards of fifty to seventy counterfeiters and criminals
on the Mississippi River.45 In actuality, the exact amount of killed counterfeiters is not
important. The mere fact that the vigilantes killed any counterfeiters at all indicates an
increased hostility towards counterfeiters, and their brazen flouting of the local judicial
system, not seen in other regions of the United States. By charting the names of the killed
counterfeiters mentioned in the nation’s newspapers, however, it is possible to arrive at a
more accurate number of those killed on the Mississippi River than the inflated numbers
reported in the nation’s newspapers. Between the first accounts that emerged in August
1841 to the Nile’s Weekly Register’s inclusion of the Arkansas Gazette’s defense of the
vigilante’s actions on November 6, twenty seven newspapers across the United States
published details about the Mississippi River incident. The names of nine men appear
frequently in all the accounts. While another six other names appear less frequently, they
are still mentioned often enough as to warrant consideration. Therefore, rather than the
disguised traders killing seventy five criminals, or fifty, or even twenty three, it is more
probable that they killed at least nine and as many as fifteen counterfeiters in the summer
of 1841. The key point, however, is that the vigilante’s resorted to deadly violence in the
first place to finally rid the area of counterfeiting. Although the group employed violence
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to remove a source of counterfeit money form the region, in doing so they aided the
state’s effort to regulate and protect the region’s economy from counterfeiting.
Additionally, while the vigilante’s also removed the counterfeiter’s families from
the area, they did not kill them. The vigilante’s restraint suggests that they reserved their
violence for those who, in their minds, deserved it. After the vigilantes killed the
counterfeiters on the Mississippi River, the group visited the areas where the family
members of the gang lived, warned them not to return, and then set fire to their homes.46
While the vigilantes burned the homes of the counterfeiters’ family members, no
evidence exists that the men targeted and killed the members of the families, indicating
that they only wanted to use their violence in response to the criminals directly
responsible for the perceived crimes that occurred along the Mississippi River.
Therefore, while the counterfeiter’s pushed the vigilante’s to act violently towards them,
the vigilantes simultaneously reserved their violent actions towards those people that they
perceived as being the one’s most deserving of their wrath.
Finally, an interesting piece of evidence emerges to show that the group appeared
to operate on a larger, regional level as a counterfeiting network and provides a
connection to the Ohio River’s counterfeiting underworld. After the vigilantes burned
the homes of the counterfeiter’s families, they continued searching the area for a man
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named Marion Wright, the “cashier” for the gang.47 The vigilantes wanted to capture
Wright before he returned to the Mississippi River after he allegedly visited a major
counterfeiting center on the Ohio River: Cincinnati.48 Cincinnati’s role as one of the key
nodes in the United States’ counterfeiting underworld and Wright’s return to Mississippi
after visiting that particular city, hints at a link between the Mississippi River
counterfeiters and Cincinnati. Wright’s fate, however, is ultimately unknown. One
account claimed that several people in Napoleon, a small town near the Arkansas River,
reported seeing Wright leave the area with “uncommon speed” in order to avoid the
vigilantes.49 Later accounts, however, painted a different story, when they somberly
noted, “the cashier of the establishment was found dead in the river at Columbus
(Columbia).”50
Contrast the rural, vigilante response to counterfeiting along the borderlands of
the South to that of the urban Cincinnati police during the late 1840s and throughout the
1850s. Sources indicate that Cincinnati police never drew their weapons and killed a
counterfeiter, even when it appeared that they would have been well in their right to do
so. One such incident occurred in 1853, when a counterfeiter attempted to avoid arrest
47
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by swinging an ax at a Cincinnati police officer. The police still arrested the man without
resorting to deadly violence.51 The Cincinnati police operated in a more reserved manner
than the rural vigilantes on the Mississippi River when it came to dealing with the
counterfeiters who operated in their city and in the surrounding countryside. Of course,
by the 1850s, the Cincinnati police had more practice in pacifying the region and were
not as concerned with the policing of slavery and all the complications that accompanied
such an effort. Even before the professionalization of the Cincinnati police, they still did
not respond to counterfeiting in a violent manner. Both Cincinnati’s police and the rural
vigilante’s however, wanted to rid their respective areas of counterfeiting that in turn
helped protect the economic soundness of the everyday transactions that took place in
both region’s economies.
The key difference between the violent Mississippi River incident and the
restraint demonstrated by Cincinnati’s police in regards to dealing with counterfeiting
resulted from the different ways that the enslaved and capitalist economies viewed their
counterfeiters constant and consistent violation of the law. First, the Mississippi River
incident occurred in 1841, shortly after the territory of Arkansas achieved its statehood.
Therefore, in order to help pacify the region for the expansion of the South and its
economy, white southern males needed to send a strong message that the former wild
frontier areas near the South were now under control. The need for the vigilante’s to
assert both their personal and judicial authority over the region emerges in the reasons for
why the group finally took action against the counterfeiters. In regards to the Mississippi
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incident, several newspapers across the United States noted that the counterfeiter’s
constant flouting of the law, by avoiding arrest, or by appearing in court to provide key
testimony that resulted in the freedom of their captured counterparts, enraged the local
populace to the point that it drove them to take vigilante action.52 In essence, the
counterfeiters flouted and mocked the judicial authority of the South by exploiting its
reliance on personal testimony that in turn allowed them to avoid justice, state sanctioned
retribution, for their crimes. In actuality, the counterfeiters also defied the personal
authority of the region’s upper class, a slight and challenge that white southerners could
not allow to go unpunished. The vigilante’s actions, however, served to supplement the
authority and power of the state and as such, they offered the state an additional tool
through which to remove counterfeiters from the region that in turn helped the state
regulate the economies of the Deep South.
An additional explanation for the vigilante’s violent actions emerges in the
August 26 edition of the Alexandria Gazette that shows the vigilantes reacted to the
counterfeiters once they encroached on their personal authority and threatened their
control over their property. The Gazette carried the story from the New Orleans Bee,
which noted that “besides the encroachment on the peace and prosperity of the public,”
hinting at the gang’s disregard for local laws, they “turned their criminal industry to horse
stealing to such an extent as to rouse the whole neighborhood.”53 The two separate
explanations for the vigilantes actions: that the gang spurned the men to action by
52
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constantly flouting the law, or that they forced the vigilante’s to act after they stole
horses, show that the vigilantes’ directed their violence towards those who undermined
their abilities to assert their power and control over a region (the gang’s constant flouting
of the local law) and over their property (their horses). Both justifications, however, also
show that the counterfeiter’s potential to subvert the social order resulted in violent
retribution, a key difference in the responses towards counterfeiting along the Mississippi
River in the Deep South and responses in the Ohio River Valley.
Two questions emerge in regards to the Mississippi River incident whose answers
in turn help explain the vigilante’s actions and whether they responded to the group
violently due to counterfeiting or for another reason such as horse stealing. First, did the
vigilantes react violently towards a group of men who disturbed the peace and stole
horses, or did they react because the men worked as counterfeiters? Second, would the
vigilantes have ignored the counterfeiters if they left their peace and property alone? The
newspapers that covered the incident provide the answers. All twenty-seven stories
described the men as counterfeiters, but not all of the reports described the men as horse
stealers, gamblers, or those who disturbed the peace, indicating that it was the men’s
identities as counterfeiters that primarily defined their danger to the Mississippi River
communities. Furthermore, while the gang’s decision to steal horses spurred the local
populace to action, the primary reason for the vigilante’s anger lay in the fact that the
counterfeiters consistently avoided punishment for the crime of counterfeiting by lying
and covering for each other during their examinations.54 Finally, the vigilantes decided
54

“The Late Lynchings in Arkansas,” The Ohio Democrat, September 30, 1841. From the Library of
Congress, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers site
(https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84028889/1841-09-30/ed-1/seq-2/).

146

that the best way to capture the counterfeiters was to obtain a ship, adopt the identity of a
group of traders travelling the river, and, most importantly, wait until the men tried to buy
goods with counterfeit money, before they arrested the gang. The local citizens did not
try and stake out a barn in order to catch the men in the act of stealing horses. Nor did
they try and detain the men after they successfully avoided a trial. Rather the vigilante’s
waited until they received counterfeit money in exchange for their goods, before tying up
and killing the men. From the vigilante’s perspectives, the counterfeit money served as
the only necessary proof of the men’s guilt that in turn provided them with the
justification to act decisively and violently to rid the area of the counterfeiters.
While counterfeit money provided the vigilante’s with important proof of the
counterfeiter’s guilt, the crime of counterfeiting provided its practitioners with key
advantages in the courtroom. Unfortunately, the Mississippi River counterfeiters
exploited these advantages to such an extent that it led to their deaths. Nineteenthcentury courtrooms across the United States relied heavily on personal testimonials in
order to obtain convictions for the crimes of counterfeiting money and/or passing
counterfeit notes.55 By covering for each other, the Mississippi River counterfeiters
simultaneously ensured both their freedom, while also reassuring each other that as long
as they kept to their stories, then they would go free. In essence, the counterfeiter’s alibis
for each other allowed the group to operate in the region with impunity, a key reason for
the vigilante’s actions.
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Finally, the non-violent nature of counterfeiting also provided its practitioners
with protection from local prosecution, and the group of counterfeiters along the
Mississippi River operated with non-violent methods. No report emerges that described
the counterfeiters as violent, or that they acted violently towards others in order to
advance their interests.56 The lack of violence that surrounded their actions allowed the
gang to appear unthreatening from a physical standpoint, which in turn allowed the group
to operate in the region longer than they would have if they used violence to advance
their interests. Other counterfeiters across the United States rarely acted violently and the
Mississippi counterfeiters fell into this category as well.57 The gang’s constant avoidance
of punishment, coupled with the local judicial system possibly tolerating their crimes far
longer than they would have because it was a non-violent crime, meant that the local
populace felt compelled to take justice into their own hands. Ironically, the advantages
that counterfeiting provided its practitioners in other parts of the United States ultimately
led to the deaths of a group of counterfeiters on the Mississippi River.
Furthermore, the tone that the nation’s newspapers used to describe the incident
reveals the deep regional divide in the United States in regards to counterfeiting, vigilante
policing in the South, and the violent response to counterfeiting along the Mississippi
River. The Southern Banner carried an article from Vicksburg Whig that titled the
incident “Summary Justice,” which implied that the citizens merely provided the justice
56
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sorely needed in their communities that the state failed to carry out in its official
capacity.58 The Columbus Democrat, published in Columbus, Mississippi carried the
same Vicksburg article but chose to title it “Summary Retributive Justice,” implying that
the criminals constant harassment of the locals justified the subsequent violent
responses.59 On the other hand, Georgetown, Ohio’s Democratic Standard carried a St.
Louis New Era article about the incident titled “Unheard of Tragedy!!—Counterfeiters
and Gamblers Drowned and Murdered—Arson—Unheard of Outrages” indicating their
outrage at what occurred downriver.60 If the article’s title failed to adequately convey the
paper’s stance on the incident, its opening left little doubt about how its writers felt about
the vigilante actions taken on the lower Mississippi. The author wrote that “We have no
language in which to characterize our detestation of the acts of cruelty and murder,”
which provides a glimpse into the different regional perspectives on the incident.61 The
author continued to lambast the incident, believing that “which for cold blooded atrocity,
are unequaled in the annals of Lynch law.”62 Firing one more salvo, he believed the
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incident surpassed the “traditions of the most ferocious savages of the country.”63
Newspapers in the New England states offered a more muted rebuke of the vigilante’s
actions. In Vermont, the Rutland Herald contained an article published in the Boston
Daily Times that labeled the incident “Most Horrible.”64
Contrast the above cultural and judicial framework of the South’s response to
counterfeiting along the Mississippi River to Cincinnati’s response to counterfeiters along
the Ohio River. Despite ample evidence from past encounters that counterfeiters could
either escape their prison cells or post bond and fail to return for a trial, Cincinnati police
never resorted to violence as a final solution for riding the area of their presence. The
difference is that Cincinnati and its people did not need to clearly establish where they
fell in a local hierarchy in relation to enslaved. Nor did one’s ability to assert their power
and control over another human being play a key role in the formation of identity in
Cincinnati. In the South, however, especially in the unsettled rural areas along the
Mississippi River in the 1830s and 1840s, the above factors, power, control, the assertion
of one’s place in an ordered society, were key foundations of one’s concept of self in the
South.
Furthermore, in comparison to the lower Mississippi River in the 1840s, by the 1850s,
Cincinnati and the Ohio River contained clearly settled areas with established judicial and
police systems that allowed the region to police counterfeiting without resorting to
63
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violence. Neither Cincinnati, nor the surrounding region, needed to assert personal and
judicial authority over a newly settled region in order to pacify the area in a way that also
made it safe for political and economic expansion. Therefore, the South’s belief in the
need for the cotton economy’s westward expansion and growth in order to ensure the
survival of the enslaved economy shaped rural southern responses to counterfeiting in
ways not seen in the North.65 For southerners, when the Mississippi River counterfeiters
constantly undermined the authority and power of those charged with protecting their
communities, which in turn potentially threatened the settlement of the area and the
westward expansion of the enslaved economy, then the local populace took justice into
their own hands and violently killed the counterfeiters operating in their midst.
In addition to the violent responses towards counterfeiting along the rural
Mississippi River, counterfeiting in the rural areas along Mississippi’s Gulf Coast also
carried penalties that had the potential to destroy local reputations. During a local
election in Gainesville, located in Hancock County, Mississippi in 1847, several residents
allegedly received counterfeit Mexican dollar coins from an old man named Brown.
When local residents failed to find counterfeit coins in Brown’s possession, they took
him to jail and threatened him with physical harm if he failed to provide information
about the counterfeit coins. It appeared that Gainesville did not want to take the chances
of bringing Brown before a local court and resorted to threatening Brown in order to
obtain more information about the origin of the counterfeit coins. The threat of physical
harm worked on Brown, who feared that the people would “take the law into their own
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hands and lynch him,” and he implicated two brothers, James and Washington Bilbo, as
the source of the counterfeit coins.66
The Bilbo brothers made for an interesting source for counterfeit coins, as they
appeared to contain the social standing needed to withstand Brown’s accusations. Prior
to the counterfeiting incident, the brothers allegedly possessed a “fair character,” they
worked as farmers, and lived in their own residence. Therefore the brothers, on the
surface at least, contained markers of legitimacy that offered them a bit of social standing
in southern society. That social standing, however, appeared to offer the brothers limited
protection, as the people of Gainesville decided to pay the brother’s farm a visit. After
Brown implicated the Bilbo brothers as the source of the counterfeit coin, Brown’s sonin-law, a man named Wages, posted Brown’s bail and the men led a group from
Gainesville to the Bilbo’s farm, located in the upper part of Hancock County, Mississippi.
Before the group arrived at the Bilbo’s farm, however, they found a counterfeiting
workshop near the farm that contained the dies and metals needed to create the fake
Mexican gold dollars. The location of the counterfeiting operation to the Bilbo’s farm,
and the discovery of the material needed to create the fake coins at the production site,
made the brothers the primary suspects for running the counterfeiting operation. The
people from Gainesville secured the counterfeiting equipment and then proceeded to the
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Bilbo's home. After they arrived, the group arrested the two brothers without incident,
and took the men back to Gainesville and placed them in jail.67
The brother’s quick release from jail with no charges filed reveals that they
possibly exploited their statuses as working farmers and men of fair character that
allowed them to secure both their bail and their freedom. The potential for criminal
accusations to negatively affect the little social capital the brothers had already accrued,
however, resulted in the men setting out to restore their standing in Hancock County by
extracting revenge on Brown and Wages. Following their release from custody, the
brothers claimed that Wages made a living by stealing and branding the cattle of Hancock
County’s farmers. By claiming that Wages made his living through illegal means, the
Bilbo’s attempted to both discredit his character and to establish that unlike their status as
working men, Wages worked as a criminal. Furthermore, at least one of the brothers,
Washington Bilbo, lived in Hancock County for a number of years, thus potentially
further establishing his standing in the rural community. Wages, on the other hand,
recently arrived in Hancock with an unsavory reputation, as many people in Gainesville
believed that prior to his arrival in Mississippi, Wages had killed a man in Alabama and
was already on the run from the law. Following the Bilbo's accusations against Wages,
Gainesville police arrested Wages, who then bonded out of custody prior to his trial. With
their reputations in disrepute, Wages and Brown decided to leave Hancock County.68
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On the surface, it appeared that the Bilbo's extracted their revenge and restored
their reputation in Hancock County. Despite bonding out of custody, however, the
Bilbos’ fellow citizens viewed the brothers with ill-repute and their reputation in
Hancock County lay in shambles.69 The charges of counterfeiting destroyed the men’s
reputations in southwestern Mississippi, which points to the serious effects that just being
accused of the crime could have on a person’s reputation in rural Mississippi. Despite
finding a counterfeiting operation on, or near, the Bilbo's farm, Hancock’s citizens failed
to locate any evidence, other than Brown’s testimony, that the brothers were the ones
who created the counterfeit Mexican gold dollars found in Gainesville in 1847.
Furthermore, the brothers never faced a trial before a Mississippi court and never
confronted the evidence, or lack thereof, of their guilt in the matter. Rather, the mere
suggestion that the Bilbo brothers ran a counterfeiting operation on or near their farm
provided Hancock’s citizens with enough suspicion about the brother’s character that
their reputation in Hancock County also lay in tatters.
The destruction of their reputation drove the Bilbo’s to confront Wages and
Brown as they departed Gainesville. For the brothers, only one option remained that
would allow them to restore their character and standing in Hancock county: violent
revenge. The Bilbo’s armed themselves and confronted Wages and Brown at which point
Wages shot and instantly killed James Bilbo. Caught unawares, Washington Bilbo failed
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to draw his rifle before Wages mortally wounded him with a second shot from his gun.
Wages and Brown left Washington in the road and escaped Gainesville. A little while
later, a traveller found Washington Bilbo on the road with his heavy wounds and took
him back to his family in Gainesville.70 Nobody in Gainesville ever saw Wages again.
Six months later, however, an interesting story emerged that hints at a deeper
connection between the Bilbo brothers and Wages. On June 29, 1849 the New Orleans
Daily Crescent published a story about the deaths of two men, Wagers (probably Wages)
and McGrath. The Daily Crescent informed its readers that for the past six months a
group of criminals terrorized Mississippi’s Harrison County, and the surrounding
counties as well. The paper also provided the last names of the criminals who terrorized
the region, they were: Wages, McGrath, Copeland, and Bilboa. The Crescent reported in
the article that six months ago, local police arrested and charged the men with belonging
to a gang of counterfeiters who operated along the Pearl River. The location of the
counterfeiting operation, on a creek that flows through the Pearl River, provides an
additional piece of evidence that hints at a more complicated story between the Bilbo’s
and Wagers. The Bilbo’s lived near the Pearl River when the Hancock citizens
confronted them six months ago, in 1847, when Brown claimed that the brothers
provided him with the counterfeit Mexican coin.71 The Daily Crescent claimed,
however, that one of the brothers provided evidence to local authorities that allowed them
to arrest the other counterfeiters. The police arrested Wages, McGrath, and Copeland,
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who failed to pay their bail. The court sentenced the men to prison to await their trial.
The three counterfeiters, however, escaped from the local jail, found Bilbo, and shot
him.72
In actuality, the relationships between the Bilbo brothers, Brown, and Wages were
far more complicated and intimate than what appeared in the scattered newspaper
accounts. In 1857, the Sheriff of Perry County, Mississippi recorded the confessions of
James Copeland, the “Great Southern Land Pirate” that detailed his exploits with the
“Wages Clan.”73 Copeland claimed that during the 1840s he and a man named Gale
Wages formed a secret band of criminals influenced by the Murrell gang who operated
across the Deep South.74 According to Copeland, the gang initially engaged in the
stealing of slaves by convincing them to runaway from their masters and then selling the
runaways to a member of their gang, a “rich planter” who lived near New Orleans.75
Copeland claimed that the gang successfully carried out their operations for years, with
one variant of the operation calling for the men to travel to Cincinnati, pose as a group of
traders travelling on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers for New Orleans, and then stealing
slaves on the way.76
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According to Copeland’s testimonial, the gang made such a profit stealing slaves
and then reselling them back into slavery that Copeland saw little point in trying to make
money from counterfeiting, an activity that the gang pursed after Copeland and Wages
met Allen Brown.77 After Brown convinced Wages to try counterfeiting, the group
located a man who claimed that he could engrave their dies with the designs of the
counterfeit bills. After the gang created their counterfeit notes, they added new members
to their ranks who were to help distribute the money across the South. Two of the new
members were James and Washington Bilbo.78 Shortly after the group split up to pass
their counterfeit money, however, the people of Gainesville caught Allen Brown paying
for a small amount of goods with counterfeit money, a tactic employed by other passers
of counterfeit money across the United States.79 In an effort to avoid punishment, Brown
informed the people that he obtained the counterfeit money from the Bilbo’s, who swore
revenge against Brown and Wages, his son-in-law, which resulted in the Bilbo’s deaths.80
Copeland’s account provides context for the Bilbo’s’ deaths and important insight
into a man’s perspective on counterfeiting in the Deep South that betrays his deep
uneasiness with the crime. For a man who engaged in the extremely dangerous practice
of slave stealing, Copeland seemed unusually skittish about the gang’s involvement in
counterfeiting money. Copeland’s account contains several assertions that pin the
destruction of the gang and Wages death to their shift from slave stealing to
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counterfeiting. Copeland believed that the gang’s association with Allen Brown and by
extension his role in convincing the group to try counterfeiting was the “main cause of
our exposure, the deaths of Wages and McGrath (another member), and the annihilation
of our clan.” 81 When Wages informed Copeland about the gang’s procurement of an
engraver and their planes to pass counterfeit money, Copeland claimed that he said he
“was in,” but “I feel somewhat fearful.”82 Copeland concluded that he believed “that this
counterfeiting business would be the means of getting us into trouble.”83 Sure enough,
Copeland’s alleged misgivings about counterfeiting proved correct when the people of
Gainesville caught Allen Brown passing the counterfeit coin, which set in motion the
chain of events that led to the deaths of several members of the gang and its destruction.
Copeland’s testimony contains another interesting claim that sheds light on both
criminal worlds of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. Copeland claimed that one of the
gang’s successful slave stealing operations resulted from the men posing as traders on the
Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.84 According to Copeland, the men would procure a skiff at
Cincinnati, obtain whiskey, bacon, and flour to trade, and then “pretend her for a peddle
boat” until “the opportunity to steal” slaves emerged.85 The strategy of posing as traders
to steal slaves contains within it an inverse of the vigilantes who employed a similar ruse
to rid the area of the counterfeiters in Mississippi in 1841. Copeland’s testimony reveals
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that, when viable, the Ohio and Mississippi River counterfeiters (the Johnson family for
example on the Ohio River in 1859) and criminals (Copeland and Wages) posed as
traders to carry out their illicit activities. Both groups believed that posing as traders to
carry out their activities offered opportunities to successfully carry out their plans,
counterfeiting/slave stealing, without being caught. Finally, posing as traders allowed
both groups to adopt an identity that forestalled questions that usually accompanied the
appearance and disappearance of strangers, that provided the men with just enough time
to escape an area before resident’s realized their true motives.86
The Bilbo’s’ involvement in a counterfeiting gang also reveals why Gainesville’s
citizens shrugged off the brother’s deaths. Copeland’s testimony and newspaper accounts
indicate that the community cared more about the men’s identity as counterfeiters rather
than criminals. Copeland revealed that the Bilbo’s’ joined the gang when they shifted
their operations towards making and passing counterfeit money and that the brothers
passed their counterfeit money between Mississippi’s Pearl River and Pascagoula.87
Neither Copeland’s testimony nor local newspaper accounts accuse the brother’s of slave
stealing, a crime that would explain the easiness with which the community greeted their
deaths. Instead, newspapers linked the brother’s deaths to counterfeiting, as seen when
one paper reported that locals believed Wages provided a public service by killing the
two due to “all believing fully in their guilt in counterfeiting.”88 The people of
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Gainesville believed Brown’s testimony that claimed he obtained the counterfeit coin
from the Bilbos and his testimony, when coupled with the discovery of a counterfeiting
operation on the Bilbo’s’ land, provided the community with key pieces of evidence of
the Bilbo’s’ guilt.
Lastly, the Bilbo case continues highlighting the intertwined roles between
violence and counterfeiting, further showing how the system of slavery influenced
responses to counterfeiting in the Deep South during the 1830s and 1840s in ways not
seen in other parts of the United States. Southerners across the Deep South executed
John Tipton in Little Rock for counterfeiting. In 1838, people in Mobile executed the
counterfeiter William Clark for slave stealing. Three years later, a group of vigilantes
executed a group of counterfeiters on the Mississippi River in 1841, burned the men’s
homes, and chased their families from the region. In 1848, the Wages gang’s
involvement in counterfeiting resulted in the discovery of their group that in turn led to
several of the men’s deaths. While the above examples appear different on the surface,
they all show that across the rural Deep South, particularly in the states that bordered the
Mississippi River, violence and counterfeiting appeared to be linked together in ways not
seen in other parts of the United States. Unlike Cincinnati’s responses to counterfeiting
along the Ohio River, which attempted to punish and control counterfeiting through the
police and court system, vigilantism and violence characterized the counterfeiting
underworld in the rural states that bordered the Mississippi River. The violent responses
to counterfeiting in southwestern Mississippi contrasts sharply with how the South’s
largest urban center, New Orleans, dealt with counterfeiting in the late 1840s and through
the 1850s. Although the Crescent City lay within the Deep South, when it came to
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punishing counterfeiting New Orleans might as well have existed hundreds of miles
away, alongside the Queen City of Cincinnati on the Ohio River.
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V. CHAPTER FOUR
The Crescent City Counterfeiters: Counterfeiting and its Punishment in New Orleans
In the summer of 1859, a ship travelled down the Mississippi River bound for
New Orleans. On board the ship, Carlisle Stranahan and Henry Brown created
counterfeit quarters and half-dollars, likely galvanizing the coins with a battery after they
finished. After the men stopped in New Orleans, they continued south to the Gulf of
Mexico, where they turned west, and travelled up the Atchafalaya River to Berwick Bay.
As they travelled along the Atchafalaya River, Carlisle and Brown passed their
counterfeit coins, likely leaving an area before the residents figured out that their coins
were counterfeit. After the two counterfeiters arrived at Berwick’s Bay, they continued
passing their counterfeit coins.1 While the men’s mobile counterfeiting operation passed
counterfeit coin around Berwick Bay for an unspecified period of time, an argument led
to its demise. The seriousness of the argument led Brown to leave the ship and travel
back to New Orleans, where he informed the chief of police about the counterfeiting
operation at Berwick Bay.2 After hearing the counterfeiter’s confession, the chief of
police and several officers travelled to Berwick Bay and arrested Carlisle Stranahan.
After they arrested Stranahan, New Orleans police found a large quantity of counterfeit
coin, the battery used to galvanize the finished forged coins, and other counterfeiting
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tools.3 If Brown anticipated leniency from the police for informing them about the
counterfeiting operation, he was sorely mistaken. After the police returned to New
Orleans from Berwick Bay, they arrested Brown for acting as Stranahan’s accomplice.4
The Chief of Police charged the men with counterfeiting and when each man defaulted on
their bond, the police escorted the men to jail to await their trial before the New Orleans
First District Court.5
In October 1859, Stranahan and Brown appeared before New Orleans’ First District
Criminal Court on charges of possessing counterfeit coin, a charge to which both men
entered a plea of not guilty.6 By agreeing to a trial, the men face significant jail time if
the First District Court convicted the counterfeiters of the charge, up to fourteen years of
prison and hard labor in the Louisiana state penitentiary at Baton Rouge.7 Finally, on
January 20, 1860, the First District Court held the counterfeiters’ trial. While the exact
details of the trial are missing, the First District Court docket reveals that the court
convicted the men of their charges on the same day, indicating that either the strength of
the state’s case against the two men, the weakness of their defense, or a combination of
3
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the two.8 Instead of sentencing the men to the full fourteen years, however, the First
District Court sentenced Brown and Stranahan to two years prison and hard labor in the
state penitentiary.9 Court records do not reveal why the court sentenced the men to a far
lesser punishment than the maximum fourteen years allowed by the Louisiana statutes.
The outcome of the Stranahan and Brown case is not unusual, however, as many
counterfeiters convicted by the First District Criminal court served less than the
maximum sentence for their crimes. The Brown and Stranahan case is just one of many
that provides a glimpse into New Orleans’ counterfeiting underworld, the power of its
police, and the city’s efforts to police counterfeiting in the South’s primary urban and
financial center.
Historians of the South have long viewed New Orleans as an economic and social
outlier when compared to the rest of the slaveholding region. The South’s largest urban
center contained economic institutions in the forms of banks and a United States Mint
that, outside of the presence of slavery, could have easily found a home in the New
England states. Within a short walking distance, along a section of the city known as
“Exchange Alley,” people in New Orleans encountered the Louisiana State Bank and the
Bank of Louisiana while other banks such as The Mechanics and Traders’ Bank and the
Canal Bank of New Orleans operated near the area.10 Banks in New Orleans facilitated a
variety of economic transactions and provided capital for the state’s public works
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projects. As the name of the Canal Bank of New Orleans implies, it offered both
banking services to the city and simultaneously invested heavily in public works projects
across New Orleans.11 Several New Orleans banks supplied capital that financed the
buying and selling of cotton from the Upper South between cargo ships and local factors.
They provided white southern males in the Deep South and along the Gulf Coast with
access to crucial lines of credit that in turn allowed these men to further develop the
areas’ slaveholding economy.12 Men who wanted to own and run their own plantations
often turned to the credit provided by New Orleans’ banks to finance the purchase of
fertile land in southwestern Mississippi and Louisiana from land speculators that allowed
them to participate in the nation’s cotton kingdom.13 Lastly, rural towns near Louisiana
preferred the stability of notes of banks from New Orleans banks rather than relying on
local currencies.14
As the Canal Bank counterfeiters demonstrated in 1859, both the counterfeit and
legitimate currency based on New Orleans’ banks circulated throughout both the Ohio
and Mississippi River Valleys, connecting the two region’s counterfeit underworlds
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together that mirrored its capitalist counterpart. Furthermore, although it lay within the
free state of Ohio, Cincinnati’s proximity to the slave state of Kentucky, the city’s
commercial economy and financial infrastructure meant that Cincinnati had quite a bit in
common with New Orleans. Thus, the region’s responses to counterfeiting can help
reveal important similarities and differences in the counterfeiting underworlds along the
Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. Finally, the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers facilitated and
fostered important travel and trade links between Cincinnati and Ohio that encouraged
Cincinnati to look west and south towards New Orleans rather than east, even though the
East Coast urban centers were geographically closer to Cincinnati. Thus, the study of
counterfeiting in the Deep South reveals another link between the free and slave
economies of the United States and how an underground economy knit the various
regions of the United States together into a shadow economy prior to the Civil War.
Through its banks, currency, and role as a major import and export center, New
Orleans contained a similar form of the commercial and financial capitalism found in
New England, one that relied on paper banknotes and credit supplied by a multitude of
financial institutions that in turn encouraged counterfeiting to take hold in both places.
An examination of counterfeiting in New Orleans demonstrates that counterfeiters in the
Deep South established operations in urban centers that contained markers of mature
capitalism; banks that supplied the necessary banknotes from which counterfeiters drew
their inspiration, to city markets that offered shovers opportunities to pass fake coins and
bank notes. While historians know that counterfeiting existed on a large scale in the New
England states, and that Cincinnati and the surround areas also contained a fairly robust
counterfeiting underworld, this chapter shows that despite the presence of slavery and a
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strong police presence, counterfeiters established their operations in the Deep South,
operations that structurally resembled those found in the other urban regions of the
United States.
The extensive presence of banks, at least in comparison to the rest of the South, in
New Orleans coupled with the city’s role as the South’s major port on the Mississippi
River and near the Gulf Coast, offered the city’s counterfeiters ideal conditions through
which to operate in the South. In New Orleans, counterfeiters found a variety of banks
from which to draw inspiration for counterfeit notes. The currency of New Orleans
banks circulated far beyond the city, as evidence by the Canal Bank notes, which meant
that the notes on the city’s banks were in high demand that in turn aided the local
shover’s efforts to pass fake currency. If the city’s police learned about a counterfeiting
operation, then the New Orleans, counterfeiters could escape via steamboat up the
Mississippi River, or they could board a ship bound for the Gulf of Mexico, escaping into
the Caribbean or the Atlantic Ocean. Finally, New Orleans’ demographics and its
population size offered counterfeiters the necessary anonymity through which to set up a
counterfeiting operation undetected.
Furthermore, an examination of counterfeiting in New Orleans demonstrates that
while the city’s counterfeiting underworld mirrored its New England counterparts, the
outcomes of its efforts to police counterfeiting differed drastically from both the
northeastern United States and the rural Mississippi River Valley. First, despite the
continued presence of counterfeiting in the city throughout the mid-nineteenth century,
New Orleans never resorted to using the kind of violence found along the rural
Mississippi River. Therefore, the policing of counterfeiting suggests that the South’s
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urban police effectively deterred counterfeiting that offers evidence of a strong municipal
police and judicial system. The effectiveness of the New Orleans’ police and judicial
system to fight counterfeiter undermines a larger argument that southern cities lacked
modern police due to the presence of slavery.15 One way to measure effectiveness is by
looking at a crime’s recidivism rate. A crime’s low recidivism rate suggests, at the very
least, that a state effectively deterred that particular crime through the punishment options
found in the state’s legal codes. Between the late 1840s and running into the early 1860s,
few of the New Orleans’ counterfeiters, dealers, and shovers who appeared before the
New Orleans First District Criminal Court returned to the city’s counterfeiting
underworld. Even though counterfeiting, as a crime, continually existed in New Orleans
throughout the nineteenth century, the city’s residences did not resort to vigilante
violence to deter the crime, which further suggests that an well-organized police and
court system that effectively punished counterfeiting acted as a deterrent to vigilante
action. The continued and consistent presence of counterfeiting in New Orleans
throughout the mid-nineteenth century, however, also indicates that the city’s
counterfeiters, distributors, and shovers did not fear Louisiana’s punishments for
counterfeiting.
Unlike the rural areas that surrounded the city, by the late 1840s and throughout the
1850s, New Orleans contained the necessary judicial infrastructure and police institutions
needed to punish counterfeiting that in turn provides clear evidence of the infrastructural
power of the American state in the Deep South. By the 1840s and 1850s, New Orleans
15
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housed one of the nation’s most powerful police forces, one that attempted to fight
counterfeiting whenever it encountered the crime and brought arrested counterfeiters
before a court of law, the New Orleans First District Criminal Court.16 In turn, the First
District Court wielded the judicial power of the state that resulted in the court sentencing
counterfeiters to prison and hard labor. Through the New Orleans police and court
system, Louisiana attempted to regulate and protect its currency from counterfeiting that
in turn shows one of the ways that Louisiana attempted to protect the common good of
the state. Therefore, the actions of New Orleans’ civil servants to fight and deter
counterfeiting across the city and throughout the region during the mid-nineteenth
century shows how the Crescent City functioned as an important nexus of American state
power that facilitated that power’s reach throughout the Deep South.
Thus, when viewed through New Orleans’ double contexts as the South’s primary
financial counter and home to one of the United States’ most powerful police forces, the
Stranahan and Brown counterfeiting case functions as a useful window that captures the
microcosm of the New Orleans counterfeiting underworld, both in its similarities to and
differences from the counterfeiting underworlds found along the rural Mississippi River,
the Ohio River, and in the New England States. Indeed, Brown and Stranahan provide a
glimpse into one of the more peculiar aspects of New Orleans’ counterfeiting
underworld, one shared by its Cincinnati counterpart: its continued focus on making
counterfeit coins. By the late 1840s and throughout the 1850s, many counterfeiters in the
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New England States shifted their efforts from forging counterfeit coins towards making
counterfeit bank notes.17 Indeed, quite a few of the New Orleans counterfeiters and
shovers who appeared before New Orleans’ First District Court faced charges of forging
and/or possessing fake coins. One possible explanation for the New Orleans’
counterfeiters focus on making fake coins rather than counterfeit bank notes could stem
from a preference for hard specie in New Orleans’ commercial economy.18 Furthermore,
the presence of the New Orleans Mint also provides a potential explanation as to why so
many of the city’s counterfeiters forged fake coins. Lastly, a difficulty in obtaining the
necessary materials to create banknotes may have contributed to coining’s prevalence in
the city’s counterfeiting underworld. Forging coins provided one way for the city’s
counterfeiters to make money, albeit through a process that was more labor intensive and
less profitable than printing counterfeit notes in bulk.19
Stranahan and Brown’s decision to create counterfeit coins placed the counterfeiters
out of step with the nation’s other groups of counterfeiters. Their coining business,
however, was quite normal in nineteenth-century New Orleans. Records for the New
Orleans penitentiary and court records for the First District Court indicate that the
counterfeiting of coin was not unusual in the Crescent City. Of the sixty cases that
appeared before the New Orleans First District Court between 1846 and 1861 that deal
with counterfeiting, fully one third dealt with some aspect of making, passing, and/or
17
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possessing counterfeit coin.20 The number of court cases that dealt with coining indicates
that a sizable portion of New Orleans’ counterfeiting underworld focused primarily on
making fake coins rather than creating counterfeit banknotes. The counterfeiters’
decisions to focus on making fake coins also suggests that many people in New Orleans,
at least in their everyday business transactions such as those found in one of New
Orleans’ many public markets, still used coins to purchase goods. In turn, the buying of
goods with coins reveals that New Orleans’ counterfeiting underworld functioned in a
similar way as Cincinnati’s, hinting at a strong desire for specie in the Deep South and
the surrounding geographical borderlands.
What is clear, however, is that the city’s coin forgers did not decide to create fake
coins in the mistaken belief that the penalties for doing so were less sever, as Louisiana
punished both the counterfeiting of coin and the counterfeiting of banknotes to the same
degree. According to the state’s 1856 revised statutes, the forging or counterfeiting of
any gold or silver coin “current in this state” carried a maximum penalty of fourteen
years in the state penitentiary.21 Additionally, if a person knew about the forging or
counterfeiting of gold and silver coins, if they knowingly assisted in the passing of the
forged and counterfeited coins, and/or if they possessed “any number not less than five
similar pieces of false money,” then they faced a possible penalty of fourteen years in the
penitentiary.22 In comparison, the counterfeiting of bank notes and/or if one possessed
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“any number not less than ten” counterfeit notes, resulted in a sentence of one to fourteen
years prison and hard labor in the state penitentiary.23
Louisiana’s counterfeiting statutes, however, carried stiffer penalties for acts related
to coin forging than it did for those who worked with counterfeit bank bills. The more
severe penalties for coining indicate that Louisiana viewed it as the more dangerous
crime, one that carried a greater potential for undermining the legitimacy of economic
transactions across the state. For example, bringing forged coin into Louisiana in 1856
carried a maximum penalty of ten years in the penitentiary, while bringing counterfeit
notes into Louisiana carried a maximum penalty of three years.24 The state’s laws
regarding the punishment of a person who made the dies and/or other tools for coining
carried a maximum of fourteen years in the penitentiary, while the penalties for engraving
banknote plates carried a penalty of seven years.25 The consistent discrepancies between
Louisiana’s punishments for coin forging and the counterfeiting of banknotes offer a
glimpse into the seriousness with which Louisiana viewed coining versus counterfeiting
during the 1850s. As such, those who counterfeited coin faced significantly more time in
jail than those who counterfeited bank bills that in turn undermines an argument that
counterfeiters in New Orleans would try to counterfeit coin due to less sever prison
sentences.
The 1856 Louisiana statutes also reveal that its lawmakers expected innocent people
to unknowingly come into possession of counterfeit coins and banknotes, and that they

23

Claiborne, John. The Revised Statutes of the State of Louisiana. New Orleans, 1856, pg. 141

24

Claiborne, John. The Revised Statutes of the State of Louisiana. New Orleans, 1856, pgs. 141-142

25

Claiborne, John. The Revised Statutes of the State of Louisiana. New Orleans, 1856, pg. 142

172

would also unintentionally pass these counterfeit coins and banknotes as well. The
statute’s requirements for prosecution, that the charged person needed to possess a
minimum of five fake coins reveals that the state’s lawmakers felt that it was within the
realm of possibility for a person to come into possession of a single to few counterfeit
coins and tried to mitigate the damage of this possibility.26 If a person possessed five or
more coins, however, then Louisiana lawmakers reasoned that the person likely knew that
the coins were fake and intended to harm the public good. Furthermore, the 1856
statute’s additional requirement, that the five coins also needed to be the same type of
coin, further indicates that Louisiana’s lawmakers sought to protect innocent people from
the state’s counterfeiters.27 If a person possessed at least five forged coins of the same
kind, then the state believed it was reasonable to presume that the person knew the coins
were forged and likely intended to pass them in exchange for goods. In regards to
counterfeit banknotes, the state’s lawmakers also felt that it was within the realm of
possibility that an innocent person could unknowingly come into possession of at least a
few counterfeit banknotes.28 Louisiana’s statutes regarding counterfeit notes state that
those who possessed more than ten of the same counterfeit bills, likely knew that the
currency was fake and did not come into their possession by accident.29 Unlike
counterfeit coins, however, the law did not require that the bills all must be of the same
type and denomination, meaning that the state expected its people to possess counterfeit
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money from various banks that consisted of various denominations. If a person
possessed at least ten counterfeit notes, regardless of bank or denomination, then it meant
they likely knew the notes were counterfeit as it was highly improbable that they
randomly came into possession of ten counterfeit notes of various denominations. Thus,
Louisiana’s laws regarding counterfeiting reveal that the state’s lawmakers recognized
the presence of counterfeit money as a real problem and that they expected innocent
people to intersect with the counterfeiting underworld. By adding possession minimums
and mandating that a person needed to also possess the same type of note and/or coin, the
state attempted to mitigate counterfeiting’s impacts on an innocent public during the midnineteenth century.
The First District Court’s charges against Stranahan and Brown simultaneously reveal
more information about their counterfeiting operation and the difficulties New Orleans
faced in bringing additional charges against the counterfeiters. When Carlisle Stranahan
and Henry Brown appeared before the First District Court in 1859, the court charged
Stranahan and Brown with the possession of counterfeit coin in the state.30 The charge
reveals that the police found that the men possessed at least five counterfeit coins of the
same denomination. The singular charge, however, also raises an interesting question:
why did the First District Court fail to charge the two men for bringing counterfeit money
into the state and for possessing tools for counterfeiting? The men travelled through
Louisiana on a ship and the New Orleans police found the tools for counterfeiting coin
near their ship. So why did the court not bring forth the additional charges? If the court
30
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decided to charge the men with bringing counterfeit money into the state, then they faced
a potential ten-year prison term; a significant amount of time that in turn could act as a
deterrent to other counterfeiters who operated in the state.31 One potential answer can be
found in two issues of the New Orleans Daily Crescent, one from July 13 1859 and the
other from August 12, 1859. The paper reported in both stories that the two men arrived
in New Orleans on a ship from “upriver.”32 The Daily Crescent hints at the men’s vague
origins while failing to provide even an approximation of their former whereabouts. The
mobility afforded to the men’s counterfeiting operation provided by the schooner gave
Stranahan and Brown enough cover that police failed, or lacked the time, to discern the
men’s origins. The failure to figure out where Stranahan and Brown came from possibly
contributed to the state’s refusal to charge the men with bringing counterfeit money into
the state. After all, it was possible that men arrived in New Orleans from a different part
of Louisiana rather than from outside the state. Thus, the men’s mobile counterfeiting
operation likely helped them avoid charges of bringing counterfeit money into the state.
It is less clear, however, why the First District Court failed to charge Stranahan and
Brown with possession of counterfeiting tools, which carried a potential penalty of
fourteen years hard labor in the state penitentiary.33 As the New Orleans Daily Crescent
reported on July 13, July 15, and August 12, 1859, New Orleans police appeared to
31
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obtain more than enough evidence needed to connect the men to the possession of the
tools used to create counterfeit coins. The July 13 article notes that police found “a
quantity of chemicals and apparatus” for making counterfeit coins.34 The July 15 article
states that New Orleans police obtained a battery used for the counterfeiting operation.35
Both articles indicate that New Orleans police found equipment explicitly used for the
counterfeiting of coin and yet the state failed, or refused, to bring charges for the
possession of counterfeiting equipment. An article about the counterfeiting operation that
appeared in the Daily Crescent reveals why the state refused to bring charges for the
possession of counterfeiting equipment. The paper noted that while New Orleans police
did find a large quantity of counterfeit coin onboard the ship, they located the
counterfeiting tools underwater, in Berwick’s Bay.36 Allegedly, the men threw the tools
overboard in order to avoid detection, an action that occurred before the fateful argument
that brought an end to their mobile counterfeiting operation. Therefore, the court may
have found it difficult to successfully argue that the counterfeiting tools found in the bay
belonged to either Stranahan or Brown and preferred not to bring forth that particular
charge. The casual disregard of their counterfeiting tools also suggests that both men
expected to either easily create or purchase the necessary tools to forge coins.
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Lastly, Stranahan and Brown’s decision to create counterfeit coin on board a ship and
then use that ship to pass the coin around Berwick Bay, demonstrates that counterfeiters
along the lower Mississippi River, like their Ohio counterparts, employed ships to help
pass counterfeit money. In 1856, an assistant “barkeer” on the steamer Grenada
appeared before a Recorder’s court in New Orleans. The Grenada’s captain charged the
man with attempting to pass a counterfeit Louisiana State Bank note. The captain also
believed that the man was “employed by other parties to circulate counterfeit money.”37
Both the 1856 case and the Stranahan and Brown case in 1859 carry similarities to the
Arkansas case from 1841, where counterfeiters posed as traders on the Mississippi River
to pass their counterfeit money, and the Johnson family from Cincinnati, who used a boat
to pass counterfeit money along the Ohio River in 1859. The above cases also
demonstrate that the two region’s counterfeiters used their ships to mask the source of the
counterfeit currency, a tactic that allowed them to escape an area more quickly and to
avoid additional charges related to counterfeiting.
By the 1850s, however, the New Orleans police and court system knew how to
handle those who passed counterfeit coin while travelling on board a ship. Prior to the
arrests of the “barkeer” in 1856, and Carlisle Stranahan and Henry Brown in 1859, New
Orleans police arrested Eli Hathaway on August 26, 1846. According to court
documents, a Captain of the Watch who worked New Orleans’ first municipality arrested
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Captain Eli Hathaway in the city near the Mississippi River.38 When the captain searched
Hathaway, he found four packages containing two hundred false and counterfeited
Mexican dollars. Then the police officer took Hathaway to his ship, the American
schooner John George, and in Hathaway’s cabin the police found five packages
containing one hundred counterfeit Mexican dollars. With the Captain’s testimony as
evidence, the state charged Hathaway with bringing forged money into the state of
Louisiana and with the possession of forged money in the state of Louisiana.39
The New Orleans First District Court docket for case 249, The State of Louisiana vs.
Eli Hathaway, reveals that on September 10, and again on October 1, 1846, a grand jury
found a “True Bill,” or that enough evidence existed to warrant prosecution against the
accused, against Hathaway for the crimes of bringing forged money into the state of
Louisiana and the possession of forged money in Louisiana. The Louisiana Grand Jury’s
statement reveals that on August 26, 1846 New Orleans police obtained three hundred
and thirteen “false, forged, and counterfeited” Mexican dollars. The First District Court’s
affidavit regarding Eli Hathaway reported that police found a total of six packages that
contained five or six hundred counterfeit Mexican dollars in Hathaway’s possession.
Following the issuance of a second True Bill against Hathaway on October 25, the
captain issued a plea of not guilty.40
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Captain Hathaway’s decision to enter a plea of “not guilty” appears strange on the
surface. Hathaway’s counsel, however, believed he could exploit a loophole in the
Louisiana statutes regarding the charge of counterfeiting. In the documents related to
Hathaway’s case, the New Orleans First District Court charged Hathaway under the
sixteenth section of the act of the twentieth of March 1818. The statute notes that if any
person shall “bring into the state of Louisiana, or shall possess in the same, any number
of false money, or coin forged or counterfeited, similar to any gold or silver coin current
within this state” then they could be imprisoned at hard labor.41 While it appeared that
within the wording of the law, the state had Hathaway all but convicted, Captain
Hathaway’s lawyer viewed the statute in a different light. Instead, Hathaway’s counsel
usurped the intention of the law by arguing that since the state charged Hathaway under
the 1818 statute, then the statute’s reference to counterfeit money could only be applied
to the money of the governments that existed in 1818. Hathaway’s counsel believed that
since the 1846 version of the Mexican government did not exist in 1818, then its coins
were exempt from the statute. In effect, Hathaway’s counsel argued that their client
committed no crime at all since the 1818 statute failed to address the change in Mexico’s
government. Unfortunately for Captain Hathaway, the jury failed to accept his counsel’s
defense and found him guilty of both charges. Fortunately for Hathaway, he only served
nine days of his sentence before he was pardoned.42
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Although Hathaway received a pardon for his crime, evidence indicates that Captain
Hathaway had already sold quite a bit of counterfeit money before New Orleans police
arrested him on August 26, 1846. According to the sworn statement from the Collector’s
Office, entered in as evidence during Hathaway’s trial, the John George arrived in New
Orleans on August 10, 1846 from Galveston, Texas.43 Over two weeks passed between
the arrival of the ship from Galveston, and Hathaway’s arrest on Bienville Street, where
the police found packages of counterfeit coin in Hathaway’s possession. That the
Captain of the Watch found packages in Hathaway’s possession and more packages in his
trunk onboard the John George, indicates that Hathaway was on his way into New
Orleans to sell the packages of counterfeit coin to the city’s distributors of counterfeit
money. If Hathaway intended to pass the coin, it is unlikely that he would attempt to
pass two hundred dollars worth of counterfeit Mexican coins in a single, or even across
multiple, business transactions, as the city’s police could track such an occurrence back
to its common denominator. Furthermore, the Captain of the Watch’s testimony was
quite specific; he noted that he found “packages” in Hathaway’s possession, not
individual coins.44 Hathaway’s decision to sell the counterfeit coin in bulk simultaneously
allowed him to pass more coins at once that lowered the risk of detection. In effect,
Hathaway’s wholesaling increased his operation’s profitability while limiting the risk of
dealing counterfeit coin in New Orleans. The Captain of the Watch also noted in his
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testimony that he found “packages” in Hathaway’s trunk on board the John George.45 In
turn, the packages indicate that Hathaway likely acted as an importer, wholesaler and
distributor of counterfeit money in a dark mirror of the cotton wholesalers and
distributors who populated New Orleans and the Deep South.46
Hathaway’s case also demonstrates that New Orleans’ position at the center of the
South’s legitimate commercial sector contained an underground counterpart. New
Orleans’ position at the mouth of the Mississippi River and along the Gulf Coast meant
that during the 1840s and into the early 1850s, the city functioned as a major port for both
the South and the United States.47 New Orleans’ status as both a major economic hub
and as the South’s largest urban center meant that a variety of real and counterfeit
currency, not just the coins and money of banks in the United States, could be found in
the city. As the records from Hathaway’s trial revealed, the John George arrived in New
Orleans from Galveston, Texas, and brought with it a large amount of counterfeit
Mexican dollars. New Orleans police obtained the coins, already divided into individual
45
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packages, which indicated that Hathaway intended to sell the coins wholesale to dealers
in New Orleans. In effect, Hathaway functioned as a merchant, one who obtained goods
in Galveston, brought the goods across the Gulf of Mexico aboard his ship, and then
attempted to import them into New Orleans. The likely possibility that the counterfeit
coins originated from Galveston, a Texas port, and consisted of currency from Mexico,
indicates that New Orleans’ counterfeiting underworld mirrored its capitalist
counterpart’s reach throughout the Gulf Coast region.48
Eli Hathaway, Carlisle Stranahan, and Henry Brown offer glimpses into the
irregularities found in New Orleans’ counterfeiting underworld in the late 1840s and late
1850s. The men decided to pass counterfeit coin in New Orleans eleven years apart and
their cases, when coupled with the ones discussed below, indicates that the city’s
counterfeiters found a market for counterfeit coins throughout the 1840s and 1850s.
Their use of ships to exploit New Orleans status as a port city also reveals that the
Crescent City’s counterfeiting underworld mirrored the geographic scope and reach of its
capitalist counterpart. Their court cases, however, also highlight the state’s difficulties in
prosecuting certain aspects of counterfeiting, such as linking counterfeiting equipment to
its owners, as seen in the court’s decision to bring forth only one charge against Brown
and Stranahan. Furthermore, when New Orleans appeared to obtain an outright victory in
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its fight against counterfeiting, as seen in Eli Hathaway’s conviction, the city’s public
fight against counterfeiting also suffered a setback when the state pardoned Hathaway for
his crimes. Nonetheless, Louisiana’s continued efforts to deter counterfeiting through its
police and judicial systems reveal a coordinated effort to limit counterfeiting’s impacts on
the Louisiana economy and its participants.
Perhaps the New Orleans First District Criminal Court did not need to worry about
state pardons for counterfeiters, or that shortened prison sentences offered the region’s
counterfeiters an incentive to return to the crime. New Orleans counterfeiters in the
1840s and 1850s rarely appear in the judicial record more than once, which in turn
suggests that the city’s counterfeiters created such high-quality counterfeiters as to avoid
detection, or they left New Orleans to practice counterfeiting elsewhere, or they left
behind their life of crime. The two men, however, appeared multiple times before the
New Orleans First District Criminal Court for various counterfeiting offenses. One is
Henry Brown, the partner of Carlisle Stranahan, who reemerged in 1861 when New
Orleans police arrested him for passing a counterfeit gold dollar coin to a man named
Charles Miller.49 The police also found five other counterfeit gold coins in Brown’s
possession that provided them with enough evidence to charge Brown with knowingly
passing counterfeit money.50 While the records for Henry Brown’s case are missing, the
docket reveals that the First District Court charged Brown with the possession of
counterfeit coin in the state of Louisiana. On May 1, 1861, Brown entered a plea of not
49
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guilty and on June 6 he faced a trial by jury. Brown’s defense of his actions appeared
ineffective as the jury convicted Brown of the charge of the possession of counterfeit coin
in Louisiana on the same day.51 The other counterfeiter who appeared multiple times
before the court was linked to Brown in the same New Orleans Daily Crescent article that
reported his arrest. After noting the details of Brown’s arrest, the paper speculated that
Henry Brown worked as one of the distributing agents for a counterfeit dealer named
“Dr. Angell.”52
Out of the sixty counterfeiting cases that appeared before New Orleans First District
Criminal court between 1846 and 1861, only Dr. Samuel Angel and Henry Brown appear
in connection to multiple counterfeiting cases. That only two mean appear multiple times
in both court cases and newspapers records between 1845 and 1861 indicates that New
Orleans’, and Louisiana’s, efforts to police counterfeiting through a judicial approach
worked. Dr. Angel first appeared in a Baltimore newspaper in October 1845, which
noted that New Orleans police arrested Dr. Angel and Pleasant Harris for swindling and
counterfeiting.53 Angel then disappeared for a few years before resurfacing in the New
Orleans First District court dockets in 1858 for counterfeiting and having counterfeit
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bank notes in his possession.54 Finally, Dr. Angel appears in two Louisiana newspapers in
January 1861, which detailed the arrests of Angel and his wife for counterfeiting.55 Other
than Samuel Angel and Henry Brown, the counterfeiters caught in New Orleans and the
surrounding areas only appear before the First District Court once. The lack of
counterfeiters who appeared before the criminal court multiple times, or in newspaper
accounts regarding counterfeiting, indicate that Louisiana’s punishment for counterfeiting
effectively worked to discourage counterfeiters, shovers, and dealers from returning back
to the counterfeiting underworld after their first offense. As such, Louisiana’s civil
servants effectively policed counterfeiting in the city and surrounding regions that in turn
reveals one of the ways that the state regulated and protected the region’s economic
transactions from counterfeiting. Louisiana’s efforts to police counterfeiting reveal the
power of the state, as despite counterfeiting’s continued presence, it did not appear to
seriously threaten the legitimacy of the region’s economy system.
A closer look at the timeline of Dr. Angel’s case also reveals some of the difficulties
that New Orleans’ First District Court encountered when it tried to convict the city’s
counterfeiters for their crimes. Dr. Angel’s first appearance in the court dockets occurred
on Christmas Eve in 1858, when the court sought more information about his crime and
charged him with counterfeiting and having counterfeit banknotes in his possession.56 On
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January 10, 1859, Dr. Angel pleaded not guilty to the two charges and the First District
Court began the process of selecting a jury for his trial. After two months of searching
for a jury, the First District Court swore one in on March 29. On the same day, however,
the court declared a mistrial and then it issued a nolle prosequi for Dr. Angel’s case two
weeks later, on April 14.57 While the trial documents are missing from the record, it
appeared that Angel’s mistrial occurred when the jury failed to reach an agreement on the
charge of counterfeiting. 58 On April 15, the court began his retrial and charged Dr. Angel
with having counterfeit coin in his possession with intent to pass. The court dropped the
counterfeiting charge altogether and focused its case on Angel’s possession of counterfeit
coin, rather than his role in making counterfeit money. In comparison to Angel’s first
case, the court quickly set up his second trial. But on May 31, 1859, the court ordered
Dr. Angel to bail and he disappears from the docket. No record of punishment exists in
the docket and no record exists of the jury finding Angel guilty of the charge of
possessing counterfeit coin with intent to pass.59 From his initial appearance before the
court on December 24, 1858, to his disappearance from the docket on May 31, 1859, five
months passed and the court failed to convict Angel of any crime. The court’s failure to
convict Angel on any charges relating to counterfeiting, coupled with its inability to even
hold a trial for the counterfeiter, reveals a frustrating process in which a repeat
counterfeiter appeared before New Orleans’ judicial system and left unpunished.
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Louisiana’s failure to punish Angel likely contributed to his reemergence in New
Orleans’ counterfeiting underworld less than a year later, in January 1861 when the New
Orleans police “specials” arrested Samuel Angel and his wife, Ann Eliza, for making and
distributing counterfeit coin.60 In 1861, Angel approached a man named Packenham in
New Orleans’ Poydras market with an offer to sell counterfeit coin, an offer that
allegedly discomforted Packenham so much that he decided to inform the mayor of
Angel’s offer. The Mayor then notified the New Orleans Chief of Police about the
proposed deal, who in turn alerted “his specials,” that resulted in setting up “a trap” to
arrest Angel.61 The “trap” reveals the police’s ingenuity in arresting a repeat
counterfeiter as it involved giving Packenham specially marked half-dollars and ordering
the man to visit Angel’s house to purchase counterfeit money while police observed the
transaction. After Packenham arrived at Angel’s home, the man offered to sell
Packenham the counterfeit money at a rate of three counterfeit coins for the price of a
single good coin and Packenham bought six counterfeit coins in exchange for two of the
specially marked coins. After the men concluded their transaction, Packenham signaled
to the nearby officers who raided the house and arrested Angel and his wife, Ann Eliza,
as she attempted to escape the home. The police found plaster of Paris molds and dies
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designed to make counterfeit American coin in Ann Eliza’s possession, key evidence of a
counterfeiting operation.62
The arrest of Dr. Angel reveals similarities between New Orleans and Cincinnati
police in their efforts to arrest counterfeiters that further demonstrates that New Orleans
shared more with Cincinnati than the Deep South in regards to policing counterfeiting. In
an effort to secure key evidence of Angel’s guilt that would aid in a conviction for
counterfeiting, police designed an undercover operation to insure that they obtained
enough evidence of his guilt. After all, Louisiana failed to send Angel to the penitentiary
two years ago due to lack of evidence that could establish his guilt as a manufacturer.63
Through the marked coins, the police obtained clear evidence of Angel selling counterfeit
coins to their informant, Packenham. The use of marked money that allowed the police
to demonstrate a link between their money and the purchased counterfeit money that
further cemented Angel’s guilt. Rather than using Packenham’s testimony as evidence to
immediately go and arrest Angel for the suspicion of dealing counterfeit money, New
Orleans police “specials” planned an undercover operation designed to convict Angell of
the crime of counterfeiting, which in turn finally sent the counterfeiter to jail.
By 1861, New Orleans police could afford to devote officers towards criminal
investigations that took more time than a chance encounter and arrest due to the city’s
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decision to pay its officers wages instead of fees.64 New Orleans’ decision to pay its
police through a wage system, rather than by a fee associated with bringing in a certain
criminal, meant that the police could devote its attention to fighting all types of crime, not
just fighting the property crime whose return guaranteed the officer’s income.
Additionally, by paying its officers a wage, New Orleans provided its police with a
financial incentive to conduct long-term police work, as seen through their use of
informants and “specials” in the Samuel Angel case, that was missing from other cities
who paid their police through fees. The city’s decision to arm its police under the guise
of policing the enslaved meant that the New Orleans police resembled a “small army,”
one that wore uniforms and carried “formidable” weapons, which in turn aided its
officers in the arrest of the “masculine” Angel and Ann Eliza.65
While newspaper accounts described Angel as “masculine,” providing an indication
of how they viewed the counterfeiter, their use of the derogatory term “quardroon” to
describe Ann Eliza betrays its view of her status in New Orleans.66 As such, Ann Eliza’s
arrest for counterfeiting carried significantly more danger for her than it did for her
husband. While Samuel Angel adopted the title “Dr.” that potentially provided him with
social capital that could muddy his arrest, and could help explain his ability to avoid
punishment for his crimes, Eliza’s perceived status offered her no such protections. Nor
could Eliza try and exploit a perception that, as a woman, she was ignorant of the crime,
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as her actions indicate otherwise. When the New Orleans police arrested Eliza, they
found the molds needed to create the counterfeit coins in her possession.67 Eliza’s
decision to take the coin molds indicates that she knew the importance of the molds as
evidence of their counterfeiting operation that in turn provided the court with key
evidence in establishing their guilt. Furthermore, Eliza’s efforts to flee the police,
possibly in an effort to destroy the evidence of the counterfeiting operation, suggests that
she knew about the counterfeiting operation and the legal seriousness of their situation.
Both Eliza’s knowledge of the counterfeiting operation, and her status likely placed her in
greater legal and personal danger in the Deep South.
While Ann Eliza potentially faced a dangerous punishment for her role in the
counterfeiting operation, Dr. Angel’s return to New Orleans’ counterfeiting underworld,
can possibly be attributed to the state’s failure to punish him in the past for
counterfeiting. Samuel Angel does not appear once in the prison records for the New
Orleans Parish prison, which run from 1852 to 1862. Nor do the prison records indicate
that Dr. Angel was out on bail and awaiting his trial. Several prisoner records indicate
that they were out on bail while awaiting their trial, which shows that if Angel paid his
bail then the records would make note of that particular circumstance.68 Dr. Angel,
however, does not appear in the parish prison records, nor does he appear on the list of
inmates present in the Louisiana state penitentiary at Baton Rouge. Furthermore, even if
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the name “Dr. Angel” was an alias, a possibility that the New Orleans Daily Crescent
alluded to by noting that “even his name is probably a counterfeit,” the parish prison
officials also noted the known aliases of their prisoners, and indicated as such in their
notes about the prisoners.69 Thus, no record provides evidence that Samuel Angel, or a
person who went by that alias, ever served prison time for counterfeiting. The state’s
failure to punish Angel likely provided him with an incentive to return to counterfeiting.
The lack of recidivism among New Orleans’ counterfeiters indicates that when New
Orleans obtained a conviction against a counterfeiter and sentenced them to the state
penitentiary for any length of time, then the punishment successfully deterred
counterfeiters from returning to their old lives, at least in New Orleans. Only Samuel
Angel and Henry Brown appear to have made a return to the city’s counterfeiting
underworld following their arrests, making the men the exceptions that prove the rule.
While Brown’s docket indicates that the court sentenced him to two years hard labor in
January 1860, his reappearance less than a year later indicates that Louisiana released
him early from his imprisonment.70 Therefore, Angel’s lack of punishment for
counterfeiting, and Brown’s shortened sentence, supports a counterintuitive argument
69

The New Orleans Parish Prison records contain an entry for W.A. Brown, charged with passing
counterfeit money. The entry notes that Brown also went by the alias “Alphonse O’Brien.” New Orleans
Parish Prison Records, 1852-1862, New Orleans Public Library, Accessed on February 19, 2018, pg. 144.
Obtained from the New Orleans Public Library on February 19, 2018.

70

The Board of Directors Report for the Louisiana State penitentiary for 1852 noted that every year the
penitentiary’s directors recommended four to five prisoners for early release from their prison sentences.
The directors’ believed that releasing a few prisoners early provided the remaining prisoners with a
powerful incentive to behave. For the year 1852, the Board of Directors recommended Lewis Bishop,
serving a fourteen-year sentence for passing counterfeit coin, and O.F. Bertwick (an O.F. Bostwick,
appears in the 1850 First District Court docket), serving a four-year sentence for possessing molds for
coining, for early release from their prison sentences. The state pardoned Lewis Bishop, but Bostwick
continued to serve his prison sentence. La Sere, Emile. Appendix, Report of the Board of Directors of the
Penitentiary of the State of Louisiana. New Orleans, 1853. pg. 4. Obtained from HathiTrust Digital Library
(http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uiug.30112088114415).

191

that when the New Orleans judicial and penal systems fully punished counterfeiters for
their crimes, they did not return to the city’s counterfeiting underworld. Of if New
Orleans counterfeiters did return to their life of crime they, at the very least, operated in a
more cautious manner designed to avoid detection. As such, if recidivism rates indicate
the state’s successful deterrence of a crime, than the low recidivism rates in New Orleans
indicate that the city successfully enforced Louisiana’s statutes that allowed it
consistently limit the influence of its counterfeiting underworld on the city’s legitimate
economy.
Dr. Samuel Angel’s encounter with Packenham at the Poydras market is intriguing as
several counterfeiters in the New Orleans First District Court records operated at, or near,
that particular public market. In an effort to pass fake coins, counterfeiters across the
United States recognized that markets and other busy places such as taverns, provided
key opportunities to pass counterfeit money.71 In New Orleans, shovers favored trying to
pass their counterfeit money in one of the city’s bustling public markets that could be
found across the city by 1861.72 In New Orleans, evidence indicates that the city’s
shovers frequently targeted the Poydras market, established in 1837, and one of the oldest
public markets in the city.73 In 1850, Isaac Stein, a jeweler who owned a store on
Poydras Street, visited the Poydras market and bought vegetables with fake coins,
pocketing the genuine money in return. After the police caught Stein in the act of passing
the counterfeit coins, they learned that Stein also attempted to pay his rent in counterfeit
71
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coin as well.74 Stein fled before his trial before the New Orleans First District court and
forfeited his bond.75 Ann Conklin, Mary Grogan, and Sabrina Moore successfully passed
their counterfeit coins in the Poydras market for weeks before New Orleans police put a
stop to their activities. Furthermore, the informant who led the New Orleans police to Dr.
Angel’s house in 1861 claimed that he met Angel at the Poydras market to discuss the
business of distributing counterfeit coins.76 Thus, when New Orleans police noted that
Angel’s associates passed his counterfeit money in the city’s Poydras market, they were
likely familiar with the market’s role in the city’s counterfeiting underworld.
While the city’s shover’s frequently targeted the Poydras market, shovers also
attempted to pass counterfeit money in one of New Orleans’ many coffee houses. In
1850, John Karr attempted, and failed, to pass a counterfeit fifty-cent piece at a coffee
house on the corner of Levee and Mandeville streets. Luckily for Karr, the jury acquitted
him of the charge of having counterfeit money and allowed him to go free.77 In 1852,
John Nicholson and a visited a New Orleans coffee house and attempted to pay for his
drinks with a counterfeit fifty-dollar bill on the Louisiana State Bank.78 Following his
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arrest, other shopkeepers came forward and claimed that Nicholson also paid them with
counterfeit money for their goods.79 The court convicted Nicholson for uttering
counterfeit bank bills and sentenced him to five years in prison and hard labor.80 In 1854
Andrew Arthur, discussed above, also tried to pass counterfeit coins at a New Orleans
coffee house.81 New Orleans’ coffee houses and public markets offered the city’s
shovers countless opportunities to pass counterfeit money undetected and as such, they
made for attractive targets.
New Orleans’ public markets, however, also provided the city’s female shovers, such
as Sabrina Moore, with their own opportunities to pass counterfeit money. Additionally,
Sabrina Moore’s case helps illuminate New Orleans’ perspectives on female
counterfeiters, how some women in the South participated in the underground capitalist
market, and the difficulties that arose when New Orleans’ confronted the presence of
women in the city’s counterfeiting underworld. In February 1857, Sabrina Moore
appeared before the New Orleans First District Court, charged with knowingly passing a
counterfeit coin as payment for goods.82 Moore pleaded not guilty to the charges and her
first trial for passing counterfeit coin ended in a mistrial. The court scheduled a retrial for
a month later, where the jury convicted Moore of the charge of knowingly passing
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counterfeit coin and sentenced her to three months imprisonment and hard labor at the
state penitentiary.83
While Moore’s court case is missing from the records, New Orleans newspapers help
fill in the rest of her story. In early December 1856, the New Orleans Daily Crescent
reported that for the past few weeks a group of women worked to pass counterfeit halfdollar coins on the merchants who worked in the Poydras and St. Mary’s markets in New
Orleans.84 The women appeared during the markets’ busy times, paid for their items with
counterfeit money, and disappeared before the shopkeepers realized that the women paid
for their items with bogus coins. After the shopkeepers alerted New Orleans police to the
presence of shovers at their markets, the police arrested Sabrina Moore at the Poydras
market as she attempted to buy goods with fake coins. By arresting the counterfeiters,
New Orleans police helped protect the market from counterfeiting, insuring the integrity
of its business transactions and fulfilling an obligation to regulate the public good.85
After the police lodged Moore at the court, one of the officers noticed a nearby woman
acting suspiciously. The police believed that she was a friend of Moore and followed her
to a nearby house, where New Orleans police found two women, Ann Conklin and Mary
Grogan, about to flee the premises. The police also found inside the home, owned by
Mary Grogan, over two hundred counterfeit coins of the same kind that had been passed
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in the markets during the past few weeks. More importantly, the police found the molds
and dies needed to create the counterfeit coins, indicating that the women created the
counterfeit coins in Grogan’s home.86 Conklin and Grogan appeared before the First
District Court on February 7, 1859, just a few days after Sabrina Moore. Both women
pleaded not guilty to the charge of passing counterfeit coin and the court set their trial for
February 27. On the day of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty for Mary
Grogan, who left the court a free woman. Ann Conklin, however, was not so fortunate
and the court convicted her of passing counterfeit coin and sentenced her to a year of hard
labor and she had to pay the court’s costs of the trial.87
On the surface, it appears that the New Orleans court rendered justice by sentencing
Sabrina Moore and Ann Conklin to prison. The court’s punishment of the female
counterfeiters, however, reveals insights into how white male southerners viewed them
and that it treated women counterfeiters differently than their male counterparts. When
Sabrina Moore’s case is compared to a similar case, that of a man named Andrew Arthur,
clear discrepancies arise. On April 4, 1854 the First District Court charged Arthur with
passing counterfeit coins and Arthur entered a plea of not guilty. It took the First District
Court a little over a month before it brought Arthur to trial for his crime and he appeared
before the court on May 18. While the First District Court convicted Arthur of passing
counterfeit coin, Arthur’s counsel filed a bill of exception that successfully challenged
the court’s decision. The court reconvened a month later, on June 22, and once again
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convicted Arthur of the charge. Unlike Sabrina Moore, however, who received a
sentence of three months hard labor and costs, the court sentenced Arthur to ten years in
the state penitentiary along with paying the court’s costs.88
Additionally, the discovery of a group of female counterfeiters led at least one New
Orleans newspaper to conclude that a gang of counterfeiters infested New Orleans. After
the police arrested Sabrina Moore, Ann Conklin, and Mary Grogan, in early February
1857, the New Orleans Daily Crescent warned its readers “There is little doubt that an
extensive counterfeiting gang is carrying on operations in our midst.”89 Furthermore, the
paper cautioned its readers to examine all of the half and quarter-dollars that they
received as a “great many of the bogus kind have been put into circulation.” 90 The Daily
Crescent’s warning that an “extensive” counterfeiting gang existed in New Orleans
appears to be overblown, at least by early 1857. Prior to the three women’s arrest for
counterfeiting, only two men appeared before the First District court on charges relating
to counterfeiting. On January 12, 1857, John Seigle appeared before the New Orleans
District court for having counterfeit coin in his possession. Seigle entered a plea of not
guilty, and the court issued a nolle prosequi in his case.91 In February 1857 John
Strawforde appeared before the First District Court on charges of passing false and
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forged bank notes as payment. Strawforde also pled not guilty and the court again issued
a nolle prosequi in Strawforde’s case.92 The appearance of two men before New Orleans’
First District Criminal court hardly constitutes an “extensive” gang of counterfeiters, and
provides an example of the city’s newspapers over-estimating counterfeiting’s presence
in the city.
Lastly, while the arrests of Moore, Conklin, and Grogan, led the New Orleans Daily
Crescent to conclude that an “extensive” gang of counterfeiters operated in New Orleans,
the paper also refused to confront the fact that these women possessed the knowledge and
technical skills to make counterfeit coins. The strongest piece of evidence that indicates
that the women counterfeited their own coins can be found in the same Daily Crescent
story. The story reveals that New Orleans police caught Conklin and Grogan fleeing
Grogan’s house with the molds and metals needed to create counterfeit coins.93 Conklin
and Grogan’s actions mirror that of Angel’s wife, Ann Eliza, in that Conklin Grogan, and
Eliza all attempted to both flee the police before they could be arrested and also tried to
bring key evidence of their guilt, in the form of the molds and metal, with them. Despite
New Orleans police finding counterfeiting equipment in Conklin and Grogan’s
possession, the New Orleans Daily Crescent believed that the women worked “merely as
distributors” at the behest of the “extensive” counterfeiting gang due to the fact that “the
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male manufactures of it being too sharp to expose themselves to detection and arrest.”94
In contrast, none of the New Orleans newspapers questioned if Samuel Angel worked at
the behest of someone else. Nor did the papers attempt to attribute Angel’s
counterfeiting expertise to another, vague, entity. The only other comparable instance of
newspapers assigning credit to another individual in regards to counterfeiting occurred
when southerners caught one of the enslaved passing counterfeit money.95
While several New Orleans’ counterfeiters created false and forged coins, other
counterfeiters who appeared before the New Orleans First District Court counterfeited
banknotes, which shows that counterfeiters of banknotes operated in the Deep South.
Indeed, unlike the rural parts of the South, New Orleans offered local and regional
counterfeiters access to the notes of several financial institutions that could provide
counterfeiters with samples from which to create counterfeit notes. As briefly mentioned
earlier, Norman’s Plan of New Orleans and its Environs reveals that New Orleans housed
seven banks within its city limits by 1854. Within the few blocks in New Orleans known
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as “Exchange Alley,” counterfeiters found access to multiple financial centers that could
provide them with bank plates, ink, and the banknote paper needed to make bills. The
city’s counterfeiters could also find the molds and the metal needed to create both fake
notes and coins at, or near, the New Orleans mint.96
Counterfeiters in New Orleans imitated the methods of other United States
counterfeiters by targeting the bank bills of prominent Louisiana and New Orleans’
banks. For example, in 1851 counterfeit bank notes circulated around New Orleans and
the police arrested John Davis, alias William Reed in connection to the bills. When
police searched Davis’ residence, they found a one hundred-dollar plate on the State
Bank of Louisiana, a fifty-dollar plate on the Union Bank of Louisiana, a twenty-dollar
plate on the Bank of Louisiana, and a ten-dollar plate on the Louisiana State Bank.97
Police also found a working copper plate press complete with the rollers needed to create
a large quantity of counterfeit banknotes. Perhaps the sheer amount of counterfeiting
equipment found at Davis’ house forced one New Orleans newspaper to conclude that the
Davis and other counterfeiters operated not just in New Orleans, but also in “every town
on the Mississippi River, as far as St. Louis.”98 The captured bank plates at Davis’
residence indicates that New Orleans police captured a counterfeiter who specialized in
making high denomination notes on several prominent local banks. Davis’ counterfeiting
equipment, the press and rollers, reveal that Davis could counterfeit the above notes
96
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quickly and in bulk, meaning that Davis could insert a large amount of high quality
counterfeit money into New Orleans’ economy quickly and undetected.
While Davis could create the counterfeit notes, he likely relied on an extended
network to effectively pass the counterfeit notes into New Orleans. Through Davis’
capture, New Orleans police tracked the counterfeiter’s visitors and that led to the arrest
of one his shovers and partner, a man Henry MaGinn. Police arrested MaGinn at a
grocery store as he attempted to pass a counterfeit twenty-dollar note in payment for his
goods.99 When the police searched MaGinn’s home, they found fifty-six counterfeit fiftydollar notes on the Union Bank in a drawer. One newspaper described MaGinn as “an
ingenious man,” and believed that he created the counterfeit press that the police found in
Davis’ residence.100
On May 16, 1851, John Davis appeared before the New Orleans First District Court
and faced charges of making a counterfeit banknote plate and also with having the
counterfeit plate in his possession.101 On the same day, the court issued a True Bill
against Davis, who pleaded not guilty to the charges on May 17. On May 22, the jury
convicted Davis of the charges and sentenced him to seven years hard labor in the state
penitentiary and ordered him to pay the costs of the trial. The jury’s conviction of Davis
indicates that the state presented a strong case that Davis likely created the plate needed
to make the counterfeit Louisiana State banknotes. Following his first trial, the First
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District Court charged Davis with forgery, uttering forged bank bills, and bringing forged
bank bills into Louisiana. The court issued a True Bill against Davis, who once again
pleaded not guilty to the charges. The state dropped all of the charges, except for the
charge of bringing counterfeit money into Louisiana. Once again, the jury convicted
Davis and this time it sentenced him to three years in the state penitentiary.102
On May 16, 1851, the same day that the First District Court issued a True Bill against
John Davis, the court also issued a True Bill against Henry and Mary MaGinn for
bringing counterfeit money into the state of Louisiana and for having counterfeit money
in their possession.103 On June 2, the First District Court found Henry not guilty of one
of the charges. Five days later, the First District Court also found Mary not guilty of one
of the charges.104 Finally, the court issued a nolle prosequi for the other charge.105 While
Mary MaGinn left the court, her husband, Henry faced another charge, one for knowingly
uttering counterfeit money. On June 25, the First District Court convicted MaGinn and
sentenced him to three years hard labor in the state penitentiary.106 According to the
Board of Director’s annual reports for the state penitentiary that cover 1852-1854,
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however, neither Henry MaGinn nor his alias Henry McGiney appear in the prison’s
records.107 MaGinn’s convoluted trial and outcome continue demonstrating the
difficulties that New Orleans’s judicial apparatus’ encountered when they tried to police
the state’s currency during the mid-nineteenth century.
While John Davis and Henry MaGinn’s counterfeiting operation focused on
counterfeiting several different bank bills of a variety of Louisiana banks, Elijah
Mallerson’s arrest in New Orleans reveals how counterfeit money from a distributor
swept several people up in New Orleans’ counterfeiting underworld. On May 28, 1853,
Henry Miller revealed in a sworn statement that Mallerson gave him a counterfeit twenty
on the Louisiana State Bank.108 Miller further informed the court that Mallerson told
Miller that he could make more counterfeit money of the same denomination and also
that he had the molds necessary to make counterfeit coin. According to Miller’s
testimony, Mallerson offered to sell Miller counterfeit twenties on the Louisiana State
Bank for the price of nine good dollars per bill. During Mallerson’s trial, Miller testified
that Mallerson told him that he was in contact with counterfeiters two hundred miles up
the Mississippi River. Miller noted that Mallerson claimed that the counterfeiters upriver
often sent him butter kegs filled with counterfeit bank bills that were then distributed
across New Orleans. With Miller’s statement, the First District court sought a search
warrant for Mallerson’s house, which they believed contained a large quantity of Bank of
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Louisiana banknote paper.109 Miller’s testimony hints at both Mallerson’s role as a
distributor in a larger counterfeiting network and reveals the extent of New Orleans’
counterfeiting underworld. Miller’s testimony also provides a glimpse into the ways that
counterfeiters in New Orleans knit the underground rural and urban counterfeiting
underworlds together that mirrored its capitalist counterpart.
Despite Henry Miller’s crucial role in implicating Elijah Mallerson in the region’s
counterfeiting underworld, the New Orleans First District Court still charged Miller with
a passing counterfeit banknotes, revealing that the gamble of turning state’s witness did
not always work out for the region’s counterfeiters. The court charged both Henry Miller
and a man named John Dyke with passing counterfeit banknotes on the State Bank of
Louisiana.110 Although the men pleaded not guilty to the charges on July 9, 1853, their
trial did not take place until December. While the court convicted John Dyke of the
charge and sentenced him to one year in the state penitentiary, Miller forfeited his one
thousand dollar bond and fled the state for California.111 For Miller, and his bondsmen,
the case cost more than the one thousand dollar forfeited bond. In early January 1854,
the state of Louisiana seized two lots in the city and planned to auction them off as
payment for Miller’s forfeited bond.112
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Elijah Mallerson’s distribution of counterfeit Bank of Louisiana banknotes caused
problems for several people in New Orleans that in turn reveals the lengthy time that
counterfeit currency could circulate in New Orleans long after its distributor was
removed from the scene. Other people appeared before the First District Court and in
New Orleans newspapers in connection with passing or possessing counterfeit money on
the Louisiana State Bank. The First District court indicted two men, Nicholas East and
Antonio Sasser for knowingly possessing counterfeit twenties on the Louisiana State
Bank.113 According to one newspaper, Elijah Mallerson implicated Sasser as a member
of the network when he confessed that Sasser brought a larger amount of counterfeit
money into Louisiana and that he and two others sold the fake money in New Orleans.114
In early January 1854, Pierre Mayer attempted, and failed, to pass a counterfeit twenty on
the Louisiana State Bank to another man.115 On July 1, 1854, New Orleans police
arrested Henry Myers for passing a counterfeit bill on the State Bank of Louisiana.116 In
August 1854, police arrested a man named Bishop for trying to pass a counterfeit twenty
on the Louisiana State Bank.117 Just a few days later, New Orleans police arrested a man
as he attempted to pass “one of those well executed counterfeit banknotes on the State
113
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Bank of Louisiana.”118 Also in September 1854, police in New Orleans arrested William
Stoepler for passing a counterfeit twenty on the State Bank of Louisiana and Elizabeth
Lane, for also passing a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill to a man.119 Through the above
arrests, it is clear that a prevalence of counterfeit money on the State Bank of Louisiana
circulated around New Orleans during 1853 and 1854. While no clear evidence exists
linking Elijah Mallerson to the above counterfeit money, Miller’s testimony that
Mallerson consistently received shipments of counterfeit money from counterfeiters up
the Mississippi River raise the strong possibility that Mallerson was, at the very least,
partially responsibly for some of the counterfeit State Bank of Louisiana notes that
circulated around New Orleans during the mid-1850s and entrapped several people in
New Orleans’ counterfeiting underworld.
The Crescent City’ counterfeiters embodied similar qualities as the counterfeiters who
operated along the Ohio River and in the New England States in the 1850s. The city
contained forgers of counterfeit coin who imported the city through the Gulf of Mexico
and attempted to pass it in the city’s bustling public markets and coffee houses. New
Orleans counterfeiters obtained bank plates, made presses, and dealt counterfeit notes in
bulk, occasionally bringing the money in from the Mississippi River. Female
counterfeiters in New Orleans benefitted from southern male’s inabilities to
conceptualize women who were intelligent enough to forge and distribute their own coins
on male shopkeepers and received lower prison sentences than their male counterparts.
118
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Counterfeiters appeared before the New Orleans First District Court, which almost as
often refused to pursue charges against them as it sent them to prison at the state
penitentiary. Unlike the other parts of the United States, however, New Orleans
counterfeiters rarely returned to the city’s underworld after they served time in the
Louisiana penitentiary at Baton Rouge. New Orleans’ punishment of counterfeiting
through its judicial system also served to deter the use of vigilante violence that other
parts of the Deep South employed to remove the counterfeiters in their midst. In short,
the New Orleans counterfeiting underworld mirrored the larger commercial capitalist
world of the late nineteenth-century United States: some counterfeiters managed to get
by and make a little money, some of them exploited the system for a bit of personal gain,
and some counterfeiters managed to get caught and punished for breaking Louisiana’s
counterfeiting laws. All of them, however, participated in an underground capitalist
system that carved out its own small niche in the Crescent City.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Counterfeiting peaked across the United States during the mid-nineteenth century
and declined towards the end of the Civil War. In the 1860s and 1870s, the recently
created U.S. Secret Service wielded the power of the federal government and set about
dismantling the nation’s counterfeiting underworld.1 The Secret Service’s extensive
powers allowed the agency to police the nation’s money supply more thoroughly than the
urban and rural police departments across the United States. By the end of the nineteenth
century, the nation’s counterfeiting underworld largely disappeared, with its practitioners
either deceased, locked up, or they had left counterfeiting altogether.2 Therefore, the preCivil War United States offers a glimpse into a time when individual states policed
counterfeiting during its heyday in an effort to ensure the integrity of their local
economies. Many of the pre-Civil War counterfeiters targeted the local economies along
the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to pass their counterfeit money. Other counterfeiters
established their operations in the two regions, particularly in Cincinnati and New
Orleans.
The policing of counterfeiting along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, shows how
counterfeiting operated in other parts of the United States, in particular how
counterfeiting worked in and along the slave states and how fake currencies entered into
the free and slave economies found along the two rivers. This story of counterfeiting
1

See Chapter Five: Dismantling the Money Market, in Johnson, David R. Illegal Tender: Counterfeiting
and the Secret Service in Nineteenth Century America. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995

2

Ibid.

208

reveals the power of Cincinnati and New Orleans over the surrounding countryside and
how their police and judicial systems pulled them further into their orbits. Cincinnati’s
police employed innovative policing techniques to infiltrate the Ohio River Valley
counterfeiting underworld and arrest its members, while New Orleans’ judicial system
sentenced counterfeiters to years in the state penitentiary. Although Cincinnati and New
Orleans’ civil servants embodied and carried out the infrastructural power of the state
along its geographical borders, rural areas along the Mississippi River in the Deep South
wielded vigilante violence in order to correct the local judicial system’s failures to punish
the criminals. When looked at from afar, however, the economies along the Ohio and
Mississippi Rivers functioned smoothly, meaning that municipal police, court systems,
and rural vigilantes effectively deterred counterfeiting. In turn, the largely successful
policing of counterfeiting in the Ohio and Mississippi River Valleys helped lay the
groundwork for the United States and capitalism’s westward expansions during the
second half of the nineteenth century.
The exploration of counterfeiting and policing along the Ohio and Mississippi
River Valleys during the mid-nineteenth century, reveals how two regions responded to
counterfeiting through state laws, municipal police, courtrooms, and vigilante violence.
Shifting our perspectives on counterfeiting from the northeastern United States towards
the Deep South and Midwest provides a view of how counterfeiting worked along and
within the system of slavery. By showing how counterfeiting worked outside of the
northeastern United States’ particular system of industrial capitalism, important
differences in the nation’s counterfeiting underworlds come to light. One key observation
that emerges from the study of counterfeiting and its policing along the Ohio and
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Mississippi River Valleys is that of two well-ordered regions, pacified through two
state’s infrastructural powers, represented by their police and court systems and
occasionally supplemented by vigilante violence, that served to protect the authority of
their respective states.
At the most basic level, the efforts of Cincinnati and New Orleans to deter
counterfeiting along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers shows how counterfeiting worked
in the river valleys. While the region’s counterfeiters largely operated within a similar
manner as their counterparts across the United States, the differences that emerged
between their operations reveals the regional variations found in both capitalism and
counterfeiting across the United States during the mid-nineteenth century. For example,
during the 1840s and 1850s counterfeiters in both Cincinnati and New Orleans devoted
extensive time and resources towards counterfeiting coins, indicating that a healthy
market for hard specie existed in the two cities. The desire for specie in the largest urban
centers on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers during the mid-nineteenth century indicates
that large portions of their populations preferred the currency of specie rather than the
fickle paper money that circulated throughout the United States. A preference for specie
over banknotes shows that large portions of the two river valleys still distrusted the
nation’s paper currency well into the 1850s. Paper money’s roles in facilitating the
economic transactions, investments, and speculations of nineteenth century capitalism
meant that people throughout the two areas distrusted key pieces of capitalism that
directed the United States’ economy during the nineteenth century.
Additionally, the study of counterfeiting in the Ohio and Mississippi River
Valleys reveals how municipal police and judicial systems policed counterfeiting in both
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their jurisdictions and throughout the two regions. In turn, adding the law enforcement
and judicial perspective to the story of counterfeiting provides a counter-narrative to the
perception that counterfeiting pervaded the nineteenth-century United States. The study
of counterfeiting and policing along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers during the midnineteenth century indicates that both Ohio and Louisiana devoted significant resources
to a crime that appeared to occur not all that often, at least from the view of the state. By
adding the police’s perspective to the study of counterfeiting we see how Cincinnati’s
law enforcement penetrated the many state, municipal, and political borders found
throughout the Ohio River Valley in their pursuits of the region’s counterfeiters. The
Cincinnati police’s dogged pursuit of counterfeiters in the Ohio River Valley challenges a
larger narrative that casts the U.S. police as both unwitting and willing accomplices of the
nation’s counterfeiters that in turn gave a de facto acceptance of counterfeiting.
Furthermore the study of the Cincinnati police shows how one municipal police in the
Midwestern United States negotiated their duties along the borders of slavery that adds to
our understanding of how policing worked in the nineteenth-century United States. In
turn, the study of New Orleans’ police reveals how the Crescent City police wielded their
powers beyond the policing of slavery and applied them to New Orleans’ various social
classes.
The persistency of the Cincinnati police’s efforts to pursue and arrest the region’s
counterfeiters throughout the 1850s caught the attention of the surrounding rural towns,
whose elected officials requested the department’s help to arrest their counterfeiters. The
requests for help demonstrate an important deviation between how counterfeiting worked
in the Ohio River Valley and how it functioned in the northeastern United States. First,

211

unlike towns in the New England states who viewed counterfeiters as providing a public
service, and therefore tolerated their presence, rural towns in the Ohio River Valley
actively removed the counterfeiters in their midst. Rather than allowing counterfeiters to
operate with impunity, the towns along the Ohio River turned to Cincinnati’s powerful
police force to aid their fight against counterfeiting. The Ohio River Valley’s desire to
deter counterfeiting contrasts sharply with the de facto tolerance for the crime that existed
across the northeastern United States.
The rural town’s requests to the Cincinnati police for help in their fights against
their local counterfeiters reveals another way that U.S. cities pulled the surrounding
hinterlands into their orbits. Urban historians have already revealed the economic links
that nineteenth-century cities like Chicago forged with the rural countryside, pulling
goods, people, and services into their orbits.3 Chicago’s economic links to its
surrounding hinterlands provides key proof of how cities across the United States created
markets that allowed the city to assert its economic control over the surrounding areas.
For Americans living near and around cities like Cincinnati and New Orleans, however,
uniformed law enforcement provided a more visible and direct representation of the city’s
influence and reach into their lives during the mid-nineteenth century. As such, local
accounts detailing the city’s role in policing their town and the surrounding rural areas
provides an additional vantage point through which rural American’s confronted the
growing power and reach of cities during the mid-nineteenth century. When rural towns
asked Cincinnati for help, it indicates that they actively sought the city’s help in dealing

3

Cronin, William. Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West. New York: W.W. Norton and
Company Inc., 1991.

212

with a problem that was beyond their town’s power to address. Through the policing of
counterfeiting, the relationships between the rural and urban United States appears more
cooperative than antagonistic. Furthermore, Americans living well beyond Cincinnati, in
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, and Virginia also confronted the power of Cincinnati’s police
and the reach of the city’s influence, when its police arrived in their towns and arrested
the counterfeiters in their midst. By removing counterfeiters from the surrounding
regions, Cincinnati’s, and to a lesser extent, New Orleans’ law enforcement reveals the
urban center’s extensive reach throughout the Ohio and Mississippi River Valleys,
connecting the regions together in previously unknown ways.
The hidden connections that knit the Ohio River Valley together in its efforts to
deter counterfeiting sharply reveals its cohesion and stability that in turn contrasts with a
national view of the region. Recent borderland histories of the Ohio River stress the
economic, political, and social interconnectedness of the region prior to the Civil War.4
The policing of counterfeiting in the Ohio River Valley shows how police and criminals
forged additional links between the nation’s free and slave states that further pulled the
region together. Cincinnati police pursued counterfeiters throughout the Ohio River
Valley and arrested them in Kentucky, Virginia, Indiana, and Illinois, and then brought
them back to Cincinnati for a trial. The rural communities in slave Kentucky allowed the
Cincinnati police to operate in their jurisdictions, while Kentucky and Ohio police
worked together to arrest counterfeiters in Ohio. The department’s joint efforts to deter
counterfeiting indicate that a close relationship existed between Ohio and Kentucky’s
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police. Additionally, the circulation of counterfeit money on both sides of the river
demonstrate the ways that an illicit economy that dealt in fake currencies connected the
free and slave economies together, forging links between the two that penetrated the Ohio
River. Therefore, rather than a political border that separated the country’s free and slave
states, the Ohio River emerges as a conduit that helps us better understand the
complicated and interconnected relationships that formed between the slave and free
states prior to the Civil War.
The Ohio River Valley’s efforts to police and control counterfeiting through the
power of the state sharply contrasts with how the rural Deep South dealt with
counterfeiting along the Mississippi River. Yet, despite the Deep South’s violent
responses to counterfeiting, their actions indicate the importance of both safeguarding
their local economic transactions from counterfeiting and supplementing the state’s
power in the region. More importantly, the violent and vigilante rural responses to
counterfeiting along the Mississippi River in the 1840s contained roots in Mississippi’s
past encounters with the mythic “Murrell” gang in the 1830s and with gamblers in
Vicksburg in 1835. Following the violent reprisals against suspected gang members and
gamblers, the justifications that emerged to defend the Deep South’s actions to the rest of
the United States contained within them the seeds of an argument that reveals the
region’s investment in the ethos of capitalism. For example, in 1835 people in Vicksburg
believed that local gamblers wrongfully obtained wealth through speculation. In turn,
gambling offered a shortcut to wealth accumulation that sharply contrasted with
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acquiring wealth through diligent hard labor.5 Vicksburg’s views towards wealth
accumulation easily fit in the ethos of industrial capitalism found in the northeastern
United States.6 As such, by removing the counterfeiters and gamblers from the area,
people across Mississippi reinforced the importance of acquiring wealth through hard
work, a key tenet of capitalism’s in the nineteenth-century United States. When
newspapers reported that local counterfeiters were suspected members of the Murrell
gang and were dealt with accordingly, those actions can be viewed as another effort by
the Deep South to protect the ethos and system of capitalism in the United States. In
doing so, the vigilante’s employed different methods to deter counterfeiting than the
police and court systems used in New Orleans and Cincinnati. However, all of the actors,
the urban police, municipal court systems, and rural vigilantes, pursued a similar goal:
the policing and protection of the economic transactions that underwrote the basic levels
of the nation’s capitalist system during the nineteenth century.
Counterfeiting along the rural Mississippi River in the Deep South also provides
important evidence that the region contained pieces of counterfeiting networks, such as
dealers and shovers, that furthers our knowledge of how counterfeiting and capitalism
worked across the United States during the mid-nineteenth century. While the research
reveals that parts of the Deep South contained aspects of counterfeiting, other places like
New Orleans contained actual counterfeiters, an important contribution that helps show
that the region also reckoned with the consequences of counterfeiting. Records from
New Orleans’ First District Criminal Court, supplemented by newspaper accounts, from
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the 1840s and 1850s, paint a picture of a fully functional counterfeiting underworld. New
Orleans’ counterfeiting system contained the necessary structure, in the form of
counterfeiters, dealers, and shovers that allowed it to spread counterfeit currency
throughout the Deep South. Upon closer inspection, however, New Orleans’
counterfeiting underworld contained minor variances that are revealing of both the local
counterfeiting and capitalist economies. New Orleans counterfeiters created specie that
hints at a preference for hard money in the Deep South and the city’s counterfeiting
underworld imported counterfeit coin from Texas and the Mississippi River. A
preference for hard specie shows that some people in New Orleans still distrusted the
nation’s banking system. The importation of fake currency from Texas and the
Mississippi River shows how New Orleans’ illicit economy worked alongside and within
its legitimate one, as both acted to import and export goods to New Orleans from across
the nation. While the vigilante violence that characterized responses to counterfeiting
along the rural Mississippi River in the Deep South in the 1830s and 1840s is jarring,
New Orleans’ urban counterfeiting underworld in the 1850s would not have been out of
place alongside Cincinnati’s in the Midwest. The similarities between the counterfeiting
underworlds of the Midwest and South means that by shifting our prospective on
counterfeiting from the industrialized northeast, we gain a clearer and more
representative understanding of how counterfeiting and policing worked in other regions
of the United States during the nineteenth century.
By better understanding how municipal law enforcement and counterfeiting
worked in the Midwest and Deep South, the failure of the northeast to act in a similar
manner shows just one of the ways the region functioned as an outlier from the rest of the
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United States during the 1840s and 1850s. A focus on the failure of local police to deter
counterfeiting in the northeastern United States creates a narrative of a weak police, and a
weak state, unable or unwilling to arrest the counterfeiters in their midst. By applying a
narrative of the northeastern United States’ inabilities or unwillingness to police
counterfeiting to the rest of the country, counterfeiters appeared to operate with impunity
across the nation during the nineteenth century. Moreover, the conclusion of the above
narrative argues that state’s failed to deter counterfeiting to any significant degree until
the arrival of a federal policing agency in the form of the Secret Service. A closer
examination of both the Cincinnati and New Orleans police demonstrates that the above
narrative is not entirely accurate, as many places across the United States were hostile
towards counterfeiting. Therefore, in order to better understand counterfeiting’s
prevalence during the nineteenth century, we need to also focus on the parts of the United
States that were inhospitable to the crime and hostile to its practitioners that in turn
reveals sharp contrasts with counterfeiting in the northeastern United States.
Furthermore, within a narrative of the government’s policing of counterfeiting
through the Secret Service, counterfeiting in the United States only declines after the
agency eradicated the crime in the second-half of the nineteenth century. From a federal
perspective, individual states appear weak, unwilling and unable to police a crime that
appeared to have an outsized impact on the social and economic worlds of the nineteenthcentury United States. By reframing the story to include the perspectives of the municipal
police of Cincinnati and New Orleans, however, an entirely different picture emerges,
one in which the who municipal police departments and judicial systems went to
extensive lengths to deter the crime. Cincinnati police willingly pursued and arrested
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counterfeiters throughout the Ohio River Valley, while New Orleans’ judicial system
sentenced the city’s counterfeiters to lengthy prison sentences between the 1840s and
1860s. Prior to the arrival of the Secret Service in the late 1860s, both Cincinnati and
New Orleans, while not fully eradicating the crime within their jurisdictions, were more
than willing to devote the necessary resources towards deterring counterfeiting during the
mid-nineteenth century. Thus, at the very least, two states in the Midwest and South set
the groundwork for dismantling counterfeiting networks that the Secret Service adopted
years later.
Indeed, all of the literature on counterfeiting situates the Secret Service as the key
institution that brought an end to its prevalence in the United States after the Civil War.7
There is no argument that the Secret Service played a critical role in counterfeiting’s
decline after the Civil War. But without the numbers to establish its frequency across the
United States prior to the Civil War, however, it is difficult to establish just how much
counterfeiting actually declined after the establishment of the Secret Service. If we base
our perspective on counterfeiting’s frequency before the Civil War on anecdotal
accounts, such as those found in the nation’s newspapers, then it appears that thousands
of counterfeiters operated with impunity across the United States. Such a perspective
means that the Secret Service’s dismantling of the nation’s counterfeiting system in the
late nineteenth century resulted in a dramatic decline. By basing our perspective on preCivil War counterfeiting on non-anecdotal evidence, such as crime statistics found in
state documents, then an initial impression emerges in which counterfeiting’s decline in
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the late nineteenth century appears to be less severe. In order to gain a clearer picture of
counterfeiting’s pre-Civil War prevalence, however, we need to obtain additional
numbers from other states detailing their encounters with counterfeiting. Ohio and
Louisiana’s numbers regarding counterfeiting suggests that in the United States, it was
not as widespread as it appears in other literatures and that its decline in the late
nineteenth century may not have been as extensive as it appears in other accounts on the
subject.
Moving towards a broader and theoretical perspective, the exploration of
alternative counterfeiting underworlds beyond the northeastern United States offers
historians an unusual model to study the reach of American state power during the midnineteenth century. By grounding stories of counterfeiting in the United States in a
narrative that emphasizes the counterfeiter’s abilities to flummox police, flout state laws
with little or no consequences, and exploit political and geographical boundaries to evade
capture, earlier works on counterfeiting reveal a weak state, one that failed to protect the
integrity of its currency and its economy. The policing of counterfeiting from the
municipal level, through Ohio and Louisiana’s statutes, their law enforcement, and their
judicial systems, reveals a different perspective of power and reach of the nineteenthcentury American state. The municipal policing of counterfeiting shows how the Ohio
and Louisiana’s civil servants carried out the state’s regulatory powers over their
respective economies. Both the Ohio and Mississippi River functioned as geographical
and political borders in the United States and the state’s ability to assert its will over these
places provides key examples of its power. Cincinnati and New Orleans deterred
counterfeiting in their regions to such an extent that the local economic systems worked,
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despite the continued presence of counterfeiters and their currencies in the region. While
rural vigilantes on the Mississippi River were not civil servants, they still pursued a
similar goal in that they wanted to protect state institutions, in the form of the local
judicial systems, from the counterfeiter’s abilities to subvert its authority. The vigilante’s
did not want to overthrow the state, nor did they seek to alter its institutions through
violence. Rather vigilantes in the Deep South sought to reinforce the state’s power that
helped protect its standing in the Mississippi River Valley. Therefore, the rural vigilantes,
municipal police and court systems pursued a common goal, the eradication of
counterfeiting in their midst, that contributes evidence to the argument that the
nineteenth-century American state was more powerful than we previously realized.
The policing of counterfeiting along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers during the
mid-nineteenth century reveals a story about one of the ways that the state pacified and
incorporated territory to spread both its borders, and the system of capitalism, westward
during the nineteenth century. Cincinnati’s police, New Orleans’ First District Criminal
Court, and even the violent actions of rural vigilantes provides evidence of the state’s
efforts to police capitalism in the Ohio and Mississippi River Valleys during the midnineteenth century. The policing of capitalism through the deterrence of counterfeiting
meant that states tried to regulate and protect the basic exchanges that characterized the
lowest levels of the nation’s capitalist system from counterfeiting. In doing so, civil
servants and vigilantes played crucial roles in laying the groundwork for capitalism to
ingratiate within, and then absorb, the Ohio and Mississippi river economies before it
continued spreading west across the United States. Yet, historians who study capitalism
and its expansion across the United States during the nineteenth century tend to focus on
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how markets and institutions acted as the catalysts to bring a region under capitalism’s
sway. In doing so, these historians overlook the equally important roles that civil
servants of the state, such as the police, judges, and juries, played in helping capitalism
spread west. Taking a larger view, neither the United States, nor capitalism, could
incorporate new territory in the West or across the Deep South without first ensuring the
integrity of the system along places like the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. Nineteenthcentury municipal police, urban court systems, and even rural vigilantes, all played
critical roles in deterring counterfeiting along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers during the
mid-nineteenth century. In turn, their efforts to police counterfeiting along the two river
valley’s contributed to capitalism’s spread west, thus fulfilling the economic manifest of
the United States’ destiny.
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